Greenough v. Tax Assessors of City of Newport, No. 461

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtREED
Citation172 A.L.R. 329,67 S.Ct. 1400,331 U.S. 486,91 L.Ed. 1621
PartiesGREENOUGH et al. v. TAX ASSESSORS OF CITY OF NEWPORT et al
Docket NumberNo. 461
Decision Date09 June 1947

331 U.S. 486
67 S.Ct. 1400
91 L.Ed. 1621
GREENOUGH et al.

v.

TAX ASSESSORS OF CITY OF NEWPORT et al.

No. 461.
Argued March 7, 1947.
Decided June 9, 1947.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 13, 1947. See 68 S.Ct. 28.

Appeal from the Superior Court of the County of Newport, State of Rhode Island.

Page 487

Messrs. William Greenough, of New York City, and William R. Harvey, of Newport, R.I., for appellants.

Mr. John C. Burke, of Newport, R.I., for appellees.

[Argument of Counsel from page 487 intentionally omitted]

Page 488

Mr. Justice REED delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellants are testamentary trustees of George H. Wrren, who died a resident of New York. His will was duly probated in that state and letters testamentary issued to appellants as executors. A duly authenticated copy of said will was filed and recorded in Rhode Island and there letters testamentary were also issued. Letters of trusteeship were granted to appellants by a surrogate's court in New York. None were needed or asked for or granted by Rhode Island. At all times pertinent to this appeal, appellants, as trustees under the will, held intangible personalty for the benefit of Constance W. Warren for her life and then to certain as yet undetermined future beneficiaries.

The evidences of the intangible property in the estate of George H. Warren and in the trust in question were at all times in New York. The life beneficiary and one of the trustees are residents of New York. The other trustee resides in Rhode Island. During the period in question, he did not, however, exercise his powers, as trustee, in Rhode Island.

A personal property tax of $50 was assessed by the City of Newport, Rhode Island, against the resident trustee upon one-half of the value of the corpus of the trust. The applicable assessment statute for ad valorem taxes appears in the margin.1 At the time of this assessment, the property consisted of 500 shares of the capital stock of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. The tax was paid by the

Page 489

trustees and this suit instituted, under appropriate state procedure, in the Superior Court of the County of Newport to recover the tax from the city. The Superior Court by decision denied the petition. A bill of exceptions was prosecuted by these petitioners to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island which overruled the exceptions and remitted the case to the superior court.2 Thereupon judgment was entered for the appellees and an appeal allowed to this Court. All questions of state procedure and of the applicability of the state statute to the resident trustee in the circumstances of this case were foreclosed for us by the rulings of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island.3

The appellants' contention throughout has been that the Rhode Island statute, under which the assessment was made, if applicable to the resident trustee, was unconstitutional under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Their objection in the state courts and here is that Rhode Island cannot tax the resident trustee's proportionate part of these trust intangibles merely because that trustee resides in Rhode Island. Such a tax, they urge, is unconstitutional under the due process clause because it exacts payment measured by the value of property wholly beyond the reach of Rhode Island's power and to which that state does not give protection or benefit. Appellants specifically disclaim reliance upon the argument that the Rhode Island tax exposes them to the danger of other ad

Page 490

valorem taxes in another state.4 The same concession was made in the Supreme Court of Rhode Island.5 We therefore restrict our discussion and determination to the issue presented by appellants' insistence that Rhode Island cannot constitutionally collect this tax because the state rendered no equivalent for its exaction in protection of or benefit to the trust fund.

For the purpose of the taxation of those resident within her borders, Rhode Island has sovereign power unembarrassed by any restriction except those that emerge from the Constitution. Whether that power is exercised wisely or unwisely is the problem of each state. It may well be that sound fiscal policy would be promoted by a tax upon trust intangibles levied only by the state that is the seat of a testamentary trust.6 Or, it may be that the actual domicile of the trustee should be preferred for a single tax. Utilization by the states of modern reciprocal statutory tax provisions may more fairly distribute tax benefits and burdens, although the danger of competitive inducements for obtaining a settlor's favor are obvious.7 But our question here is whether or not a provision of the Constitution forbids this tax. Neither the expediency of the levy nor its economic effect on the economy of the taxing state is for our consideration.8 We are dealing with the totality

Page 491

of a state's authority in the exercise of its revenue raising powers.

