Greene v. Amritsar Auto Services Co.

• Decision Date: 18 June 2002
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A. 01-0630 RMU.,Civ.A. 01-0630 RMU.
• Citation: 206 F.Supp.2d 4
• Parties: Bryan GREENE, Plaintiff, v. AMRITSAR AUTO SERVICES COMPANY, LLC and Balvir Singh Johal, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

206 F.Supp.2d 4

Bryan GREENE, Plaintiff, v. AMRITSAR AUTO SERVICES COMPANY, LLC and Balvir Singh Johal, Defendants.

No. Civ.A. 01-0630 RMU.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

June 18, 2002.

E. Desmond Hogan, Audrey E. Moog, Hogan & Hartson, L.L.P., Susan E. Huhta, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

George Joseph Hughes, George Christopher Courtot, Elizabeth Hughes Hughes & Bentzen, PLLC, Horace L. Bradshaw, Jr., Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

URBINA, District Judge.

DENYING DEFENDANT AMRITSAR'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

This civil-rights matter comes before the court upon defendant Amritsar Auto Services Company, LLC's ("Amritsar") motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff, Bryan Greene, alleges that the individual defendant, Balvir Singh Johal ("Johal"), a taxicab driver for Amritsar, refused to provide service to the plaintiff because of the plaintiff's race, in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 et seq., and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, as amended, D.C.Code §§ 1-2519 et seq. ("DCHRA"). Upon consideration of the parties' submissions and the relevant law, the court denies the defendant's motion.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The plaintiff is an African-American man who resides in the District of Columbia and is employed as the director of Policy and Program Evaluation and chief policy advisor in the Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity at the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). See Compl. ¶ 5. Defendant Amritsar is a company that provides taxicab services in the District of Columbia under the trade names of "Your Way Cab Association" and "Atlantic Cab Association." See id. ¶ 6. Defendant Johal owns and drives a taxicab bearing the name, logo, colorings, and markings of Your Way. See id. ¶ 7.

The gravamen of the complaint is that the plaintiff attempted to procure taxicab service from defendant Johal, who allegedly refused service on account of the plaintiff's race. See id. ¶¶ 13-15. The plaintiff states that on the night of April 2, 2000, at about 9:30 p.m., he tried to hail a taxicab from the entrance of a hotel, located in the southwest quadrant of the District of Columbia. See id. ¶ 10. "Neatly" attired in a black baseball jersey, green checkered shorts, army-green socks, black sneakers, and eyeglasses, the plaintiff carried a green knapsack and a white shopping bag. See id. ¶ 11. He had walked the few blocks from his office in the HUD building to the hotel. See id. ¶ 10. The plaintiff explains that catching a taxicab at the hotel is easier than trying to get one on the street outside the HUD building, which is "virtually deserted" at that hour. See id. The plaintiff entered the hotel lobby through a back staircase, walked across the lobby, and exited the front door of the hotel in order to have the hotel doorman hail him a taxicab. See id. ¶ 12.

The plaintiff signaled to the hotel doorman that he wanted a taxicab and "tendered himself in a fit and proper state to be transported as a taxicab passenger." Id. ¶ 13. As defendant Johal dropped off a Caucasian passenger at the curb, the hotel doorman alerted the taxicab driver to the presence of the plaintiff by "tapping the side of the taxicab and telling the driver to stop so that the plaintiff could get in." See id. ¶¶ 12-14. According to the plaintiff, defendant Johal looked directly at him, "sized him up, and then began slowly to pull away from the curb." Id. ¶ 14. The doorman alerted defendant Johal twice of the plaintiff's desire to catch a taxicab, but defendant Johal "refused to stop ... and intentionally refused to provide taxicab service to [the plaintiff]," allegedly "on the basis of the plaintiff's race, color, or personal appearance." See id. ¶¶ 14-15.

