Greene Cty. Agricultural Soc. v. Liming

• Decision Date: 06 September 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-1755.,99-1755.
• Citation: 89 Ohio St.3d 551,733 NE 2d 1141
• Parties: GREENE COUNTY AGRICULTURAL SOCIETY, APPELLEE, v. LIMING ET AL., APPELLANTS; MANGAN, APPELLEE.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

89 Ohio St.3d 551

733 NE 2d 1141

GREENE COUNTY AGRICULTURAL SOCIETY, APPELLEE, v. LIMING ET AL., APPELLANTS; MANGAN, APPELLEE.

No. 99-1755.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted May 23, 2000.

Decided September 6, 2000.

Freund, Freeze & Arnold, Neil F. Freund and Lynnette Pisone Ballato, for appellees Greene County Agricultural Society and Larry T. Mangan.

David M. Deutsch Co., L.P.A., and David M. Deutsch, for appellants. Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Barbara A. Serve and Peter M. Thomas, Assistant Attorneys General, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Department of Agriculture.

King & Blair and James F. Blair, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Fair Managers Association.

ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.

The sole issue presented for review is whether the Society is entitled to immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744, so that summary judgment was appropriate as a matter of law.¹ In the circumstances of this case, this issue has two components: (1) Is the Society a political subdivision for purposes of R.C. Chapter 2744? and (2) If the answer to the first question is yes, was the Society engaged in a governmental function in performing the actions at issue? For the reasons that follow, we find that the Society is not immune from suit, and accordingly reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

I

Since R.C. Chapter 2744 deals with Political Subdivision Tort Liability, the first question we must answer is whether the Society, as a county agricultural society, is a "political subdivision." If, as appellants contend, the Society is not a political subdivision, then R.C. Chapter 2744 does not apply to it, it is not immune from suit for that reason, and our inquiry is at an end. If, on the other hand, the Society is a political subdivision, then we must further consider, as the second component of our inquiry, how other provisions of R.C. Chapter 2744 apply to this case.

R.C. 2744.01(F) defines a "political subdivision" as "a municipal corporation, township, county, school district, or other body corporate and politic responsible for governmental activities in a geographic area smaller than that of the state." R.C. 2744.01(F) then goes on to set forth a nonexhaustive list of particular bodies that fall within the above definition. County agricultural societies are not specifically mentioned in the statute.

Since the Society does not fall within any of the other groups listed in R.C. 2744.01(F), for it to be a political subdivision it must be a "body corporate and politic responsible for governmental activities." It is clear that a county agricultural society exists "in a geographic area smaller than that of the state," so that statutory requirement is easily met.

R.C. Chapter 1711 provides for the establishment, organization, and functioning of county agricultural societies. R.C. 1711.13 explicitly provides that "[c]ounty agricultural societies are hereby declared bodies corporate and politic." Therefore, if county agricultural societies are "responsible for governmental activities," then all requirements of R.C. 2744.01(F) are met to qualify the Society for status as a political subdivision.

Black's Law Dictionary (7 Ed.1999) 167, defines "body politic" as "[a] group of people regarded in a political (rather than private) sense and organized under a single governmental authority."

This exact issue of whether a county agricultural society is a political subdivision as contemplated in R.C. 2744.01(F) was considered by the Attorney General of Ohio in 1988 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 88-034. The issue arose in the context of considering whether a county agricultural society was a political subdivision that could establish and maintain a self-insurance program under R.C. 2744.08(A)(2)(a) to cover tort liability claims against it and whether a county agricultural society was a political subdivision that could join with other political subdivisions in establishing and maintaining a joint self-insurance pool under R.C. 2744.081(A) to pay tort judgments, settlements, and the like relating to acts or omissions of the political subdivision or its employees. In order to undertake those actions, a county agricultural society first had to qualify as a political subdivision pursuant to R.C. 2744.01(F).

In that opinion, the Attorney General determined that a county agricultural society is a political subdivision and so could undertake the insurance actions at issue relating to tort claims against it. Similarly to the framework of the discussion we have set out above, the Attorney General stated that the only requirement of R.C. 2744.01(F) that required a "detailed analysis" was whether a county agricultural society is responsible for governmental activities.

The Attorney General acknowledged that "[c]ertainly, county agricultural societies possess some characteristics that suggest that their activities are not governmental." However, the Attorney General nevertheless concluded that county agricultural societies are responsible for governmental activities, and therefore are political subdivisions under R.C. 2744.01(F).

