Green v. Zendrian, Civil Action No. S 95-439.

• Decision Date: 14 February 1996
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. S 95-439.
• Citation: 916 F. Supp. 493
• Parties: Joseph B. GREEN; Cheryl D. Hailey v. James M. ZENDRIAN; John P. Jendricks; Samuel F. Bosley, III; George O. Smith; and Deirdre A. Hill.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

916 F. Supp. 493

Joseph B. GREEN; Cheryl D. Hailey v. James M. ZENDRIAN; John P. Jendricks; Samuel F. Bosley, III; George O. Smith; and Deirdre A. Hill.

Civil Action No. S 95-439.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

February 14, 1996.

Paul R. Kramer, Baltimore, MD, Allan Heneson, Gordon & Heneson, Baltimore, MD, for Plaintiffs.

Paul D. Shelton, Piper & Marbury, Baltimore, MD, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SMALKIN, District Judge.

This civil rights action arose out of an incident in which the plaintiffs, Joseph Green and Cheryl Hailey, were arrested by officers of the Baltimore City Police Department. The plaintiffs' subsequent twelve-count complaint against the officers, which was filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, included claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, four Maryland common law torts, and two constitutional torts arising under the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The case was removed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446. On February 1, 1996, shortly after the transfer of the case to the undersigned, this Court sent a letter to counsel, advising them that it was inclined to exercise its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the many claims based on state law. In its letter, the Court advised counsel that it would hear argument on the jurisdictional issues prior to trial on February 6, 1996. Although the plaintiffs expressed a preference to have all claims tried in this Court, the defendants did not object to the Court's decision. The plaintiffs requested that the state claims be remanded to the state court, rather than dismissed without prejudice, so that the plaintiffs would not incur the additional expense of reinstituting the litigation. The defendants made no objection to the plaintiffs' proposal.¹ Accordingly, this Court entered an order remanding the state causes of action to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The federal claims were then tried, resulting in a jury verdict and/or judgments as a matter of law in favor of all defendants. This opinion sets forth the reasons for the Court's declination of supplemental jurisdiction. In that it is entered after completion of the trial, some reference will be made to certain facts that emerged at trial.

A. Facts

On December 29, 1994, the plaintiffs, Joseph Green and Cheryl Hailey, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, naming as defendants James Zendrian, John Jendrek, Samuel Bosley, George Smith, and Dierdre Hill. Each of the defendants was a member of the Baltimore City Police Department at the time of the acts in suit. On February 13, 1995, the case was removed to this Court.

The incident giving rise to the complaint was the warrantless arrest of Hailey and Green in the early morning of February 20, 1994, in Hailey's apartment. The parties' pre-trial submissions and the evidence at trial both showed that the resolution of the federal aspects of the case would depend upon whether the plaintiffs' or the defendants' account of the incident was more credible to the jury. It was undisputed both that Green had been injured by the force used to effect his arrest and that the police officers had probable cause to arrest him.² The plaintiffs alleged that the officers attacked and unjustifiably beat Green, even though Green was not resisting arrest. The defendants, by contrast, asserted that Green had been "abusive and uncooperative," and that they had used only reasonable force to take him into custody.

The parties gave similarly irreconcilable accounts of Ms. Hailey's conduct. According to the plaintiffs, Ms. Hailey had stood quietly while Green was being beaten by the police, mildly remonstrating with some of the defendants. According to the defendants, Hailey screamed, became hysterical, and tried to intervene physically on Green's behalf. The parties agreed that Hailey was arrested at the scene and later charged with the common law offense of obstructing or hindering a police officer in the performance of official duties.