The plaintiff subsequently initiated the present action, demanding a jury trial, and asserting the following four causes of action against the defendants: (1) violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 et seq.; (2) violation of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, as amended, D.C.Code §§ 1-2519 et seq.; (3) breach of the common law common-carrier duty, and; (4) negligent supervision.¹ See id. ¶¶23-38. For his injuries, the plaintiff requests injunctive relief ordering the defendants to cease all racially discriminatory activity, an unspecified amount of compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. See id. at 10.

B. Procedural History

On May 21, 2001, defendant Johal filed a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Def. Johal's Mot. to Dismiss. The court denied defendant Johal's motion, reasoning that the plaintiff need not exhaust his administrative remedies with the D.C. Taxicab Commission before pursuing his claims in this court and that the plaintiff had sufficiently stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Mem.Op. and Order dated July 31, 2001. The court now turns to defendant Amritsar's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, wherein defendant Amritsar argues that it is not vicariously liable for the alleged act of discrimination committed by defendant Johal against the plaintiff. See Def.'s Mot. for Summ.J ("Def.'s Mot.") at 7-14.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Diamond v. Atwood, 43 F.3d 1538, 1540 (D.C.Cir.1995). To determine which facts are "material," a court must look to the substantive law on which each claim rests. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A "genuine issue" is one whose resolution could establish an element of a claim or defense and, therefore, affect the outcome of the action. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor and accept the nonmoving party's evidence as true. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A nonmoving party, however, must establish more than "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of its position. See id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show that the nonmoving party "fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. By pointing to the absence of evidence proffered by the nonmoving party, a moving party may succeed on summary judgment. See id.

In addition, the nonmoving party may not rely solely on allegations or conclusory statements. See Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C.Cir.1999); Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 154 (D.C.Cir.1993). Rather, the nonmoving party must present specific facts that would enable a reasonable jury to find in its favor. See Greene, 164 F.3d at 675. If the evidence "is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal citations omitted).

B. The Court Concludes That Defendant Amritsar is Subject to Liability for the Alleged Discrimination by Defendant Johal Against the Plaintiff

The plaintiff's claim against defendant Amritsar rests on the common law doctrine of respondeat superior. See Compl. ¶ 18; Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. ("Pl.'s Opp'n") at 4-7. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer or "master" may be held liable for the wrongful acts and omissions of its employee or "servant." See General Building Contractors Assoc., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 392, 102 S.Ct. 3141, 73 L.Ed.2d 835 (1982) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 215-216 (1958); W. Prosser &amp W. Keaton, The Law of Torts §§ 69-70 (1971)). In order to find an employer vicariously liable for an employee's acts, a court must first determine that an employer-employee, or "master-servant" relationship in fact exists. See Dovell v. Arundel Supply Corp., 361 F.2d 543, 544 (D.C.Cir. 1966); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Kelly, 448 A.2d 856, 860 (D.C.1982). In addition, the court must determine that the employee was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the prohibited act. See Jordan v. Medley, 711 F.2d 211, 213 (D.C.Cir.1983).

Whether an employer-employee relationship exists is generally a question of fact. See Dovell, 361 F.2d at 544 (stating that the decisive test is "whether the employer has the right to control and direct the servant in the performance of both his work and in the manner in which the work is to be done"); Morrison v. Int'l Programs Consortium, Inc., 253 F.3d 5, 11 (D.C.Cir.2001) (stating that "[f]acile labels and subjective factors ... are only relevant to the extent that they mirror `economic reality'") (citations omitted). Under the relevant case law, however, defendant Amritsar is estopped from denying an employer-employee relationship with defendant Johal. See Rhone v. Try Me Cab Co., 65 F.2d 834 (App.D.C.1933). Moreover, as explained later in this opinion, the court concludes that there is a genuine issue over whether defendant Johal was acting within the scope of his employment when the alleged discrimination took place. The court addresses these issues in turn.

1. An Employer-Employee Relationship Existed Between the...