Greene v. A.P. Products, Ltd.
| Decision Date | 19 July 2006 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 127718.,Docket No. 127734. Calendar No. 2. |
| Citation | 475 Mich. 502,717 N.W.2d 855 |
| Parties | Cheryce GREENE, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Keimer Easley, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. A.P. PRODUCTS, LTD., and Revlon Consumer Products Corporation, Defendants-Appellants, and Super 7 Beauty Supply, Inc., f/k/a Pro Care Beauty Service, Inc, f/k/a Pro Care Beauty Supply, Defendants-Appellees, and Raani Corporation, Defendant. Cheryce Greene, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Keimer Easley, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. A.P. Products, Ltd., and Revlon Consumer Products Corporation, Defendants-Appellees, and Super 7 Beauty Supply, Inc., f/k/a Pro Care Beauty Service, Inc., f/k/a Pro Care Beauty Supply, Defendants-Appellants, and Raani Corporation, Defendant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
McKeen & Associates, P.C. (by Brian J. McKeen and Ramona C. Howard), Detroit and Frederick M. Rosen, Detroit for the plaintiff.
Plunkett & Cooney, P.C. (by Ernest R. Bazzana and Edward J. Higgins), Detroit, for A.P. Products, Ltd., and Revlon Consumer Products Corporation.
Kaufman, Payton & Chapa (by Howard S. Weingarden and Frank A. Misuraca) Farmington Hills, for Super 7 Beauty Supply, Inc.
In this case we consider the scope of a manufacturer's or seller's duty to warn of product risks under MCL 600.2948(2). We conclude that the statute imposes a duty to warn that extends only to material risks not obvious to a reasonably prudent product user, and to material risks that are not, or should not be, a matter of common knowledge to persons in the same or a similar position as the person who suffered the injury in question. Because the material risk associated with ingesting and inhaling Wonder 8 Hair Oil, as occurred here, would have been obvious to a reasonably prudent product user, the failure to warn against the risk is not actionable. The Court of Appeals misunderstood this duty and held that a duty also existed to warn of the kind of injuries that were suffered. The Court of Appeals also incorrectly allowed various warranty claims to proceed on the basis that the warning was inadequate. Because no warning was required, these holdings were in error. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's order granting summary disposition to all defendants.
In April 1999, plaintiff purchased a spray bottle of African Pride Ginseng Miracle Wonder 8 Oil, Hair and Body Mist-Captivate (Wonder 8 Hair Oil) from defendant Pro Care Beauty Supply, which is currently known as Super 7 Beauty Supply, Inc. Defendant A.P. Products, which was subsequently acquired by Revlon Consumer Products Corporation, packaged and labeled Wonder 8 Hair Oil. Wonder 8 Hair Oil was marketed principally to African-Americans as a new type of spray-on body and hair moisturizer containing eight natural oils. Plaintiff decided to try the oil after reading the ingredients on the label,1 some of which were familiar to her and some of which were not. Although the bottle's label cautioned the user never to spray the oil near sparks or an open flame, it did not warn that the hair oil should be kept out of reach of children or that it was potentially harmful or fatal if swallowed.2 Plaintiff's 11-month-old son, Keimer Easley, had been left unattended. Somehow he obtained the bottle of hair oil, which had been left within his reach. He ingested and inhaled the hair oil.3 The child died about one month later from multisystem organ failure secondary to chemical pneumonitis, secondary to hydrocarbon ingestion. In other words, the mineral oil clogged the child's lungs, causing inflammatory respiratory failure.
Plaintiff filed this product-liability action, alleging that defendants breached their duty to warn that the product could be harmful if ingested and that it should be kept out of reach of small children. Plaintiff further claimed that defendants breached an implied warranty by failing adequately to label the product as toxic.
Defendants moved for summary disposition. A.P. Products and Revlon argued that they had no duty to warn because the material risks associated with ingesting Wonder 8 Hair Oil were obvious to a reasonably prudent product user. They further argued that the lack of warning was not the proximate cause of the injury and that the product had been misused in a way that was not reasonably foreseeable. Super 7 Beauty Supply argued that plaintiff failed to establish that it, as a nonmanufacturing seller, had independently breached an express or implied warranty or was independently negligent. It further argued that plaintiff failed to show that the product was not fit for its ordinary uses or for a particular purpose.