The Attorney General reasoned that "the primary purpose of county agricultural societies has repeatedly been identified as education." The Attorney General quoted from State ex rel. Leaverton v. Kerns (1922), 104 Ohio St. 550, 554-555, 136 N.E. 217, 218: "[A]n agricultural fair is * * * a public institution designed for public instruction, the advancement of learning and the dissemination of useful knowledge." The Attorney General also pointed out that under R.C. 1711.10, the Director of Agriculture may withhold funds for a particular county agricultural society if it is shown that the fair put on by that agricultural society was not of sufficient educational value to justify the expenditure of those funds. The Attorney General further pointed out that "the promotion of educational goals traditionally has been regarded as an appropriate governmental activity," citing as support for that statement Tilton v. Richardson (1971), 403 U.S. 672, 91 S.Ct. 2091, 29 L.Ed.2d 790; Hadley v. Junior College Dist. of Kansas City (1970), 397 U.S. 50, 90 S.Ct. 791, 25 L.Ed.2d 45; Green v. Thomas (1930), 37 Ohio App. 489, 175 N.E. 226; and Meyer v. Cleveland (1930), 35 Ohio App. 20, 171 N.E. 606.

We are in agreement with the court of appeals that appellants' arguments based on Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities v. Professionals Guild of Ohio (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 147, 545 N.E.2d 1260, are not on point. The issue in that case was whether the county board was a "person" for purposes of R.C. 119.01(F) who could appeal a decision of the State Employment Relations Board. The issue was not whether the county board was a political subdivision.

We see no reason to disagree with the conclusion reached by the Attorney General in 1988 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 88-034 on this point, the first component of our inquiry.² We hold that a county agricultural society is a political subdivision pursuant to R.C. 2744.01(F). We thus agree with the decision of the court of appeals upholding the ruling of the trial court on this question.

II

Having found that the Society is a political subdivision, we must ask, as the next component of our inquiry, whether the Society is entitled to immunity under the provisions of R.C. Chapter 2744.

R.C. Chapter 2744 sets out the method of analysis, which can be viewed as involving three tiers, for determining a political subdivision's immunity from liability. First, R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) sets out a general rule that political subdivisions are not liable in damages. In setting out this rule, R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) classifies the functions of political subdivisions into governmental and proprietary functions and states that the general rule of immunity is not absolute, but is limited by the provisions of R.C. 2744.02(B), which details when a political subdivision is not immune. Thus, the relevant point of analysis (the second tier) then becomes whether any of the exceptions in R.C. 2744.02(B) apply. Furthermore, if any of R.C. 2744.02(B)'s exceptions are found to apply, a consideration of the application of R.C. 2744.03 becomes relevant, as the third tier of analysis.³ See Cater v. Cleveland (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 24, 28, 697 N.E.2d 610, 614-615. See, also, Harp v. Cleveland Hts. (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 506, 509, 721 N.E.2d 1020, 1023; Hill v. Urbana (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 130, 133, 679 N.E.2d 1109, 1112.

The exception in R.C. 2744.02(B) implicated by this case that potentially defeats the Society's immunity under the analysis discussed above is R.C. 2744.02(B)(2), which provides that political subdivisions are liable for "negligent performance of acts by their employees with respect to proprietary functions." Appellants claim that the Society was engaged in proprietary functions when it conducted the hog show and the investigation of the alleged Big Fat incident at issue, so that the Society is not immune, and the judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed. Appellees, on the other hand, claim that the Society engaged in governmental functions. If appellees are correct, then R.C. 2744.02(B)(2)'s exception to immunity does not apply, R.C. 2744.02(A)(1)'s general rule of immunity is not defeated, and we must affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

The mutually exclusive definitions of "governmental function" and "proprietary function" are set out in R.C. 2744.01. R.C. 2744.01(C)(2) lists specific functions expressly designated as governmental functions, and R.C. 2744.01(G)(2) lists specific functions that are expressly designated as proprietary functions. The activities of the Society at issue in the present case do not fall within either R.C. 2744.01(C)(2) or 2744.01(G)(2). Therefore, to classify the Society's activities, we look to R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)'s definition of "governmental function," which we set out below. See, also, R.C. 2744.01(G)(1)(b), which for our...