Greenhut Const. Co. v. Henry A. Knott, Inc., P-108

• Decision Date: 22 April 1971
• Docket Number: No. P-108,P-108
• Citation: 247 So.2d 517
• Parties: GREENHUT CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. HENRY A. KNOTT, INC., Reubin O'D. Askew, Governor of the State of Florida, Richard B. Stone, Secretary of State of the State of Florida, Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of the State of Florida, Floyd T. Christian, Commissioner of Education of the State of Florida, Doyle E. Conner, Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of Florida, Fred O. Dickinson, Jr., Comptroller of the State of Florida, and Thomas D. O'Malley, Jr., Treasurer of the State of Florida, as and constituting the heard of the Department of General Services, an agency of the State of Florida, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 517

247 So.2d 517

GREENHUT CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. HENRY A. KNOTT, INC., Reubin O'D. Askew, Governor of the State of Florida, Richard B. Stone, Secretary of State of the State of Florida, Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of the State of Florida, Floyd T. Christian, Commissioner of Education of the State of Florida, Doyle E. Conner, Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of Florida, Fred O. Dickinson, Jr., Comptroller of the State of Florida, and Thomas D. O'Malley, Jr., Treasurer of the State of Florida, as and constituting the heard of the Department of General Services, an agency of the State of Florida, Appellees.

No. P-108.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 22, 1971.

Holsberry, Emmanuel, Sheppard, Mitchell & Condon, Pensacola, for appellant.

Ervin, Pennington, Varn & Jacobs, Tallahassee, for appellee Henry A. Knott, Inc.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Arthur C. Canady, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Arnold Greenfield, Gen. Counsel, Tallahassee, for appellee Dept. of General Services.

WIGGINTON, Judge.

Defendant intervenor has appealed a declaratory judgment by which the trial court construed pertinent provisions of F.S. chapter 468, F.S.A, relating to the licensing of the construction industry. By the terms of the judgment the Department of General Services, an agency of the State of Florida, was enjoined from refusing to consider or from rejecting the bid of the plaintiff, Henry A. Knott, Inc., for the construction of legislative buildings in the Florida Capitol Center at Tallahassee solely because of Knott's status with reference to registration and certification of it by the Construction Industry Licensing Board of Florida.

This suit was instituted by Knott, a non-resident building contractor, in which only the Department of General Services of the State of Florida was made a party defendant. Greenhut Construction Company moved the court for permission to intervene as a party defendant because of its interest in the outcome of the case. Greenhut's motion was granted, and it became a party defendant pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.230, R.C.P., 30 F.S.A.; its intervention was in subordination to and in recognition of the propriety of the main proceedings.

The undisputed facts are that in response to an invitation to bidders issued by General Services, a number of contractors, including Knott and Greenhut, submitted bids for construction of two legislative office buildings to be built in the capitol Center. At the opening of the bids it was found that Knott's bid for the entire project was low by some $2,000 under the bid submitted by Greenhut, each of which bids approximated the sum of $10,000.000. At that point Knott's qualification as a bidder was challenged on the ground that it was not a registered and certified contractor as required by the laws of Florida as a condition precedent to bidding on public works. General Services requested on opinion from the Attorney General of Florida as to whether the law required a bidder to be a registered and certified contractor as a prequalification for bidding on a public project to be constructed by the state. In the opinion rendered by him, the Attorney General advised that the law of this state required contractors to be duly registered and certified by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board in order to be qualified to submit a bid for the construction of any public project and that in the absence of such registration and certification a bid submitted by an uncertified contractor should not be considered. On the basis of this advice General Services placed on its agenda for its next succeeding meeting an item for the consideration of Greenhut as the lowest responsible bidder and the award to it of the contract for the construction of the project. It was at this point in time that Knott filed this action in the Circuit Court of Leon County seeking a judicial declaration of its rights under F.S. chapter 468, F.S.A., dealing with the licensing of the construction industry, and a determination as to whether the bid submitted by it was entitled to consideration despite the fact that it did not possess the status of a registered and certified contractor at the time the bid was filed. By the judgment appealed the trial court found in favor of Knott and held that the law did not require it to be registered and certified as a contractor pursuant to the provisions of F.S., chapter 468, F.S.A., at the time it filed its bid. General Services was enjoined from rejecting or refusing to consider the bid solely because of Knott's status as a non-registered and noncertified contractor. The judgment has been appealed only by Greenhut, the State having filed in this cause its election not to appeal.

