Greene v. International Typographical Union

• Decision Date: 08 January 1960
• Docket Number: No. 8136.,8136.
• Citation: 182 F. Supp. 788
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Robert E. GREENE, Acting Regional Director of the First Region of the National Labor Relations Board, for and on behalf of the National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner v. INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION, and Local 285, Ansonia Typographical Union, International Typographical Union, Respondents.

182 F. Supp. 788

Robert E. GREENE, Acting Regional Director of the First Region of the National Labor Relations Board, for and on behalf of the National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner v. INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION, and Local 285, Ansonia Typographical Union, International Typographical Union, Respondents.

No. 8136.

United States District Court D. Connecticut.

January 8, 1960.

Stuart Rothman, General Counsel, Thomas J. McDermott, Asso. Gen. Counsel, Winthrop A. Johns, Assist. Gen. Counsel, Julius G. Serot, Washington, D. C., Robert S. Fuchs, Boston, Mass., Eugene R. Jackson, Joseph I. Nachman, N. L. R. B., Washington, D. C., for petitioner.

Norman Zolot, Hamden, Conn., for Local 285, ITU, Gerhard Van Arkel, Washington, D. C., specially appearing, for respondents.

ANDERSON, District Judge.

1. Petitioner is Acting Regional Director of the First Region of the Board, an agency of the United States, and filed the petition herein for and on behalf of the Board.

2. On or about December 14, 1959, Charlton Press, Inc. (herein called Charlton), pursuant to the provisions of the Act, filed a charge with the Board alleging, inter alia, that International Typographical Union, and Local 285, Ansonia Typographical Union, International Typographical Union (herein called International and Local 285 respectively), labor organizations, have engaged in, and are engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of § 8(b) (7) subparagraph (C), of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b) (7) (C).

3. The aforesaid charge was referred to petitioner as Acting Regional Director of the First Region of the Board.

4. There is, and petitioner has, reasonable cause to believe that:

(a) Respondent Local 285, an unincorporated association, is an organization in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.

(b) Respondent Local 285 maintains its principal offices at Shelton, Connecticut, and at all times material herein has been engaged within this judicial district in transacting business and in promoting and protecting the interests of their employee members.

(c) Charlton is engaged at Derby, Connecticut, in the printing, sale and distribution of magazines, books and other literature. In the operation of its business, Charlton annually receives goods and materials from outside the State of Connecticut valued at in excess of $50,000, and annually ships products outside the State of Connecticut valued at in excess of $50,000.

(d) Local 285 is not currently certified as the representative of any of Charlton's employees.

(e) On or about December 18, 1959 respondent filed with the Board a charge under § 8(a) (2) of the Act alleging that Charlton has unlawfully recognized or assisted another labor organization.

(f) The aforesaid charge was referred to the petitioner as Acting Regional Director of the First Region of the Board and was dismissed by petitioner for lack of merit.

(g) Respondent, at various times since on or about February 24, 1959 has demanded that Charlton recognize and bargain with respondent as the representative of Charlton's composing room employees.

(h) In furtherance of the aforesaid demands for recognition and bargaining, respondent, Local 285, since on or about March 9, 1959 has picketed Charlton's premises.

(i) The aforesaid picketing has been conducted for more than thirty (30) days from November 13, 1959 without the filing of a petition under § 9(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(c) for a Board election.

(j) The aforesaid picketing has induced individuals employed by other employers not to make pickups or deliveries at Charlton's premises, or perform services at such premises.

(k) An object of the picketing set forth in Findings of Fact 4(h), (i), and (j) above, has been and is to force or require Charlton to recognize or bargain with respondent Local 285 as the representative of Charlton's composing room employees, notwithstanding that it is not currently certified as the representative of such employees.

(l) By its picketing since November 13, 1959 as described in Findings of Fact 4(h), (i), (j), and (k) above, respondent Local 285 has engaged in, and is engaging in, acts and conduct in violation of § 8(b)(7), subparagraph (C), of the Act.

(m) The acts and conduct of respondent Local 285 set forth in Findings of Fact 4(h), (i), (j), (k), and (l) above, occurring in connection with the operations of Charlton, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to and do lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.