The Fourteenth Amendment has been held to place a limit on a state's power to lay an ad valorem tax on its residents.9 Previous decisions of this Court have held that mere power over a resident does not permit a state to exact from him a property tax on his tangible property permanently located outside the jurisdiction of the taxing state.10 Such an exaction, the cases teach, would violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because no benefit or protection, adequate to support a tax exaction, is furnished by the state of residence.11 The domiciliary state of the owner of tangibles permanently located in another state, however, may require its resident to contribute to the government under which he lives by an income tax in which the income from the out-of-state property is an item of the taxpayer's gross income. It is immaterial, in such a case, that the property producting the income is located in another state. People of State of New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 57 S.Ct. 466, 81 L.Ed. 666, 108 A.L.R. 721. And, where the tangible property of a corporation has no taxable situs outside the domiciliary state, that state may tax the tangibles because the cor-

Page 492

poration exists under the law of its domicile. Southern Pacific Co. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63, 32 S.Ct. 13, 56 L.Ed. 96.12

The precedents, holding it unconstitutional for a state to tax tangibles of a resident that are permanently beyond its boundaries, have not been applied to intangibles where the documents of owner interest are beyond the confines of the taxing jurisdiction or where the choses in action are mere promises of a nonresident without documents.13 One reason that state taxation of a resident on his intangibles is justified is that when the taxpayer's wealth is represented by intangibles, the tax gatherer has difficulty in locating them and there is uncertainty as to which taxing district affords benefits or protection to the actual property that the intangibles represent. There may be no 'papers.' If the assessment is not made at the residence of the owner, intangibles may be overlooked easily by other assessors of taxes. A state is dependent upon its citizens for revenue. Wealth has long been accepted as a fair measure of a tax assessment. As a practical mode of collecting reenue, the states unrestricted by the federal Constitution have been accustomed to assess property taxes upon intangibles 'wherever held or deposited,' belonging to their citizens and regardless of the location of the debtor.14 So long as a state chooses to tax the value of intangibles as a part of a taxpayer's wealth, the location of the evidences of ownership is immaterial. If the location of the documents was controlling, their transfer to another jurisdiction would defeat

Page 493

the tax of the domiciliary state. As a matter of fact, there is more reason for the domiciliary state of the owner of the intangibles than for any other taxing jurisdiction to collect a property tax on the intangibles. Since the intangibles themselves have no real situs, the domicile of the owner is the nearest approximation, although other taxing jurisdictions may also have power to tax the same intangibles.15 Normally the intangibles are subject to the immediate control of the owner. This close relationship between the intangibles and the owner furnishes an adequate basis for the tax on the owner by the state of his residence as against any attack for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The state of the owner's residence supplies the owner with the benefits and protection inherent in the existence of an organized government. He may choose to expand his activities beyond its borders but the state of his residence is his base of operations. It is the place where he exercises certain privileges of citizenship and enjoys the protection of his domiciliary government. Does a similar relationship exist between a trustee and the intangibles of a trust?

The trustee of today moves freely from state to state. The settlor's residence may be one state, the seat of a trust another state and the trustee or trustees may live in still another jurisdiction or may constantly change their residence.16 The official life of a trustee is, of course, different from his personal. A trust, this Court has said, is 'an abstraction.' In federal income tax purposes it is sometimes dealt with as though it had a separate existence. Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U.S. 20, 27, 53 S.Ct. 417, 420, 77 L.Ed. 1004. This is because Con-

Page 494

gress has seen fit so to deal with the trust. This entity, the trust, from another point of view consists of separate interests, the equitable interest in the res of the beneficiary17 and the legal interest of the trustee. The legal interest of the trustee in the res is a distinct right. It enables a settlor to protect his beneficiaries from the burdens of ownership, while the beneficiary retained the right, through...

