Greenfield v. Central Labor Council of Portland and Vicinity

• Citation: 104 Or. 236,192 P. 783
• Parties: GREENFIELD v. CENTRAL LABOR COUNCIL OF PORTLAND AND VICINITY ET AL.
• Decision Date: 01 October 1920
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

192 P. 783

104 Or. 236

GREENFIELD v. CENTRAL LABOR COUNCIL OF PORTLAND AND VICINITY ET AL.

Supreme Court of Oregon

October 1, 1920

In Banc.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah County; John McCourt, Judge.

Suit by George L. Greenfield, doing business under the assumed name of "Wright's Sample Shoe Shop," and also doing business under the name of "Greenfield's," against the Central Labor Council of Porland and Vicinity and others. From the decree, both parties appeal. Modified.

At the times alleged the plaintiff was, and now is, engaged in operating two retail stores for the sale of boots and shoes one at the corner of Fourth and Alder streets, and the other at the corner of Fourth and Morrison streets, in the city of Portland. The defendant local union No. 1257 of the Retail Clerk's International Protective Association is an organized, but unincorporated, union known as a laborers' union, with a constitution, rules, and regulation, and a president, secretary and business agent as officers. The members thereof are men and women employed as retail shoe clerks, some of whom prior to January 19, 1920, were employed by the plaintiff in his stores. The Central Labor Council of Portland is a body of delegates appointed by and representing numerous labor unions, including the defendant local union No. 1257, with authority to decide all questions in respect to the conduct and actions of the several unions. The defendant Nickerson is president of that council and E. J Stack is its secretary.

It is alleged, in substance, that on and prior to January 19, 1920 the defendants formed a plan of federation and conspiracy "with the purpose and object of injuring and destroying the business of plaintiff by preventing the customers of said plaintiff from entering into his two said places of business as aforesaid, and buying his said merchandise," and conspired together to intimidate and annoy the customers about to enter plaintiff's said places of business by means of pickets, to stand in front of and near the two stores, on the sidewalk and in the streets, to parade in front of the entrances to the stores, wearing banners or scarfs conspicuously displayed, and inscribed with the words "Unfair to Organized Labor," to address his customers, warning and advising them not to patronize the plaintiff, as he was unfair to organized labor, and to use insulting, opprobrious, and disgraceful language to his customers and his employés.

The complaint is in form and substance very similar to that in the Heitkemper Case, 192 P. 765, in which an opinion has this day been rendered, including an allegation of resultant loss of business and charging that the defendants are unable to respond in damages; that they will continue to picket plaintiff's places of business unless restrained by order of court; and that the plaintiff has no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at law. The prayer is for an injunction restraining them from the commission of such alleged acts.

The defendants admit that they caused the pickets to walk back and forth on the sidewalk near the curb in front of the plaintiff's stores; that they wore scarfs with the words mentioned inscribed thereon; and that such pickets announced to passers-by that the plaintiff was unfair to organized labor, and publicly advised "all friends of decent working conditions, hours, and wages, and of organized labor to refuse to patronize the plaintiff's stores or any of them because they were unfair, and because plaintiff was unfair to organized labor, and to refuse such patronage until the plaintiff and his stores should become fair to organized labor." They deny any intimidation, or that they committed any unlawful acts, and allege that policemen were in constant attendance; that no one of the pickets was ever arrested; and that no complaint was filed against either of them. They also deny any conspiracy, and allege that there was a trade dispute between the plaintiff and the defendants, and that the picketing was done and would continue to be carried on in a peaceful manner, as authorized by chapter 346, Laws 1919, set out at large in the opinion in the Heitkemper Case.

As a further and separate defense it is then alleged that about March 1, 1919, the plaintiff entered into a written contract with defendant local union No. 1257 for a period of 12 months, by which he leased R. C. I. P. A. union card No. 8, wherein it was provided that--

"Parties of the second part [meaning plaintiff] agree to retain in their employ only members or those, if eligible, who will become members within fifteen days from the date of their employment, of Local No. 1257 Retail Clerks' International Protective Association."

