Greene v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 31 October 1890
• Citation: 25 N.E. 583,134 Ill. 310
• Parties: GREENE v. PHOENIX MUT. LIFE INS. CO. et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

134 Ill. 310

25 N.E. 583

GREENE

v.PHOENIX MUT. LIFE INS. CO. et al.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 31, 1890.

Appeal from circuit court, Cook county.

Bill by Mary J. Greene against the Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company and others to set aside a trustee's sale of land under two trust-deeds given by complainant to Lyman Baird, as trustee, to secure a loan from said insurance company. At the hearing the bill was dismissed, and complainant appeals.

W. P. Black, F. A. Johnson, and J. N. Barker, for appellant.

L. H. Boutell, Wilson & Moore, and Wm. Eliot Furness, for appellees.

SHOPE, J.

We are of opinion that a single point only is presented by this record which we can properly consider. One of the important questions involved at the hearing was whether, at the time of the execution of the trust-deeds, and the subsequent sale thereunder, and from thence to shortly before the filing of the original bill, appellant had been and was insane. It is substantially conceded, and, if it was not, it is clearly manifest, that the issue of insanity, and whether the complainant was thereby excused from the delay in bringing her bill, or whether she was guilty of laches therein, was of controlling importance. The law presumes the fact of sanity, and hence the burden is cast upon the party alleging insanity to establish it by a preponderance of proof. No rule can be formulated, as to the quantum of evidence necessary to establish insanity, otherwise than that it must be sufficient to overcome the legal presumption of sanity, and to overbalance the testimony tending to sustain such presumption. This preponderance of evidence necessary to satisfy the judicial mind does not, as a matter of course, depend upon the number of witnesses testifying on either side, but when all are apparently possessed of the same means of knowledge, and are equally intelligent and credible, the greater number must generally prevail. The trial court must, of necessity, exercise discretion as to the number of witnesses to prove a given fact that is not disputed, or that is merely collateral to the main issue, depending very much upon the nature and subject-matter of the inquiry. Familiar illustrations of cases in which the discretion could not be exercised where the inquiry is single, as in cases of right of way, the grant of a prescriptive right, the proof of a custom, or the identity of persons or property which are disputed, will readily occur to any one. The phases of insanity, and the facts and circumstances which may tend to establish, and are proper for consideration, are so numerous and varied that a great number of witnesses may be required to determine the fact in issue. And it is found that persons of equal intelligence differ in opinion as to the inference to be drawn from such facts and circumstances. In such cases, great latitude has always been allowed, and should prevail. No reason can be perceived why the same rule might not be applied to any single collateral fact that would be applied to such collateral fact in any other inquiry. It must be apparent that the limitation of witnesses in such cases, to an equal number on each side, as was here done, even supposing they were of equal...