Greenspan v. Greenspan

• Decision Date: 12 May 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:16-cv-0001-RMG-MGB
• Parties: JACOB GREENSPAN, Plaintiff, v. JOEL GREENSPAN, and JUNE GREENSPAN, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

JACOB GREENSPAN, Plaintiff, v. JOEL GREENSPAN, and JUNE GREENSPAN, Defendants.

Case No. 2:16-cv-0001-RMG-MGB

DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLESTON DIVISION

May 12, 2016

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Jacob Greenspan ("Plaintiff") is proceeding pro se and has paid the filing fee in this civil diversity action. Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(A), and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g), D.S.C., pretrial matters involving pro se litigants are referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge for consideration. After careful review, the undersigned recommends that the Complaint should be summarily dismissed, without prejudice and without issuance and service of process, for the following reasons:

I. Background and Factual Allegations

In his own words, the pro se Plaintiff is suing his parents for "damages arising out of the fractured relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants' (sic)." (DE# 1, ¶ 7). Proceeding under diversity jurisdiction, Plaintiff brings state law claims against his parents for alleged "breach of fiduciary relationship," constructive fraud, civil conspiracy, and defamation.

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that his parents have allegedly made unspecified statements concerning his "mental health and competence, and the state of Plaintiff's personal and professional lives." (DE# 1, ¶ 9). He alleges that his parents have attacked his "character" and held him "out to be an individual that (sic) is not to be taken seriously." (Id., ¶ 10). He complains that his parents have provided "Plaintiff's family and friends with the belief that Plaintiff is to blame for the problems that exist in the relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants' (sic)." (Id., ¶ 11). He contends that unspecified statements by his parents have caused others "to perceive him as "troubled" and "to question Plaintiff's ability to think and act for himself." (Id., ¶ 12). Plaintiff insists that he has "no history of mental health problems." (Id., ¶ 14). He claims that he is therefore "entitled to recover actual, consequential and incidental damages and punitive damages from Defendants' (sic)." (Id., ¶ 20).

In his cause of action for "Breach of Fiduciary Duty," Plaintiff alleges that:

A fiduciary relationship was established between Plaintiff and Defendants' (sic) based upon the nature of Defendants' parental relationship to Plaintiff in which Plaintiff was, in fact, accustomed to being guided and influenced by the judgment and advice of Defendants' (sic), and Defendants' inducement of Plaintiff into placing his trust and confidence in the integrity and fidelity of Defendants' (sic) by agreeing to be guided by Defendants' judgment and advice in reliance of Defendants' promise of financial support.

(DE# 1, ¶ 21). Plaintiff complains that his parents advanced "their own interests ahead of Plaintiff's best interests" and that "such actions and omissions constitute Defendants' failures to act with due care, loyally (sic), and in good faith and with due regard for Plaintiffs' interests." (Id., ¶ 23).

Similarly, in his cause of action for "constructive fraud," Plaintiff alleges that "a fiduciary relationship existed in which Defendants' (sic) breached their fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff." (Id., ¶ 27). He alleges that the "Defendants' (sic) intentionally and willfully abused and betrayed the trust and confidence reposed in them by Plaintiff with the intention of advancing their own interests ahead of Plaintiff's best interests." (Id., ¶ 28).

Finally, in his cause of action against his parents for "conspiracy" with each other, Plaintiff contends that the "Defendants' (sic) acted together in denying and continuing to deny their wrongful actions" and "have continuously relied upon the manipulation of facts and information with the intentions of absolving themselves of any wrongdoing and relieving themselves of the financial burden associated with their promises made to Plaintiff due to Defendants' (sic) dissatisfaction with their own judgment and the advice offered to Plaintiff." (Id., ¶¶ 33-34).

For relief, Plaintiff seeks "an award of all actual, compensatory, consequential, and incidental damages," punitive damages, and the costs of suit. Although Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he asks for "attorney fees." (DE# 1, ¶ 41).