The trial court granted defendants' motions for summary disposition. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that the questions whether the Wonder 8 Hair Oil required a warning label, whether defendants breached an implied warranty, and whether plaintiff established proximate cause should have been submitted to a jury.4
Defendants sought leave to appeal in this Court. We granted defendants' applications for leave to appeal.5
This case requires us to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's grant of summary disposition in favor of defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We review this issue de novo. Rose v. Nat'l Auction Group, 466 Mich. 453, 461, 646 N.W.2d 455 (2002), citing Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 118, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). "In reviewing such a decision, we consider the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Rose, supra at 461, 646 N.W.2d 455, citing Quinto v. Cross & Peters Co., 451 Mich. 358, 362, 547 N.W.2d 314 (1996). "Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is appropriately granted if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rose, supra at 461, 646 N.W.2d 455, citing MCR 2.116(C)(10).
Before 1995, a manufacturer's or seller's duty to warn of material risks in a product-liability action was governed by common-law principles. Tort reform legislation enacted in 1995,6 however, displaced the common law. MCL 600.2948, in chapter 29 of the Revised Judicature Act, now governs a defendant's duty to warn of an obvious danger in a product-liability action. It states, in relevant part:
A defendant is not liable for failure to warn of a material risk that is or should be obvious to a reasonably prudent product user or a material risk that is or should be a matter of common knowledge to persons in the same or similar position as the person upon whose injury or death the claim is based in a product liability action. [MCL 600.2948(2).]7
Under the plain language of MCL 600.2948(2), a manufacturer has no duty to warn of a material risk associated with the use of a product if the risk: (1) is obvious, or should be obvious, to a reasonably prudent product user, or (2) is or should be a matter of common knowledge to a person in the same or a similar position as the person upon whose injury or death the claim is based.8 Accordingly, this statute, by looking to the reasonably prudent product user, or persons in the same or a similar position as the injured person,9 establishes an objective standard.10
In determining what constitutes a material risk, we are mindful that the statutes governing statutory construction direct us to construe "all words and phrases. . . according to the common and approved usage of the language," but construe "technical words and phrases, and such as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law" according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning. MCL 8.3a; Horace v. City of Pontiac, 456 Mich. 744, 756, 575 N.W.2d 762 (1998). Our research reveals that the term "material risk" has no prior "peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law." It is thus not a term of art. When considering a word or phrase that has not been given prior legal meaning, resort to a lay dictionary such as Webster's is appropriate. Id. at 756, 575 N.W.2d 762. Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997) defines "material," in relevant part, as "important: to make a material difference; pertinent: a material question." Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997) defines "risk" as "exposure to the chance of injury or loss." We thus conclude that a "material risk" is an important or significant exposure to the chance of injury or loss.
Finally, regarding the meaning of the statute, we conclude that the Legislature has imposed no duty to warn beyond obvious material risks. The statute does not impose a duty to warn of a specific type of injury that could result from a risk. The Court of Appeals, however, mistakenly held that warnings must cover not only material risks, as described, but must also cover potential injuries that could result.
While the Court of Appeals properly applied an objective standard in determining the suitability of the warning, it stated that it could not conclude that "as a matter of law, the risk of death from the ingestion of Wonder 8 Hair Oil would be obvious to a reasonably prudent product user and be a matter of common knowledge, especially considering the lack of any relevant warning." 264 Mich.App. at 401, 691 N.W.2d 38 (first emphasis added). The Court of Appeals thus required that the warning indicate specific injuries a product user could incur. Yet, as we have stated, the statute does not require that a warning address possible injuries that might occur.11
Here, tragically, plaintiff's 11-month-old son died after ingesting and inhaling Wonder 8 Hair Oil.12 Under the law, however, defendants owed no duty to warn of specific injuries or...
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