Greenhill v. Spellings

Decision Date06 April 2007
Docket NumberNo. 06-5030.,06-5030.
Citation482 F.3d 569
PartiesFrances L. GREENHILL, Appellant v. Margaret SPELLINGS, Secretary, U.S. Department of Education, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 05cv01100).

Daniel Moar, Student Counsel, argued the cause for amicus curiae in support of appellant. With him on the briefs were Stephen H. Goldblatt, Director, and Michael Huang, Student Counsel.

Frances L. Greenhill, pro se, was on the briefs for appellant.

Megan L. Rose, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney. Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: GARLAND and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge WILLIAMS.

STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

In 2002 Frances Greenhill received a letter from the Department of Justice rescinding an offer of employment. This rescission was the result of a negative reference, which Greenhill claims came from her former supervisor at the Department of Education in contravention of a settlement agreement. Plaintiff brought suit in district court, seeking $210,000 in damages and some equitable remedies. The district court concluded that the cause of action was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. We agree. We remand the case to the district court with instructions to transfer the case to that court.

* * *

Greenhill, an employee of the Department of Education ("DOE"), executed a settlement agreement with the Department in 1999 to resolve complaints of age and race discrimination that she had filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). According to the agreement, DOE was to remove certain documents from Greenhill's record and to direct to a specified person all requests for employment references on Greenhill. In February 2002, Greenhill received an offer of employment from the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), pending a background investigation. But on June 21, 2002 DOJ wrote to Greenhill rescinding the offer, citing a negative reference from DOE.

Because Greenhill believed that DOE had breached the 1999 settlement, she consulted with Equal Employment Specialist Cathy Hawkins during the summer of 2002. The 1999 agreement required that any complaint alleging breach must be filed "in writing within thirty (30) calendar days of the date [Greenhill] knew or should have known of the alleged noncompliance." Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 41. Plaintiff in fact didn't submit a written complaint until July 30, 2003, more than a year after she learned of the bad reference. The Equal Employment Opportunity office at DOE initially accepted Greenhill's complaint for formal processing but on August 17, 2004 dismissed it for lack of timeliness. The EEOC affirmed the dismissal and sent Greenhill a right-to-sue letter. Plaintiff then filed a timely pro se complaint in district court seeking $210,000 in damages and various forms of equitable relief, including reinstatement to her position at DOE, restoration of leave, and reinstatement into retirement and savings plans. Noting that the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over all contract claims against the federal government in excess of $10,000, the court dismissed the cause of action without prejudice for want of jurisdiction.

* * *

The Tucker Act provides that "[t]he United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded ... upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Although the Little Tucker Act gives district courts jurisdiction over certain similar claims against the federal government, the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims is exclusive when a plaintiff seeks more than $10,000 in damages. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a); Sharp v. Weinberger, 798 F.2d 1521, 1523 (D.C.Cir. 1986).

As we said, Greenhill's complaint requested $210,000 as well as equitable relief. Although the complaint did not explicitly denominate the $210,000 claim as one for contract damages (as opposed, for example, to back pay under Title VII, see Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1216 (D.C.Cir. 2006)), neither Greenhill nor amicus argues that the amount sought is anything other than contract damages. Thus the complaint on its face appears to be one over which the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction.

On appeal, Greenhill has benefited from the able advocacy of amicus, who offers several theories to avoid the jurisdictional limitation. Close inspection, though, reveals none of them to be availing. First, amicus argues that the district court failed to recognize a Title VII retaliation claim in Greenhill's complaint or, alternatively, in her motion for the court to reconsider its dismissal of the complaint. The district court would have had jurisdiction over a retaliation claim and, according to amicus's theory, could then have exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the contract claim. See Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1215.

The Supreme Court has stated that pro se complaints, "however inartfully pleaded," are to be held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). We have also permitted courts to consider supplemental material filed by a pro se litigant in order to clarify the precise claims being urged. See Anyanwutaku v. Moore, 151 F.3d 1053, 1054 (D.C.Cir. 1998). But even under these liberal pleading standards Greenhill has not shown that a Title VII retaliation claim was before the district court.

Essentially, Greenhill argues that the negative evaluation supplied to DOJ by her former supervisor, Mary Brayboy, is indicative of animus toward Greenhill and thus "supports an inference of retaliation." Amicus's Br. at 28. Although providing a negative employment reference may be consistent with retaliatory behavior, the district court here could not reasonably be expected to discern a separate retaliation claim. The complaint makes no reference to retaliation, and the negative statements by Greenhill's former supervisor, without more, are not self-evidently retaliatory.

Amicus also points to two statements in the record that supposedly should have placed the district court on notice that Greenhill sought to pursue a retaliation claim. In an August 24, 2004 letter to the EEOC, Greenhill wrote that "Ms. Brayboy retaliated as well as discriminated as stated in the first complaint claimed." J.A. 77. Also, in a declaration before the EEOC, Greenhill asserted, "I am a victim of race and disability discrimination." J.A. 11. These are at best, two isolated statements in over 100 pages of documents—a potpourri of letters, declarations, e-mail exchanges, and the like—that plaintiff attached to the complaint. Although accompanying documents might clarify an otherwise ambiguous complaint, see Stewart v. National Education Association, 471 F.3d 169, 173 (D.C.Cir. 2006), nothing in our case law requires a district court to go on a fishing expedition for new claims.

Alternatively, amicus asserts that Greenhill's motion for reconsideration of the district court's dismissal of her complaint effectively amended the original complaint. In that motion, amidst numerous charges of malice, recklessness, and evil intent on the part of Ms. Brayboy, Greenhill asserted that she was the victim of "intentional discrimination." J.A. 212-14. Although Greenhill included numerous allegations and declarations in her pro se motion, the essence of the motion was: "Ms. Mary Brayboy in fact did breach our 1999 ... settlement ...." J.A. 212. The other statements did nothing to clarify or amend the original complaint; rather, by all appearances, they simply sought to bolster the argument that there was a breach.

Consequently, we reject amicus's suggestion that Greenhill brought a Title VII claim within the district court's jurisdiction. We thus have no occasion to consider the possible application of Rochon, i.e., whether, or under what circumstances, a district court might exercise supplemental jurisdiction over contract claims that otherwise fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.

Amicus's second theory for avoiding the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims relies on the fact that the settlement agreement explicitly precludes Greenhill from recovering damages. Because of this bar, amicus says, Greenhill can in fact obtain only equitable relief; and because the Court of Federal Claims can award only money damages (a much oversimplified proposition, as we note below), that court lacks jurisdiction to award Greenhill any relief. Amicus anticipates that if the present case were brought in the Court of Federal Claims, the government would argue that the court lacks jurisdiction on precisely these grounds. To be sure, it would be unseemly for a party to engage in a "paper charade," arguing to a district court that the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over a case, only to make a contradictory jurisdictional argument once the case is transferred. See Stovall v. United States, 71 Fed.Cl. 696, 697-98 (2006). But there is no reason to believe that the government has behaved or will behave with such duplicity here. More to the point, the possibility of shenanigans by a party doesn't permit a court to ignore jurisdictional defects.

Jurisdiction is determined by looking to the complaint. See Tootle v. Secretary of the Navy, 446 F.3d 167, 174 (D.C.Cir. 2006). If Greenhill explicitly or in essence seeks money damages in excess of $10,000,...

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