5. It may fairly be anticipated that, unless enjoined, respondent will continue and repeat the acts and conduct set forth in Findings of Fact 4(h), (i), (j), (k), and (l) above, or similar or like acts and conduct.

Conclusions of Law

1. This Court has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter of this proceeding, and under § 10(l) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(l) is empowered to grant injunctive relief.

2. There is, and petitioner has, reasonable cause to believe that: (a) Respondent Local 285 is a labor organization within the meaning of §§ 2(5), 8(b) and 10(l) of the Act; (b) Charlton is engaged in commerce within the meaning of §§ 2(6) and (7) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. A. § 152(6, 7); and (c) Respondent Local 285 has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of § 8(b) (7) subparagraph (C), of the Act, affecting commerce within the meaning of §§ 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and a continuation of these practices will impair the policies of the Act as set forth in § 1(b), 29 U.S. C.A. § 151(b) thereof.

3. To preserve the issues for a prompt and orderly determination by the Board, it is appropriate, just and proper that, pending the final disposition of the matters herein involved pending before the Board, Respondent Local 285, its officers, representatives, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all members and persons acting in concert or participation with it, be enjoined and restrained from the commission, continuation, or repetition of the acts and conduct set forth in Findings of Fact 4(h), (i), (j), (k), and (l) above, acts or conduct in furtherance or support thereof, subject, however, to the provisos set forth in said § 8(b)(7)(C). Said temporary injunction will remain operative for ninety (90) days or until the final disposition by the Board of the matters pending, whichever is sooner; provided that if for reasons beyond its control, the Board is unable to make such final disposition within said ninety (90) days, then within fifteen (15) days before the end of said ninety (90) day period it may be heard on a petition to extend the temporary injunction for such further period as may be deemed just under the circumstances.

Discussion.

The question before the court stems from a controversy between the employer, Charlton Press, and the respondent, Local 285, which arose in February of 1959 when, respondent claims, all the eight employees of Charlton's composing room became members of the respondent Local following which the employer discharged these eight employees. The Union charged Charlton, the employer, with an unfair labor practice and a hearing on this issue was held before a trial examiner who, on July 28, 1959, found the employer guilty of an unfair labor practice. While in his report the trial examiner recommended restoration of pay, there was no recommendation as to reinstatement because the employer agreed to restore the discharged men to their former or equivalent positions. It is undisputed that the men refused to be reinstated unless the Union was given recognition, a stipulation which the employer would not consider. Thereafter, in August the Union again petitioned the N.L.R.B. charging Charlton Press, Inc. with an unfair labor practice and with refusing to reinstate the employees. The Board recommended that the charges be withdrawn and the Union withdrew them. This was on the eve of the new amendments to the Labor Management Relations Act which was passed on September 13, 1959 and which took effect on November 13, 1959. Picketing continued through this entire period and is still going on. The thirty day period provided in § 8(b) (7) (C) commenced on November 13, 1959. After the thirty days had expired the Union, on December 15, 1959, filed a petition for an immediate election under § 8(b) (7) (C).

The Union's position is that § 8 (b) (7) (C) does not apply to it under the circumstances of this case because it in fact has in its membership 100% of the employees of the Charlton Press's composing room and these employees in fact are an appropriate bargaining unit, and that it is endeavoring to meet an § 8(a) (5) violation by the employer. While the main thrust of this new amendment to the Labor Management Relations Act was to prevent recognition picketing by a union representing a minority of employees or none at all, § 8(b) (7) (C) simply sets up a procedure whereby the factual qualifications of a union to act as the representative of a group of employees is to be determined by the N.L. R.B. The Union urges that no such accelerated election under a § 8(b) (7) (C) proceeding is needed or called for when the union represents a majority of employees in defending against an § 8(a) (5) violation and that this should be a defense to the § 8(b) (7) proceeding; moreover, that it will be timely enough to pass upon the question of majority representation when the Board hears the § 8(b) (7) charge. However, this would obviously be very much less effective in meeting the improper practices sought to be corrected; and Congress plainly felt that it was in the public interest to have the question of majority or minority representation determined at an early stage by a speedy...