Green v. Wilson
| Decision Date | 22 July 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 9,Docket Nos. 104028,104034 and 104039,9 |
| Parties | Diane B. GREEN and Leslie Lynn Martin, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Fraser Robert WILSON, and Jason Enterprises, Inc., doing business as The Booby Trap Lounge, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellants, and Vivio's Inc., d/b/a Vivio's Food and Spirits, Defendant-Appellant. Calendar |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Addis & Imbrunone, P.C. by Thomas L. Imbrunone, Royal Oak, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Plunkett & Cooney, P.C. by Ernest R. Bazzana, Detroit, for defendant-appellant Robert Wilson.
Kallas & Henk, P.C. by Theodore M. Kozerski, Bloomfield Hills, for defendant-appellant Jason Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a The Booby Trap Lounge.
Morrison, Morrison & Finley by Gregory W. Finley, Detroit, for defendant Vivios, Inc., d/b/a Vivio's Food and Spirits.
This case presents two issues: 1) whether Michigan courts may exercise limited personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who becomes intoxicated in Michigan, chooses to drive intoxicated in Michigan, and causes an accident in another jurisdiction, and 2) whether compliance with the name-and-retain provision of the dramshop act will be excused when the allegedly intoxicated person is dismissed from litigation for lack of personal jurisdiction. M.C.L. § 436.22(6); M.S.A. § 18.993(6). We conclude that defendant Fraser Wilson's acts in Michigan that preceded his allegedly tortious acts in Canada were insufficient to subject him to subsection (2) of M.C.L. § 600.705; M.S.A. § 27A.705. Therefore, we would reverse the Court of Appeals determination that Michigan courts may exercise limited personal jurisdiction over him.
As Wilson cannot be retained in the suit, it is necessary to determine whether the dramshop action against defendants Jason Enterprises and Vivio's was properly dismissed. We conclude that the failure to retain Wilson was due to a jurisdictional defect that plaintiffs could not avoid. We also conclude that fear of collusion between plaintiffs and defendant Wilson is significantly reduced in this case. Under the circumstances, strict compliance with the name-and-retain provision would frustrate the purpose of the Dramshop Act. Consequently, we would affirm the Court of Appeals decision that allows a continuation of the dramshop action against defendants Jason Enterprises and Vivio's.
Plaintiffs Diane Green and Leslie Lynn Martin, both residents of Michigan, and defendant Wilson, a resident of Ontario, were Plaintiffs sued Wilson for negligence in Wayne Circuit Court and instituted dramshop actions against defendants Vivio's, Inc. and Jason Enterprises, Inc. Both Vivio's and Jason Enterprises operate bars in the City of Detroit. In their complaint, plaintiffs allege that both establishments served alcohol to Wilson while he was visibly intoxicated. Plaintiffs also assert that the accident occurred when Wilson was returning home from the defendant bars.
involved in an automobile accident in the Detroit-Windsor tunnel. The accident occurred in Canada, approximately one thousand yards south of the Michigan-Ontario border. Plaintiffs allege that Wilson was exceeding the speed limit when his car crossed the center line and collided head-on with their car. Plaintiffs further allege that Wilson was intoxicated.
Wilson moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(1), arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The trial court granted the motion, holding that Wilson was not within the reach of Michigan's long-arm statute, M.C.L. § 600.705; M.S.A. § 27A.705. The trial court also dismissed the dramshop actions against Jason Enterprises and Vivio's, because the plaintiffs failed to retain the allegedly intoxicated person as a defendant. 1 The Court of Appeals held that Michigan courts do have jurisdiction over Wilson for the purposes of this litigation. The Court further held that compliance with the name-and-retain clause of the dramshop act would be excused when the allegedly intoxicated person is dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. 211 Mich.App. 140, 535 N.W.2d 233 (1995). We granted leave to appeal. 453 Mich. 900, 554 N.W.2d 321 (1996).
A personal jurisdiction analysis is a two-fold inquiry: (1) do the defendant's acts fall within the applicable long-arm statute, and (2) does the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant comport with due process? Starbrite Distributing v. Excelda Mfg. Co., 454 Mich. 302, 562 N.W.2d 640 (1997). It is useful to review the history and interplay between state long-arm statutes and the Due Process Clause 2 before applying them in this case.
The United States Supreme Court expanded the constitutional scope of personal jurisdiction with its decision in Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). In Int'l Shoe, the Court interpreted the Due Process Clause as not conferring jurisdiction. Rather, it construed the clause as establishing the outer limits of permissible jurisdictional power. The actual grant of personal jurisdiction comes from legislative long-arm statutes that invest courts with the power to exercise personal jurisdiction. 3
Long-arm statutes establish the nature, character, and types of contacts that must exist for purposes of exercising personal jurisdiction. Due process, on the other hand, restricts permissible long-arm jurisdiction by defining the quality of contacts necessary to justify personal jurisdiction under the constitution. See Hadad v. Lewis, 382 F.Supp. 1365, 1371 (E.D.Mich., 1974). Thus, situations may arise where a long-arm statute permits greater jurisdiction than does the constitution. 4 See Starbrite at 315, 562 N.W.2d 640 (Weaver, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Likewise, there may be instances where a state court will lack the power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, even though jurisdiction may be constitutionally permissible. See Mallory v There are primarily two types of long-arm statutes: the "self-adjusting," such as the California long-arm statute, and the "laundry-list," such as Michigan's M.C.L. § 600.705; M.S.A. § 27A.705. The California statute has been called self-adjusting because it stretches automatically to extend jurisdiction wherever the Due Process Clause permits. Like a complete solar eclipse, the due process and statutory analyses overlap entirely. Therefore, only a one-step analysis is necessary. Glannon, Civil Procedure, Examples and Explanations (2d ed.), pp. 24-27.