During the early stages of trial, it became clear that each plaintiff was asserting a separate violation of the Fourth Amendment which might give rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Green's federal cause of action was based upon a theory that the police used excessive force to arrest him, whereas Hailey alleged that the police had arrested her without probable cause. There was no evidence to support any allegation that the plaintiffs' civil rights had been violated in any other way, and the plaintiffs' lawyers accordingly acknowledged that each plaintiff was proceeding upon his or her single substantive theory as described above. In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had conspired to commit the substantive violations of their federal civil rights. Consequently, all federal issues for trial turned upon the jury's factual determinations with respect to the events of February 20, 1994.

As noted ante, the federal causes of action were originally accompanied by numerous claims under Maryland law. The plaintiffs had sought to recover damages for assault, battery, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and violations of their rights under Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages in connection with both the federal and the state claims.

B. Analysis

There is no doubt that this Court could, in its discretion, have exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' state claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) ("the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over ... claims that are so related to claims in the action within the original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy....") Nonetheless, under the circumstances of the case, sound discretion counselled against this Court's exercising that supplemental jurisdiction. Subsection (c) of § 1367 sets out four categories of circumstances in which a district court may, in its discretion, decline jurisdiction over state claims. This case presented three of the four: a complex and novel issue of Maryland law, (§ 1367(c)(1)); state claims that substantially predominate over the federal claims (§ 1367(c)(2)); and exceptional circumstances that provide compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction (§ 1367(c)(4)).

The federal issues in this case were straightforward. The Supreme Court held in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), that an arrest made with excessive force violates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures and may therefore form the basis of a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Graham opinion clearly set forth a number of factors that a jury might consider in assessing whether the force used to effect an arrest is reasonable. 490 U.S. at 396-397, 109 S.Ct. at 1872. Likewise, the circumstances under which an arrest made without probable cause may violate the Fourth Amendment are well-established in this Circuit. See Clipper v. Takoma Park, 876 F.2d 17, 19 (4th Cir.1989), and cases there cited. Finally, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Hafner v. Brown, 983 F.2d 570 (4th Cir.1992), clearly articulates the legal standards applicable to the plaintiffs' conspiracy claim.

Both the applicable Fourth Amendment law and the law of conspiracy to violate federal civil rights could readily be applied to the facts of the case. The disposition of each federal claim turned on the jury's factual determinations with respect to the underlying factual dispute. By contrast, the plaintiffs' state law claims created a morass of complicated and overlapping issues of fact and law.

a. The case presented a serious issue of state constitutional law

This Court may decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state claim which "raises a novel or complex issue of State law," or where "there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) & (c)(4). Mr. Green and Ms. Hailey's action raised a serious issue of first impression with respect to the interpretation of Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, namely whether an arrest made with excessive force violates Article 26. The question is a difficult one and should, for reasons of comity, be resolved by the courts of Maryland.

This Court has been unable to find any Maryland decision holding that an arrest made with excessive force violates Article 26. Ordinarily, this Court could determine whether an excessive force claim is cognizable under Article 26 by reference to well-established interpretive principles of Maryland law. With regard to the particular constitutional question at issue here, however, Maryland's two best-entrenched principles of constitutional construction lead to opposite conclusions.

The first principle of Maryland constitutional interpretation directs courts to give effect to the plain language of the constitution. As Judge J. Dudley Digges wrote for the Court of Appeals,

"generally speaking, the same rules that are applicable to the construction of statutory language are employed in interpreting constitutional verbiage ... Accordingly, it is axiomatic that the words used in the enactment should be given the construction that effectuates the intent of its framers ...; such intent is first sought from the terminology used in the provision, with each word being given its ordinary and popularly understood meaning ...; and, if the words are not ambiguous, the inquiry is terminated, for the Court is not at liberty to search beyond the Constitution itself where the intention of the framers is clearly demonstrated by the phraseology utilized."

Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273, 277-278, 412 A.2d 396, 398-399 (1980) (citations omitted). See also Luppino v. Gray, 336 Md. 194, 204 n. 8, 647 A.2d 429, 434 n. 8 (1994); Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 511, 374 A.2d 900, 902 (1977); ...