Greenville Cnty. Republican Party Exec. Comm. v. State, C.A. No. 6:10–cv–01407–JMC.

CourtUnited States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court of South Carolina
Citation824 F.Supp.2d 655
Decision Date30 March 2011
Docket NumberC.A. No. 6:10–cv–01407–JMC.
PartiesThe GREENVILLE COUNTY REPUBLICAN PARTY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, The South Carolina Republican Party, Patrick B. Haddon, in his official capacity as the Chairman of the Greenville County Republican Party, and William “Billy” Mitchell, Plaintiffs, v. The State of SOUTH CAROLINA and John H. Hudgens, III, in his official capacity as the Chairman of the South Carolina State Election Commission, Defendants.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

William Douglas Smith, Johnson Smith Hibbard and Wildman, Spartanburg, SC, Samuel Darryl Harms, III, Harms Law Firm, Stephen Henry Brown, Stephen H. Brown Law Firm, Greenville, SC, for Plaintiffs.

J. C. Nicholson, III, Office of Attorney General, Alan Wilson, Clyde Havird Jones, Jr., John W. McIntosh, Robert Dewayne Cook, SC Attorney General's Office, Columbia, SC, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

J. MICHELLE CHILDS, District Judge.

This case involves a challenge to multiple election laws of the State of South Carolina brought by The Greenville County Republican Party Executive Committee, The South Carolina Republican Party, Patrick B. Haddon, in his official capacity as the Chairman of the Greenville County Republican Party, and William “Billy” Mitchell (Plaintiffs) against The State of South Carolina and John H. Hudgens, III, in his official capacity as the Chairman of the South Carolina State Election Commission (Defendants). Plaintiffs contend that the open primary system and other laws placing restrictions on the candidate nomination process are unconstitutional because they allegedly violate Plaintiffs' right to freedom of association and equal protection as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Currently before the court are Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 28], Defendant State of South Carolina's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 29], and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 30].

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

South Carolina law currently provides for an open primary election system as the general method of nominating political party candidates for inclusion on the general election ballot. Under the law, any qualified elector is allowed to vote in the party primary of his or her choice; provided, however, that the elector may vote in only one party primary during any single election cycle. See S.C.Code. Ann. §§ 7–11–10, –9–20, –13–1010 (2010). Primaries in South Carolina are conducted as open primaries regardless of whether the primary is conducted by the State Election Commission, County Election Commission, or the political parties.

Political parties may elect not to participate in the primary process and instead nominate its candidates for the general election by convention. See S.C.Code. Ann. § 7–11–10. However, to nominate candidates by convention, three-fourths of the total membership of the party's state convention must vote to use the nomination method. See S.C.Code Ann. § 7–11–30. Under State election law, candidates may also be placed on the general election ballot by petition. See S.C.Code. Ann. § 7–11–10. Although the petition method of nomination is not typically used by organized political parties, South Carolina law does not expressly prohibit political parties from using petitions to place the candidate of the party's choice on the general election ballot.

On June 1, 2010, Plaintiffs filed this action against Defendants alleging violations of the Plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of free association and the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed in the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs allege that South Carolina's open primary nomination method is unconstitutional and that South Carolina law provides no viable alternative method of nominating candidates due to additionally unreasonable and unconstitutional statutory restraints on the regulation of the party's internal processes which prevent the parties from exercising other nomination options. Plaintiffs seek permanent injunctive relief from the enforcement of S.C.Code Ann. § 7–5–340 (Duties of State Election Commission respecting removal of elector from official list), § 7–5–420 (Lists of voters for party primaries), § 7–5–610 (Who is entitled to vote in municipal elections), § 7–5–630 (Municipal registration or enrollment shall not be required), § 7–9–20 (Qualifications for party membership and voting in primary election), § 7–11–20 (Conduct of party conventions or party primary elections generally; presidential preference primaries), § 7–11–30 (Convention nomination of candidates), § 7–13–15 (Primaries to be conducted by State Election Commission and county election commissions on second Tuesday in June), and § 7–15–320 (Persons qualified to vote by absentee ballot). 1 In addition to their requests for injunctive relief, Plaintiffs' Complaint also requests a declaratory judgment regarding the constitutionality of the statutes, both on their face and as applied.2

Defendants answered the Complaint on July 19, 2010, generally denying Plaintiffs' entitlement to the requested relief. Defendants further asserted that the action was barred, as against the State, by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The parties agreed on an abbreviated scheduling order for this matter and did not engage in any discovery. On February 10, 2011, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment only as to Plaintiffs' facial constitutional challenge to the election statutes. Defendant State of South Carolina contemporaneously filed a motion seeking dismissal as a defendant in this action based on sovereign immunity.3 A disparate group of individuals and organizations, including but not limited to individual voters self-categorized as independents, the South Carolina Independence Party, the South Carolina Constitution Party, the Progressive Network Education Fund, Inc., the Columbia Tea Party, Inc., the Committee for a Unified Independent Party, Inc. (d/b/a IndependentVoting.org), and members of the Black Legislative Caucus of the South Carolina House of Representatives (collectively, Intervenors) submitted a single motion to intervene in the action which the court granted shortly before holding a hearing on the pending motions. The court heard oral arguments on the motions on March 10, 2011.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate that: (1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; and (2) that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962).

The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the district court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist which give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Ross v. Commc'ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir.1985). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs assert that South Carolina's primary election statutes are unconstitutional on their face. In their summary judgment motion, they ask the court to enter a declaration of unconstitutionality and to enjoin Defendants from enforcing the statutes.4

To prevail on a facial attack on a statute, a plaintiff must demonstrate that there are no set of circumstances under which the law could be validly applied. See New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 11, 108 S.Ct. 2225, 101 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988). [A] facial challenge must fail where the statute has a plainly legitimate sweep.” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) (internal citations omitted). Courts have also recognized an additional type of facial challenge which allows a finding of unconstitutionality in the First Amendment context where the challenged law is so broad that there is a realistic possibility that the law may inhibit the First Amendment rights of parties not before the court. See New York State Club Ass'n, Inc., 487 U.S. at 11, 108 S.Ct. 2225.

“In determining whether a law is facially invalid, [the court] must be careful not to go beyond the statute's facial requirements and speculate about ‘hypothetical’ or ‘imaginary’ cases.” Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 450, 128 S.Ct. 1184 (internal citations omitted). Facial challenges are generally disfavored because they “threaten to short circuit the democratic process by preventing laws embodying the will of the people from...

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