Conida Warehouses, 113 Mich.App. 280, 286-288, 317 N.W.2d 597 (1982).
Laundry-list statutes enumerate specific acts that give rise to personal jurisdiction. They do not permit a one-step analysis, even in circumstances where they are thought to be "coextensive" with due process. Their analysis is akin to a partial solar eclipse, with part of the statute granting jurisdiction within the permissible constitutional scope and part of the statute possibly outside it. Id.
The Sifers' Court is the first in Michigan that was credited with stating the concept that limited personal jurisdiction is coextensive with due process. Since Sifers, many Michigan state and federal courts have interpreted Michigan long-arm statutes as coextensive with due process. 5 In Sifers, the Court stated:
We are called upon in this case to construe a Michigan statute which represents an attempt on the part of the Michigan legislature to expand to its full potential limited personal jurisdiction of Michigan courts over nonresidents.
Unless we are prepared to say that Michigan is forbidden by the Federal Constitution to exercise jurisdiction to the extent indicated in the statute we should not construe the statute so restrictively. [Sifers v. Horen, 385 Mich. 195, 198, 188 N.W.2d 623 (1971) (emphasis added).]
We interpret Sifers to mean that, if a defendant's actions or status fit within a provision of a long-arm statute, jurisdiction may be extended as far as due process permits. 6 The long-arm statute is coextensive with due process insofar as the statute is limited by due process, and, therefore, the statute and due process share the same outer boundary. The reasoning implicit in Mallory supports this interpretation. Mallory, supra at 286-288, 317 N.W.2d 597.
In Mallory, the Court of Appeals determined that none of the statutory grounds for personal jurisdiction permitted the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a sister state. Id. at 286-287, 317 N.W.2d 597. It reasoned that the Legislature did not intend to permit such a suit in Michigan, regardless of what due process would allow. Consequently, there was no need to conduct a due process analysis. Id. at 288, 317 N.W.2d 597.
The coextensive nature of Michigan's long-arm jurisdiction becomes pertinent only if the particular acts or status of a defendant first fit within a long-arm statute provision. As the Mallory Court implicitly concluded, this does not mean that the two are equal The provisions enumerated in § 705 would be superfluous if the Legislature intended that any activity that is constitutional also satisfy a long-arm statute. Furthermore, the Michigan Legislature could have written language into the statutes that confers jurisdiction to the broadest limits of due process, as other states have done. It chose not to do so. 7
and require a single inquiry based solely upon due process restrictions.
The State of Michigan may exercise limited personal jurisdiction over Wilson if two conditions are met: First, Wilson's conduct must fall within a provision of Michigan's long-arm statutes. Second, the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with due process. Starbrite, supra.
The state's long-arm statute pertaining to acquiring limited personal jurisdiction over individuals on the basis of specific acts is codified at M.C.L. § 600.705; M.S.A. § 27A.705. It states:
The existence of any of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Oberlies v. Searchmont Resort, Inc., Docket No. 220485.
...a provision of a Michigan long-arm statute and whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process. Green v. Wilson, 455 Mich. 342, 351, 565 N.W.2d 813 (1997); Aaronson v. Lindsay & Hauer Int'l Ltd., 235 Mich.App. 259, 262, 597 N.W.2d 227 (1999). Long-arm statutes delineate the n......
-
Lease Acceptance Corp. v. Adams
...character, and types of contacts that must exist for purposes of exercising personal jurisdiction. Green v. Wilson, 455 Mich. 342, 348, 565 N.W.2d 813 (1997) (opinion by Knell, J.). Under Michigan law, personal jurisdiction can be established by "[c]onset, to the extent authorized by the co......
-
Ajuba Int'l, L.L.C. v. Saharia
...inquiry. Air Products and Controls, Inc. v. Safetech Int'l, Inc., 503 F.3d 544, 550 (6th Cir.2007); see also Green v. Wilson, 455 Mich. 342, 565 N.W.2d 813, 815 (1997). First, “the court must determine whether any of Michigan's relevant long-arm statutes authorize the exercise of jurisdicti......
-
Audi Ag and Volkswagon of America, Inc. v. D'Amato
...(citing Michigan Coalition of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 954 F.2d 1174, 1176 (6th Cir.1992); Green v. Wilson, 455 Mich. 342, 565 N.W.2d 813 (1997)). In order to comply with the Due Process Clause, the plaintiff must establish that significant minimum contacts exist suf......