The agreement contains further stipulations as to holidays, hours of labor, times for meals, and payment for overtime, and concludes with the recital:

"That the interests of each shall be mutually taken care of and advanced, and that any violation of the foregoing stipulations shall be sufficient cause for surrender of the union store card."

It was duly executed by the plaintiff and the defendant union. It is alleged that about November 15, 1919, the plaintiff violated, and ever since that date continues to violate, the agreement; that he required certain of his employés who were members of the union to work four hours a week overtime without additional compensation; that he refused to perform his contract to employ only such individuals as were eligible for membership in, and who would become members of, said local union No. 1257 within 15 days from the date of their employment or at all; that about January 13, 1920, the plaintiff wholly repudiated his contract, and declared that he would not recognize or deal with the said defendant union or its members, and sought, and still seeks, to destroy its organization; that by reason thereof pickets were employed to inform passersby that there was a trade dispute between the plaintiff and the defendants, and to advise friends of the defendants to patronize merchants who would keep and perform their contracts; and that the plaintiff has since advised, and does now advise, his employés and others not to join the union and to resign and leave their membership therein. The defendants declare that--

"If any injury arises to the plaintiff because of said picketing it is merely incidental in defendants' endeavor to benefit themselves by demonstrating to plaintiff and to such employers as are interested that the friends of organized labor will and do patronize employers who maintain fair and reasonable conditions of labor for their employés and who will and do deal collectively with them in business affecting the welfare of employers, employés, and the public generally."

It is also charged by the defendants that "the plaintiff used all means in his power to injure labor organizations generally and to prevent others from uniting with them," and that he offered "to pay all expenses of picketing Meier & Frank's store of Portland, Or., for one week, if said local union would do so."

It was stipulated that the answer should be construed as an admission of the complaint in the following particulars:

"That the defendants will continue in like manner to picket the plaintiff's places of business described in the complaint if they are not restrained from so doing by the injunction of this court.

"That by reason of said picketing plaintiff has suffered reduction in the amount of his sales of merchandise, and consequent damage.

"That defendants have no property exempt from execution."

Further it was agreed that--

"All of the affidavits filed by the defendants upon the order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be granted during the pendency of this suit, together with the affidavit of Ben M. Hecht, filed this day, may be, and each of them shall be, considered as competent evidence offered by defendants upon the trial of this cause upon its merits. And plaintiff shall file affidavits of and as to the kind, nature, extent, and character of said picketing, and the court shall determine therefrom the character of said picketing. Said affidavits to be in lieu of evidence."

A reply was then filed denying all of the new matter in the answer, and alleging that--

"Said pickets were not placed in front of plaintiff's said places of business with the intent and for the purpose of benefiting said defendants and other union workmen or employés, but, on the contrary, were placed by defendants in front of plaintiff's said places of business for the sole purpose and with the sole intent of injuring plaintiff in his said business, and compelling plaintiff to recognize said union, and to deal with them contrary to his wishes in said matter."

A trial was had, and, based upon the pleadings and evidence, the court made the following material findings of fact--

"That plaintiff in the operation of his said two retail shoe stores employed certain clerks or employés, and that all of the employés employed by plaintiff in his said shoe stores located at Fourth and Alder streets were members of said local union No. 1257, and that all of plaintiff's employés in his said store at Fourth and Morrison streets were members of said local union No. 1257, save and except four of said employés; that on or about the 15th day of January, 1920, the defendants, and each of them, demanded of plaintiff that he cause the said four nonunion employés to join defendants' local union No. 1257, and that upon their failure or refusal so to join that plaintiff discharge said four employés; that plaintiff refused so to do; that thereupon said defendants, and each of them, threatened plaintiff with a strike of all of his union employés, and threatened to picket plaintiff's said...