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54 practice notes
  • Miller Bros Co v. State of Maryland, No. 160
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • April 5, 1954
    ...66 L.Ed. 149; Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors, 282 U.S. 19, 24, 51 S.Ct. 15, 16, 75 L.Ed. 140; Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport, 331 U.S. 486, 67 S.Ct. 1400, 91 L.Ed. 1621. See Nevada Bank v. Sedgwick, 104 U.S. 111, 26 L.Ed. 703; Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 595, 26 L.Ed. 84......
  • Comptroller of Treasury v. Taylor, No. 56, Sept. Term, 2018
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • July 29, 2019
    ...relies heavily on the principle that states may tax the intangible assets of their domiciliaries. Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport , 331 U.S. 486, 492-93, 67 S.Ct. 1400, 91 L.Ed. 1621 (1947). See also Bonaparte v. State , 63 Md. 465, 472 (1885) (holding "the 465 Md. 118 domicile of a t......
  • Gott v. Norberg, No. 77-436-M
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island
    • July 8, 1980
    ...it provides no benefit or protection in return. Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport, 71 R.I. 477, 488, 47 A.2d 625, 631 (1946), aff'd, 331 U.S. 486, 67 S.Ct. 1400, 91 L.Ed. 1621 (1947), reh. denied, 332 U.S. 784, 68 S.Ct. 28, 92 L.Ed. 367 (1947); Wood v. Quimby, supra. In such circumstanc......
  • Estate of Brooks v. Comm'r of Revenue Servs., SC 19577
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • May 23, 2017
    ...S.Ct. 870, 86 L.Ed. 1097 (1942). For this reason, "intangibles themselves have no real situs ...." Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport , 331 U.S. 486, 493, 67 S.Ct. 1400, 91 L.Ed. 1621 (1947). Accordingly, the rule of situs is not controlling with respect to the issue of jurisdiction to l......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
54 cases
  • Miller Bros Co v. State of Maryland, No. 160
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • April 5, 1954
    ...66 L.Ed. 149; Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors, 282 U.S. 19, 24, 51 S.Ct. 15, 16, 75 L.Ed. 140; Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport, 331 U.S. 486, 67 S.Ct. 1400, 91 L.Ed. 1621. See Nevada Bank v. Sedgwick, 104 U.S. 111, 26 L.Ed. 703; Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 595, 26 L.Ed. 84......
  • Comptroller of Treasury v. Taylor, No. 56, Sept. Term, 2018
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • July 29, 2019
    ...relies heavily on the principle that states may tax the intangible assets of their domiciliaries. Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport , 331 U.S. 486, 492-93, 67 S.Ct. 1400, 91 L.Ed. 1621 (1947). See also Bonaparte v. State , 63 Md. 465, 472 (1885) (holding "the 465 Md. 118 domicile of a t......
  • Gott v. Norberg, No. 77-436-M
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island
    • July 8, 1980
    ...it provides no benefit or protection in return. Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport, 71 R.I. 477, 488, 47 A.2d 625, 631 (1946), aff'd, 331 U.S. 486, 67 S.Ct. 1400, 91 L.Ed. 1621 (1947), reh. denied, 332 U.S. 784, 68 S.Ct. 28, 92 L.Ed. 367 (1947); Wood v. Quimby, supra. In such circumstanc......
  • Estate of Brooks v. Comm'r of Revenue Servs., SC 19577
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • May 23, 2017
    ...S.Ct. 870, 86 L.Ed. 1097 (1942). For this reason, "intangibles themselves have no real situs ...." Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport , 331 U.S. 486, 493, 67 S.Ct. 1400, 91 L.Ed. 1621 (1947). Accordingly, the rule of situs is not controlling with respect to the issue of jurisdiction to l......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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