Greenup v. Morris

• Decision Date: 18 November 2021
• Docket Number: 4:19-cv-00243-DCN
• Parties: GREENUP ET AL, Plaintiff, v. MORRIS ET AL, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Idaho

GREENUP ET AL, Plaintiff,
v.
MORRIS ET AL, Defendant.

No. 4:19-cv-00243-DCN

United States District Court, D. Idaho

November 18, 2021

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

DAVID C. NYE, CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This case revolves around the death of minor Justice Bishop on July 3, 2017. Dkt. 1. Plaintiffs Danielle Greenup and Andrew and Darce Bishop allege a federal claim under 42 U.S. § 1983, and two claims under Idaho state law: a wrongful death claim, and a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. Currently pending before the Court are Defendant McKenzie Morris's Motion for Summary Judgment^[1] (Dkt. 28), and Defendants Russell Barron, Joel Corrington, Elizabeth Fehringer, Christopher Freeburne, Lisa Hettinger, Carol Jeffries, Dave Jeppesen, Elizabeth Loosli, Caprice Miller, Rachel Peace, Brian Plowman, David Taylor, Lyndsey Walls, and Lori Wolff's (hereinafter “State

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Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 30).^[2]

The Court held oral argument on August 13, 2021, and took the matter under advisement. Upon review, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Morris's Motion for Summary Judgment, and GRANTS the State Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiffs Danielle Greenup and Andrew Bishop are the natural parents of minor Justice Bishop, and Plaintiff Darce Bishop is Justice's paternal grandmother. Dkt. 28-1, at 1. Justice suffered throughout her life from Short Bowel Syndrome, a life-threatening condition which required a substantial amount of medical attention and ongoing care, “the absence of which would place the child in grave harm.” Dkt. 1, at 6.^[3]

In November 2016, the State of Idaho removed Justice from Danielle and Andrew's custody after her doctors expressed concern that her parents had not sought emergency medical attention after noticing Justice had an infection. Dkt. 30-3, at 3. Justice was eventually placed with foster parents-the Morrises. On July 2, 2017, while in the custody of the Morrises, Justice developed a fever and complained of nausea, vomiting, and

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diarrhea that appears to have started a few days prior (June 30, 2017). Id. Justice's condition deteriorated that day to the point that the Morrises sought urgent hospitalization. Dkt. 1, at 8. Justice was initially hospitalized at Bingham Memorial Hospital in Blackfoot, Idaho. Greenup and Andrew Bishop were turned away from seeing Justice at Bingham Memorial, purportedly by the Morrises. Soon after, Justice was transported by life flight to Primary Children's Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah, where she passed away on July 3, 2017, from complications related to her Short Bowel Syndrome. Id. Greenup and Andrew Bishop were able to see Justice before she passed away.

B. Procedural Background

On July 1, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against the Morris Defendants; the State Defendants; Heritage Home Health, LLC; and Angela Young (a nurse with Heritage Home Health, LLC). Dkt. 1. Following discovery, Morris filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. 28. Subsequently, the State Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. 30. The same day, Heritage Home Health and Angela Young filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. 29. Prior to the hearing on the motions, however, Plaintiffs agreed to dismiss defendants Angela Young and Heritage Home Health. See Dkt. 58. And even though the Court will not definitely rule on Heritage Home Health's Motion for Summary Judgment, its argument regarding causation, contained in its Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 29), were joined by both the State Defendants and Morris. Dkts. 31, 33. Thus, the Court will address the topic in due course.

For reasons discussed in detail below, the Court GRANTS the State Defendants' Motion and GRANTS in PART and DENIES in PART Morris's Motion. Because it grants

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Morris's Motion as to the federal claims, the Court also declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claims.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

I. Summary Judgment standard

Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party can show that, as to any claim or defense, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The Court must enter summary judgment if a party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule “is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.” Id. at 322. It is not “a disfavored procedural shortcut, ” but is instead the “principal tool[] by which factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private resources.” Id. at 327.

“The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original). Material facts are those “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. at 248. Summary judgment is not appropriate “if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

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The Court's role at summary judgment is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The Court does not make credibility determinations at this stage of the litigation, as such determinations are reserved for the trier of fact. Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 507 (9th Cir. 1992). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must also “view[] the facts in the non-moving party's favor[.]” Zetwick v. Cty. of Yolo, 850 F.3d 436, 441 (9th Cir. 2017).

However, the Court need not accept allegations by the non-moving party if such allegations are not supported by sufficient evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Instead, the nonmoving party “must go beyond the pleadings and by its own evidence and ‘set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'” Far Out Productions, Inc. v. Oskar, 247 F.3d 986, 997 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)); Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting the nonmoving party must “identify with particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment”). “If the evidence is colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (cleaned up).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Defendant Morris's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 28)

1. Whether Plaintiff Darce Bishop has standing

As a threshold matter, Morris asserts Darce Bishop, Justice's paternal grandmother, does not having standing to pursue claims against any defendant in this matter. Dkt. 28, at 12-14. This is so, she contends, because Justice's natural parents are still alive, and because

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Darce Bishop was not dependent on financial support or services from Justice. Id. at 13 (citing Idaho Code § 5-311). Plaintiffs responded to this argument by incorporating their response to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the State Defendants (Dkt. 40)- who also argued Darce does not have standing-wherein they concede Darce does not have standing to pursue a wrongful death claim, but assert she, nonetheless, still has her own “independent claim for violations of her substantive due process rights . . . .” Dkt. 40, at 3.

First, the Court agrees that Darce indeed does not have standing to bring a wrongful death claim. Idaho Code § 5-311 outlines that only heirs of the deceased, as defined by that statute^[4], are allowed to bring a wrongful death claim. Because Darce Bishop has made no claim that she fits this statutory definition, she is not an “heir” as defined in Idaho Code § 5-311. Accordingly, she lacks standing to bring a state law claim for wrongful death.

Similarly, Darce Bishop lacks standing to bring a § 1983 claim. For starters, federal law does not specifically provide for the survival of civil rights actions under § 1983 upon the death of the person whose rights were allegedly violated. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589 (1978). And again, even if there was some type of “survivorship” provision at play here, Darce is not an heir or representative of Justice's and cannot bring claims on her behalf.

In addition, it appears this claim has morphed to some degree. Originally, Darce was bringing a § 1983 claim on behalf of Justice. As noted, however, such is not allowed.

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Apparently realizing this, Plaintiffs pivot and now argue Darce's own constitutional rights were violated because she wasn't free to associate with, or care for, Justice. Dkt. 40, at 4, 8. First, a changed theory this late in the litigation prejudices Defendants. What's more, the rights of grandparents are separate and distinct from the rights of parents. See Miller v. California, 355 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2004). Second, Darce has not provided any evidence to suggest the State owed her any constitutional duty. Any duty owed was to Justice and/or her parents-but not Darce. Absent a duty owed, Darce cannot articulate a cognizable constitutional right she had that was violated by Defendants' actions under § 1983.

Ultimately, the Court finds Darce Bishop lacks standing to bring any state or federal claims, and, therefore, grants this portion of Morris's Motion (and the joining parties' motions on the same topic). Darce Bishop is...