Greene v. Lafler
| Decision Date | 23 August 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-10103-BC.,03-10103-BC. |
| Citation | 447 F.Supp.2d 780 |
| Parties | Michael D. GREENE, Petitioner, v. Blaine LAFLER, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Michael Green, Freeland, MI, pro se.
Brenda E. Turner, Janet Van Cleve, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Lansing, MI, for Respondent.
The petitioner, Michael D. Greene, presently confined at the Saginaw Correctional Facility in Freeland, Michigan, has filed a pro se application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petitioner was convicted at a single trial in the Wayne County, Michigan circuit court of five armed robberies and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony ("felony firearm"). On May 10, 1999, a Wayne County Circuit Court judge sentenced the petitioner to two years in prison for the felony firearm conviction, followed by concurrent terms of twenty to fifty years in prison for each of the armed robberies. The petitioner alleges that he is incarcerated in violation of his constitutional rights to a fair trial, to due process of law, and to effective assistance of counsel. The respondent has filed an answer to the petition asserting that the petitioner's claims are procedurally defaulted or meritless. The Court concludes that the doctrine of procedural default bars review of the prosecutorial misconduct issues, and the remaining claims do not entitle the petitioner to relief. Therefore, the Court will deny the petition.
The five counts of armed robbery and one count of felony firearm arose from an incident that occurred outside Memorial Hall on Van Dyke Avenue in Detroit, Michigan on November 22, 1998. The incident also led to five counts of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree.
At about 11:00 p.m., Darnell Devine drove into the parking lot of the hall. He planned to attend a party inside the hall, but he was approached by a man dressed in dark clothing who demanded his wallet and ring. Shortly after Mr. Devine was robbed, five young women who were going to the party also were robbed of valuables by a man dressed in dark clothing. The women claimed that the robber fondled their breasts as he pretended to search them. They reported the incident to two security guards, who ran off in pursuit of the robber. The guards found the petitioner wrestling with another man on the ground in the alley behind the hall. They pulled the petitioner off the other man and detained him for the police. While the petitioner was being detained outside the hall, Mr. Devine and three of the young women identified him as the man who had robbed them.
The petitioner's defense at trial was misidentification. The jury was not persuaded and found the petitioner guilty of the armed robbery and felony firearm charges. The prosecutor agreed to dismiss one of the criminal sexual conduct counts during trial for lack of evidence and the jury acquitted the petitioner of the remaining criminal sexual conduct charges. The trial court sentenced the petitioner as noted earlier on May 10, 1999.
On appeal, the petitioner argued that: (1) a juror ignored the trial court's instructions and discussed the case outside the courtroom; (2) the prosecutor's closing argument deprived him of due process and a fair trial because, among other things, the prosecutor impermissibly commented on the petitioner's silence and the petitioner's failure to explain the evidence; (3) the prosecutor deprived him of due process, a fair trial, and his right of confrontation by failing to produce two res gestae witnesses; (4) he was denied effective assistance of counsel, and the trial court abused its discretion by denying him an evidentiary hearing; (5) ineffective assistance of counsel resulted in an involuntary waiver of his right to testify; (6) the cumulative effect of the foregoing errors denied him a fair trial; and (7) he was entitled to be resentenced because the trial court administratively amended his sentence. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the petitioner's convictions and sentence in an unpublished per curiam opinion. See People v. Greene, No. 220095, 2001 WL 1134704 (Mich.Ct.App. Sept.25, 2001).
The petitioner then applied for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, where he raised the same claims that he presented to the Michigan Court of Appeals. In the section for "new issues," he alleged that (1) he was deprived of his right to a fair trial and his right to remain silent when the prosecutor shifted the burden of proof and (2) he was entitled to a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence (knowing use of perjured testimony). The supreme court denied leave to appeal. See People v. Greene, 466 Mich. 856, 644 N.W.2d 760 (2002) (table).
The petitioner filed his habeas corpus petition on April 14, 2003. The petition raised the eight claims that the petitioner presented to the Michigan Supreme Court. The respondent argued in an answer to the petition that the Court should dismiss the habeas petition as a "mixed" petition of exhausted and unexhausted claims. The petitioner then moved to dismiss his petition without prejudice so that he could return to state court and pursue state remedies for his unexhausted claims.
The Court determined that the only unexhausted claim was the one alleging newly discovered evidence of perjury. The Court denied the petitioner's motion, but held his case in abeyance and administratively closed the case so that the petitioner could either amend his petition by deleting the unexhausted claim or file a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court. The petitioner then filed an amended petition for the writ of habeas corpus in which he deleted the unexhausted claim regarding newly discovered evidence of perjury. The Court re-opened the case and ordered the respondent to file an answer to the amended petition. Respondent has filed an answer, and the case is now ready for decision.
The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996), which govern this case, "circumscribe[d]" the standard of review federal courts must apply when considering applications for a writ of habeas corpus raising constitutional claims, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003).
As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Therefore, federal courts are bound by a state court's adjudication of a petitioner's claims unless the state court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429, 433 (6th Cir. 1998). Mere error by the state court will not justify issuance of the writ; rather, the state court's application of federal law "must have been objectively unreasonable." Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); internal quotes omitted). Additionally, this Court must presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (); see also West v. Seabold, 73 F.3d 81, 84 (6th Cir. 1996) ().
The Supreme Court has explained the proper application of the "contrary to" clause as follows:
A state-court decision will certainly be contrary to [the Supreme Court's] clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases
A state-court decision will also be contrary to this Court's clearly established precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court's] precedent.
Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495.
The Supreme Court has held that a federal court should analyze a claim for habeas corpus relief under the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1) "when a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of this Court to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495. The Court defined "unreasonable application" as follows:
[A] federal habeas court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable ....
[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.... Under § 2254(d)(1)'s "unreasonable application" clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that...
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