Greenfield v. Schmidt Baking Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 March 1997
• Docket Number: No. 23574,23574
• Citation: 485 S.E.2d 391,199 W.Va. 447
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: , 156 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2717 Martin GREENFIELD, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. SCHMIDT BAKING COMPANY, INC., John F. Morrison and Dennis Swartz, Defendants Below, Appellees.

Page 391

485 S.E.2d 391

199 W.Va. 447, 156 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2717

Martin GREENFIELD, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. SCHMIDT BAKING COMPANY, INC., John F. Morrison and Dennis

Swartz, Defendants Below, Appellees.

No. 23574.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted Feb. 4, 1997.

Decided March 19, 1997.

[199 W.Va. 449] Syllabus by the Court

1. " 'A circuit court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.' Syl. pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994)." Syllabus point 1, Davis v. Foley, 193 W.Va. 595, 457 S.E.2d 532 (1995).

2. " ' "A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law." Syllabus Point 3, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Federal Insurance Co. of New York, 148 W.Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963).' Syllabus Point 1, Andrick v. Town of Buckhannon, 187 W.Va. 706, 421 S.E.2d 247 (1992)." Syllabus point 1, Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W.Va. 52, 459 S.E.2d 329 (1995).

3. "Roughly stated, a 'genuine issue' for purposes of West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) is simply one half of a trialworthy issue, and a genuine issue does not arise unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for that party. The opposing half of a trialworthy issue is present where the non-moving party can point to one or more disputed 'material' facts. A material fact is one that has the capacity to sway the outcome of the litigation under the applicable law." Syllabus point 5, Jividen v. Law, 194 W.Va. 705, 461 S.E.2d 451 (1995).

4. An application of state law is pre-empted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947) (1994 ed.), only if such application requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement.

5. A determination of pre-emption under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947) (1994 ed.), requires a fact specific analysis.

6. "Under West Virginia law, a libel plaintiff's status sets the standard for assessing the defendant's conduct. Plaintiffs who are public officials or public figures must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendants made their defamatory statement with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. Private figures need only show that the defendants were negligent in publishing the false and defamatory statement." Syllabus point 2, State ex rel. Suriano v. Gaughan, 198 W.Va. 339, 480 S.E.2d 548 (1996).

7. "The essential elements for a successful defamation action by a private individual are (1) defamatory statements; (2) a nonprivileged communication to a third party; (3) falsity; (4) reference to the plaintiff; (5) at least negligence on the part of the publisher; and (6) resulting injury." Syllabus point 1, Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 173 W.Va. 699, 320 S.E.2d 70 (1983).

8. Defamation published in written form, as opposed to spoken form, constitutes libel.

9. "Qualified privileges are based upon the public policy that true information be given whenever it is reasonably necessary for the protection of one's own interests, the interests of third persons or certain interests of the public. A qualified privilege exists when a person publishes a statement in good faith about a subject in which he has an interest or duty and limits the publication of the statement to those persons who have a legitimate interest in the subject matter; however, a bad motive will defeat a qualified privilege defense." Syllabus point 4, Dzinglski v. Weirton Steel Corp., 191 W.Va. 278, 445 S.E.2d 219 (1994).

10. "An 'invasion of privacy' includes (1) an unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (2) an appropriation of another's name or likeness; (3) unreasonable publicity given to another's private life; and (4) publicity that unreasonably places another in a false light before the public." Syllabus point 8, Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 173 W.Va. 699, 320 S.E.2d 70 (1983).

11. " ' "One who by extreme or outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for bodily harm." Syllabus pt. 6, Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmont, 169 W.Va. 673, 289 S.E.2d 692, (1982).' Syl. Pt. 1, Dzinglski v. Weirton Steel Corp., 191 W.Va. 278, 445 S.E.2d 219 (1994)." Syllabus point 3, Tanner v. Rite Aid of West Virginia, Inc., 194 W.Va. 643, 461 S.E.2d 149 (1995).

Lawrence M. Schultz, Burke & Schultz, Martinsburg, for Appellant.

