Greenly v. Davis

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware
• Writing for the Court: Before HERRMANN; PER CURIAM
• Citation: 486 A.2d 669
• Parties: William Allen GREENLY, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. William K. DAVIS and Kathleen Davis, Defendants Below, Appellees. . Submitted:
• Decision Date: 17 October 1983

Page 669

486 A.2d 669 William Allen GREENLY, Plaintiff Below, Appellant,
v.
William K. DAVIS and Kathleen Davis, Defendants Below, Appellees. Supreme Court of Delaware. Submitted: Oct. 17, 1983.
Decided: Jan. 17, 1984.

Upon appeal from Superior Court. Affirmed.

Benjamin F. Shaw, III (argued), James C. Eberly, Sr., Georgetown, for plaintiff below, appellant.

Arthur G. Connolly, Jr., (argued), James S. Green, Connolly, Bove, Lodge & Hutz, Wilmington, for defendants below, appellees.

Before HERRMANN, C.J., and HORSEY and CHRISTIE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff-appellant, William A. Greenly, filed a suit in the Superior Court against defendants-appellees, William K. Davis and Kathleen Davis, alleging a breach of a contract for the sale of stock in two corporations. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction and for insufficiency of notice to the nonresident defendants of substituted service of process. The Superior Court granted defendants' motion ruling that the Court lacked jurisdiction and that notice of the service of process had not met statutory requirements.

On appeal, plaintiff contends that: (a) the trial judge failed to view the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff even though the law required that he do so, (b) the trial judge made an erroneous interpretation of the Delaware long-arm statute,

Page 670

10 Del.C. § 3104(c)(1) and (2) ¹, when he found that a contract for the sale of stock which was to be delivered in Delaware did not bring the contracting parties within the jurisdiction of Delaware courts, and (c) the trial judge erred in requiring strict compliance with the notice provisions of the long-arm statute as set forth in 10 Del.C. § 3104(d). ²

Plaintiff contends that the trial judge in considering the motion to dismiss actually picked and chose facts from among conflicting affidavits on the factual issues surrounding the application of the long-arm statute, and that he thereby ignored the well-established rule that the record be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and that all reasonable inferences be considered most strongly in favor of plaintiff. We have examined the record on which the trial judge relied and the conclusions he reached. We find no error in what the trial court did. It is true that the trial judge did rely on William K. Davis' specific factual assertions as to where most of the negotiations between the parties took place, and he concluded that the negotiations took place in Pennsylvania. In so doing, he gave little weight to vague, general assertions contained in plaintiff's counter-affidavit where plaintiff asserted that he had met on "numerous occasions" with defendant William K. Davis at Greenwood, Delaware but failed to state when the meetings occurred or that they were related to the contract in question. This was appropriate in view of the wording of the affidavits. The burden was upon the plaintiff to make a specific showing that the Delaware court has jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. of Indiana, Inc., 298 U.S. 178, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936); Harmon v. Eudaily, Del.Super., 407 A.2d 232 (1979), aff'd, Del.Supr., 420 A.2d 1175 (1980); ALTECH Indus., Inc., v. Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp., 542...