II. Standard of Review

A. No Screening Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915(e)(2)

Pre-screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is not applicable in pro se, non-prisoner, fee-paid cases (such as the present case). See e.g., Chong Su Yi v. Social Sec. Admin., 554 F.App'x 247 (4th Cir. 2014); Mayhew v. Duffy, Case No. 2:14-cv-24-RMG-BM, 2014 WL 468938, *1 (D.S.C. Feb. 4, 2014). Therefore, the Magistrate Judge is not conducting initial review pursuant to 28 U .S.C. § 1915. As Plaintiff has paid the filing fee, screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) is also not applicable. See, e.g., Bardes v. Magera, Case No. 2:08-487-PMD-RSC, 2008 WL 2627134, *8-10 (D.S.C. June 25, 2008); Anderson v. Patterson, Case No. No. 6:16-761-MGL-JDA, 2016 WL 1743095 (D.S.C. April 12, 2016), adopted by 2016 WL 1732763 (D.S.C., May 2, 2016).

B. Inherent Authority to Dismiss Frivolous Cases

However, even in cases where a pro se litigant has paid the full filing fee, the United States Supreme Court has observed that district courts possess the inherent authority to dismiss frivolous cases. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989) ("Section 1915(d) ...authorizes courts to dismiss a 'frivolous or malicious' action, but there is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision."). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has also held that "frivolous complaints are subject to summary dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court." Ross v. Baron, Case No. 12-1272, 2012 WL 3590914, *1, 493 F.App'x 405, 406 (4th Cir. Aug. 22, 2012). Other circuits agree. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. First E. 7th St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363 (2d Cir. 2000) ("district courts may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee"); Greathouse v. JHS Sec. Inc., 784 F.3d 105, 119 (2d Cir. 2015) (courts have inherent authority to sua sponte dismiss frivolous suits). Therefore, this Complaint is subject to review pursuant to the inherent authority of this Court to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that the case is not frivolous. See e.g., Carter v. Ervin, Case No. 0:14-cv-00865-TLW-PJG, 2014 WL 2468351 (D.S.C. June 2, 2014), appeal dism'd, 585 F.App'x 98 (4th Cir. 2014); Cornelius v. Howell, Case No. 3:06-3387-MBS-BM, 2007 WL 397449, *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 8, 2007), adopted by, 2007 WL 4952430 (D.S.C. Jan. 30, 2007), aff'd, 251 F.App'x 246 (2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1057 (2008); Duffy, 2014 WL 468938, *1 fn.1.

C. Liberal Construction

Pro se pleadings are given liberal construction and are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, "[t]he 'special judicial solicitude' with which a district court should view ... pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate. United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir.2012), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 2401 (2013). Only those questions which are squarely presented to a court may properly be addressed." Weller v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. for City of Baltimore, 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir.1990). Giving "liberal construction" does not mean that theCourt can ignore a pro se plaintiff's clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim. "Principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints ... [do] not require ... courts to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1088 (1986).

III. Discussion

A. Diversity Jurisdiction

This Court has the inherent authority to review a Complaint to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists. See Davis v. Wilson, Case No. 9:13-cv-382-GRA-BHH, 2013 WL 1282024, *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 8, 2013), adopted by 2013 WL 1282024 (D.S.C. March 27, 2013), aff'd by 539 F.App'x 145 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied by 134 S.Ct. 940 (2014). Payment of the full filing fee does not cure a lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Myers v. McKnight, Case No. 2:10-cv-3259-RMG-RSC, 2011 WL 221867, *7 (D.S.C. Jan.5 2011), adopted by 2011 WL 219847 (D.S.C. Jan. 24, 2011); Myers v. Kaufmann, Case No. 2:10-cv-2081-RMG-RSC, 2010 WL 4338097, *8 n.1 (D.S.C. Sept. 16. 2010), adopted by 2010 WL 4340381 (D.S.C. Oct. 25, 2010), aff'd by, 420 F.App'x 302 (4th Cir. Apr. 4, 2011).

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, "constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute." In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir.1998). A federal district court may sua sponte consider whether a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists and must "dismiss the action if no such ground appears." Id. at 352; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) ("If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action."). Although a lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time during a case, determining jurisdiction at the outset of the litigation is the most efficient procedure. Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4thCir.1999); and see, e.g., Cuyler v. Dept. of Army, Case No. 3:14-cv-3228-CMC-SVH, 2014 WL 4635570 (D.S.C. Sept. 15, 2014) (summarily dismissing).

Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1) requires that the complaint provide "a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction." Plaintiff's Complaint asserts only state law claims and does not seek to proceed under federal question jurisdiction. Rather, Plaintiff's Complaint seeks to proceed under diversity jurisdiction pursuant...