Wm. Richard McCune, Jr., Tammy Mitchell Bittorf, McCune & Bittorf, Martinsburg, for Appellees.

DAVIS, Justice:

The appellant, Martin Greenfield, plaintiff below, appeals an award of summary judgment in favor of the appellees, Schmidt Baking Company, Inc., John F. Morrison and Dennis Schwartz, in an action claiming defamation/libel, invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Greenfield contends the circuit court erred in finding that the resolution of his causes of action required interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement governing his employment relationship with Schmidt Baking Company, Inc., and his claims were, therefore, pre-empted by federal law under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947) (1994 ed.). We agree. We find that all three of Greenfield's claims may be resolved without interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, they are not pre-empted.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

At the time of the event complained of, the appellant, Martin Greenfield [hereinafter Greenfield], was employed by Schmidt Baking Co., Inc. [hereinafter Schmidt Baking], at its plant in Martinsburg, West Virginia. Greenfield was also a member of Local No. 68, Bakery, Confectionery and Tobacco Workers International Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., C.L.C. [hereinafter Union]. ¹ Consequently, the employment relationship between Greenfield and Schmidt Baking was governed by a Collective Bargaining Agreement [hereinafter CBA].

In early 1995, the Union filed a grievance regarding the eligibility of part-time employees for sick pay benefits under the CBA. John F. Morrison, Vice President of Industrial Relations for Schmidt Baking, responded to the grievance by letter dated March 14, 1995. Dennis Schwartz, Manager of Schmidt Baking's Martinsburg plant, posted the letter near the time clock in the Martinsburg plant. ² In the letter, Mr. Morrison Shortly after the posting of the letter, Greenfield filed a grievance protesting the portion of the letter indicating that he was a habitual user of sick pay benefits. ³ Greenfield subsequently abandoned the grievance. On April 5, 1995, he filed the instant lawsuit against Schmidt, Mr. Morrison and Mr. Schwartz [hereinafter collectively referred to as Schmidt]. Schmidt made no attempt to remove the action to federal court. However, on May 31, 1995, Schmidt filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that Greenfield's claims implicated the CBA and were, therefore, pre-empted by federal law under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947) (1994 ed.). The circuit court determined that "the sum and substance of plaintiff's claims boil down to two questions: (1) was the posting of the letter with the reference to the plaintiff a reasonable response to the grievance that was filed; and (2) whether the identification of plaintiff was a reasonable exercise of the Company's authority to discipline or discharge employees." The court concluded that the answer to both questions required interpretation of the CBA, and, thus, the case was pre-empted by federal law. ⁴ Consequently, by order dated November 9, 1995, the Circuit Court of Berkeley County granted summary judgment in favor of Schmidt. It is from this order Greenfield appeals.

                [199 W.Va. 451] first stated the company's position that part-time employees were eligible to collect sick pay benefits.  The letter continued by providing statistics regarding the high cost to the company of the "use and abuse of the sick pay program."   The letter further named seven employees, including Greenfield, who management had identified as "recipients of sick pay benefits on a habitual basis."   The letter then stated "[t]he Company will pursue an investigation of the aforementioned individuals and others not named in an attempt to detect abuse of the sick pay program.  If such abuse/fraud is detected, disciplinary action will be taken up to and including termination of employment."   Finally, the letter expressed the company's position that it could not afford to operate the Martinsburg plant under the burdensome financial conditions caused, in part, by excessive sick pay claims, and, thus, the company would pursue the elimination of sick pay benefits in future labor negotiations
                

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We are asked to review the circuit court's award of summary judgment in favor of Schmidt. On appeal, " '[a] circuit court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.' Syl. pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994)." Syl. pt. 1, Davis v. Foley, 193 W.Va. 595, 457 S.E.2d 532 (1995).

We have repeatedly held that under Rule 56(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, " ' "[a] motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law." Syllabus Point 3, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Federal Insurance Co. of New York, 148 W.Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963).' Syllabus Point 1, Andrick v. Town of Buckhannon, 187 W.Va. 706, 421 S.E.2d 247 (1992)." Syl. pt. 1, Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W.Va. 52, 459 S.E.2d...