Greenfield v. State, No. 75--1731
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
| Writing for the Court | McNULTY; HOBSON; GRIMES; GRIMES |
| Citation | 337 So.2d 1021 |
| Parties | David Wayne GREENFIELD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Decision Date | 24 September 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 75--1731 |
Page 1021
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 25, 1976.
Jack O. Johnson, Public Defender, Robert H. Grizzard, II, Asst. Public Defender, and Paul J. Martin, Legal Intern, Bartow, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and William I. Munsey, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.
McNULTY, Chief Judge.
On this direct appeal appellant Greenfield assails his conviction of sexual battery. The sole issue on appeal relates to the denial of a motion for new trial predicated on the ground that the prosecutor prejudicially commented in summation on appellant's exercise
Page 1022
of his right to remain silent at the giving of his Miranda rights at the time of his arrest. We affirm.Most significantly, in this case, appellant pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. Accordingly, there was no real dispute as to the essential objective facts herein. They are that the prosecutrix, having sunned herself on a local beach in Sarasota in the late morning or early afternoon on the day of the offense, was returning to her car because of the threat of rain. It was necessary that she pass through a wooded area bordering the beach. While in this wooded area she was accosted by appellant and dragged to a more secluded area of the beach where the sexual assault occurred. Upon her release by appellant the prosecutrix drove immediately to the police station and reported the incident, describing appellant. A police officer promptly returned to the scene of the assault and in the vicinity thereof spotted appellant as one fitting in considerable detail the description given by the prosecutrix. He arrested appellant and read him his Miranda rights.
The officer testified that he explained these rights, that appellant thanked him for explaining them, and that appellant said he understood them and did not wish to speak to the officer until he spoke to an attorney. Shortly thereafter at the police station appellant was again interviewed by other officers, again reminded of his rights and again he reiterated that he did not wish to speak to the officers, that he wanted to speak to an attorney. In fact, he was permitted to and did call an attorney. No objection was made to the introduction of this evidence relating to the giving of the Miranda rights and to appellant's responses thereto.
During closing arguments, however, the prosecutor made the following comments:
'But let's go on from what she stated. Let's go on to Officer Pilafant who took the stand, who the psychiatrists, both defense psychiatrists, never even heard about, never even talked to. He states that he saw this fellow on the beach and that he went up to him, talked to him and then arrested him for the offense. The fellow voluntarily put his arms behind his back and said he would go to the car. This is supposedly an insane person under the throes of an acute condition of schizophrenic paranoia at the time. He goes to the car and the officer reads him his Miranda rights. Does he say he doesn't understand them? Does he say 'What's going on?' No. He says 'I understand my rights. I do not want to speak to you. I want to speak to an attorney.' Again an occasion of a person who knows what's going on around his surroundings, and knows the consequences of his act. Even down--as going down (in) the car as you recollect Officer Pilafant...
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Tsavaris v. Scruggs, No. 48637
...Nevels v. State, 351 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) Page 759 Clark v. State, 336 So.2d 468 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1976) Greenfield v. State, 337 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1976) Mansfield v. State, 338 So.2d 857 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976), Cert. dismissed Fla., 342 So.2d 1102 Cridland v. State, 338 So.2d 30 (......
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Wainwright v. Greenfield, No. 84-1480
...Page 288 By a 2-to-1 vote, the Florida Court of Appeal for the Second District affirmed the conviction. Greenfield v. State, 337 So.2d 1021 (1976). After noting that "prosecutorial comment relating to a defendant's insistence on his right to remain silent generally constitutes reversib......
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Blatch v. State, No. 80-320
...self-incrimination rights under the Fifth Amendment. See Collins v. State, 227 So.2d 538 (Fla.3d DCA 1969). See also Greenfield v. State, 337 So.2d 1021 (Fla.2d DCA 1976). It does instead present a Fourth Amendment claim. If the interrogation which served as a seizure of evidence of Blatch'......
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Matire v. Wainwright, No. 84-5705
...this case, and finally because the facts of this case do not constitute a procedural default under Florida law. In Greenfield v. State, 337 So.2d 1021, 1022-23 (Fla.App.1976), an improper comment on Greenfield's silence was made by the testifying officer, but there was no objection. However......
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Tsavaris v. Scruggs, No. 48637
...Nevels v. State, 351 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) Page 759 Clark v. State, 336 So.2d 468 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1976) Greenfield v. State, 337 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1976) Mansfield v. State, 338 So.2d 857 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976), Cert. dismissed Fla., 342 So.2d 1102 Cridland v. State, 338 So.2d 30 (......
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Wainwright v. Greenfield, No. 84-1480
...Page 288 By a 2-to-1 vote, the Florida Court of Appeal for the Second District affirmed the conviction. Greenfield v. State, 337 So.2d 1021 (1976). After noting that "prosecutorial comment relating to a defendant's insistence on his right to remain silent generally constitutes reversib......
-
Blatch v. State, No. 80-320
...self-incrimination rights under the Fifth Amendment. See Collins v. State, 227 So.2d 538 (Fla.3d DCA 1969). See also Greenfield v. State, 337 So.2d 1021 (Fla.2d DCA 1976). It does instead present a Fourth Amendment claim. If the interrogation which served as a seizure of evidence of Blatch'......
-
Matire v. Wainwright, No. 84-5705
...this case, and finally because the facts of this case do not constitute a procedural default under Florida law. In Greenfield v. State, 337 So.2d 1021, 1022-23 (Fla.App.1976), an improper comment on Greenfield's silence was made by the testifying officer, but there was no objection. However......