Greenwald v. Appell
Decision Date | 23 June 1883 |
Citation | 17 F. 140 |
Parties | GREENWALD and others v. APPELL. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
This is an action at law upon certain promissory notes, and also, I believe, upon an open account. There is a demurrer to the complaint, which raises the question whether the action is barred by the statute of limitations of this state. The defendant, Appell, was adjudicated bankrupt in the state of Pennsylvania some years ago, and the proceedings in bankruptcy were continued for some years, and are probably still pending; but Appell has never been discharged.
The theory of this suit is that, having delayed for an unreasonable time to apply for his discharge, the right of action against him upon these debts, which was suspended by the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy, has revived and the question here is whether, during the time that the right of action was suspended by the bankruptcy proceedings the statute of limitations of the state of Colorado continued to run in favor of the bankrupt; or, in other words, does the bankruptcy of the debtor suspend the running of the statute of limitations in his favor? That it suspends the right to sue, by the very terms of the bankrupt act, is not disputed. After the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy against the debtor, and after an adjudication in bankruptcy, no suit can be brought against him in any court; certainly, not without the consent of the bankruptcy court. It amounts, in other words, to an injunction against any proceedings against the bankrupt to enforce his contracts in the courts of the country. If he is not discharged, then the action revives after the proceedings in bankruptcy are ended.
The old rule upon this subject was very strict, and many authorities have been cited which clearly hold that if the statute of limitations begins to run, nothing will stop its running except something that is expressly provided in the statute itself; and it was formerly held that even a state of war was not sufficient; that an injunction against the creditor from bringing a suit was not sufficient to suspend the statute, and that it continued to run notwithstanding these things. That rule will be found laid down in Angell & Ames on Limitations, and I think in some other standard authorities. But the more modern rule is otherwise. It has been settled now, by the decisions of the supreme court of the United States, that there...
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Marcos v. United States, 50278.
...or restoration of these rights with the return of peace between the belligerents. Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532, 18 L.Ed. 939; Greenwald v. Appel, C.C., 17 F. 140. As the views of the civilized world gradually changed with respect to the conduct of war, the modern day practice evolved to su......
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King Iron Bridge & Mfg. Co. v. Otoe County
...for in such a case the creditor has not the time within which to bring his suit that the statute contemplated he should have. Greenwald v. Appell, 17 F. 140. object of the statute is to suppress fraudulent and stale claims, and prevent them from showing up at great distances of time, and su......
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Limbocker v. Higinbotham
...Gray, 243; Johnson v. Bleaching Co., 15 id. 216; Worsted Co. v. Holliston Mills, 149 Mass. 359; Hammond v. Pinkham, 149 id. 356; Greenwald v. Appell, 17 F. 140; In re Bird, 39 520; Newark v. Stout, 52 N.J.L. 35. See, also, Toby v. Brown, 11 Ark. (6 Eng.) 308; Nelson v. Couch, 15 C. B. (N. S......
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In re Sweet
... ... the case at bar is fatal to the discharge. In re ... Harrison, 22 F. 528. In fe Kelly, 3 F. 219; In re ... Wolfe, 10 F. 383; Greenwald v. Appell, 17 F ... 140; Dingee v. Becker, 9 N.B.R. 508. In ... Harrison's Case, supra, it was held that, 'where six ... years have been allowed ... ...