The first question presented for our decision concerns the motion to dismiss the appeal filed by Knott which is grounded on the proposition that Greenhut, as intervenor, has no legal status to seek appellate review of the judgment complained about. It is Knott's position that only General Services is aggrieved by the injunctive features of the final judgment which is binding on it alone and which cannot be said to adversely affect or prejudice the interest of Greenhut.

It appears to be the established law of this state that subject to the qualification that intervention shall be in subordination to and in recognition of the propriety of the main proceeding, an intervenor is a party for all purposes with the same rights and privileges of other parties to the cause. ¹ An intervenor is bound by the court's judgment entered in the cause and may appeal any ruling adverse to him. ² We are unable to agree with appellee Knott that the judgment sought to be reviewed herein is not adverse to the rights and interests of Greenhut, or that the latter is not prejudiced by virtue of such ruling. Before Knott filed this action in the trial court Greenhut was the apparent low responsible bidder on a $10,000,000 construction project with excellent prospects of being awarded the contract. As a result of the judgment rendered by the trial court, Greenhut is now no longer the lowest bidder, which status is occupied by Knott under the trial court's ruling. If the trial court's judgment is affirmed, Knott's bid will remain the lowest bid offered for the construction of the project and its chances of securing the contract will be good. If the trial court's judgment is reversed, the situation of the parties will be changed; then Greenhut's bid will be low and its prospects of becoming the contractor for construction of the project will again be bright. To say that Greenhut is not aggrieved by the judgment here appealed and its interest not prejudiced thereby is to ignore the realities of the situation. It is our view that Greenhut is an aggrieved party to the cause within the meaning of the applicable appellant rule which provides that: 'Any party who shall feel aggrieved by a final decision, order, judgment or decree may take an appeal and all parties to the cause who are not named as parties appellant shall automatically become parties appellee. * * *' ³ Appellee Knott's motion to quash or dismiss the appeal is therefore denied.

The primary question to be considered on the merits of the appeal concerns the correctness of the trial court's holding (1) that under the applicable statutes and decisions of this state it was not necessary for Knott to have registered with and been certified by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board prior to submitting its bid for the construction of the public project involved in this case and (2) that despite such lack of registration and certification Knott's bid was eligible for consideration by General services and could not be rejected solely because of Knott's unregistered status as a contractor.

The Legislature of Florida, by the enactment of the statute designated as 'Part II. Licensing of Construction Industry', ⁴ declared it to be the public policy of the state that in order to safeguard the life, health, property, and public welfare of its citizens, the business of construction and home improvement is a matter affecting the public interest, and all persons engaging in the business of contracting should be required to establish their competency and qualifications to be registered or certified as therein provided. ⁵

The statute defines a contractor as any person who, for compensation, undertakes to, or submits a bid to, construct any building or structure. ⁶ The statute further provides that the term 'contracting' means engaging in business as a contractor. ⁷

From the foregoing statutory definitions it seems eminently clear that any person who submits a bid to construct a building is engaging in business as a contractor. The penal provision of the statute provides:

'It is unlawful for any person to engage in the business or act in the capacity of a contractor without having been duly registered or certified.' ⁸

A plain and literal construction of the statute compels the conclusion that if one submits a bid agreeing to undertake, for a compensation, to construct an office building, it would be engaging in the business of acting in the capacity of a contractor. If such a bid is submitted before the bidder is duly registered and certified in accordance with the requirements of the statute, it would, in the absence of extenuating circumstances, be guilty of violating the penal provisions of the statute.

The statute sets forth the procedure to be followed by an applicant seeking registration and certification as a contractor by requiring that an application be filed with the board, a fee paid, and an examination taken in which the applicant attains a passing grade of not less than 75%. In addition, as a prerequisite to the issuance of a certificate, the applicant must submit satisfactory evidence that he has obtained the necessary insurance required of...