Greenwold v. Faber

Citation234 Mich. 217,207 N.W. 911
Decision Date20 March 1926
Docket NumberNo. 117.,117.
PartiesGREENWOLD v. FABER et al.
CourtSupreme Court of Michigan

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Error to Circuit Court, Kent County; Royal A. Hawley, Special Judge.

Action by Peter H. Greenwold against Herman W. Faber and another. Judgment for plaintiff against the named defendant, and in favor of defendant Albert Yarbrough, and defendant Faber brings error. Affirmed.

Argued before BIRD, C. J., and SHARPE, SNOW, STEERE, FELLOWS, WIEST, CLARK, and McDONALD, JJ.William J. Balgooyen, of Muskegon Heights, and Wykes & Sherk, of Grand Rapids, for appellant.

John J. Smolenski, of Grand Rapids, for appellee.

SNOW, J.

Plaintiff was injured while crossing Seneca street just beyond the corporate limits of the city of Grand Rapids by reason of two automobiles, driven by the defendants, colliding at the corner of said street and Godfrey avenue. Both cars had been going north on Godfrey; the defendant Faber in the lead, and defendant Yarbrough following. As Faber drove into Seneca street, where it runs into Godfrey, he attempted to turn west, and at the same time Yarbrough attempted to pass him on the left, with the result that the cars came together, and, because of the impact, plaintiff was struck by Yarbrough's car. Plaintiff brings this action, claiming both drivers are at fault, while each of the two defendants attempts by the evidence to justify his conduct, and lays the blame on the other. No claim is made that the plaintiff was negligent. Defendant Yarbrough had verdict in his favor, while plaintiff recovered against defendant Faber in the sum of $700, from which he appeals.

The questions involved have to do with instructions to the jury, improper remarks, and statements of counsel for plaintiff, and the refusal of the court to grant a new trial because the verdict was against the weight of evidence. They will be discussed in the order mentioned.

The court instructed the jury:

‘It occurs to me, and I so charge you, that the vital or crucial negligence, if any, involved in this case, relates, not so much to the rate of speed at which the cars of the defendants were driven at the time of the accident, although the rate of speed may be incidentally involved, but rather as to whether signals were given by defendant Yarbrough as to his desire to pass the car driven by defendant Faber, and whether defendant Faber heard them or not, and whether he should or would have heard them if he had been exercising his faculties as an ordinarily careful, prudent, and vigilant person would have done under like circumstances, also whether defendant Faber gave the signals that he claims to have given of his intention to turn to the left at the intersection of Seneca street and Godfrey avenue, and whether those signals were timely and given substantially as the law requires.’

Also:

‘As I have indicated to you, the speed law, while I do not think it is of vital importance in this case, may be of more or less incidental importance.’

Appellant complains of these instructions, and argues that thereby was ‘eliminated from the jury the issue as to whether or not the proximate cause of the accident was the speed at which defendant Yarbrough's car was driven,’ which is asserted to be the claim of Faber. The record does not disclose that the speed of either of the defendants' cars was in dispute, or that Yarbrough was driving at an excessive rate. Whether or not proper signals of the intentions of the respective defendants were given, one to make a left turn, and the other to pass him, was the question in dispute between the two defendants in the attempt of each to put the responsibility of the injury upon the other. The jury was not instructed that the rate of speed of the two automobiles should not be considered at all, but, immediately following the instruction complained of, the court said further:

‘I will state to you that the statute makes provision in regard to the rate of speed as follows: No person shall operate a motor vehicle upon a public highway at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and proper, having regard to the traffic and use of the highway, or so as to endanger the life or limb of any person or the safety of any property, and shall not in any event while upon any highway run at a higher rate of speed than 35 miles an hour. Now, that is the highest rate of speed at which it is lawful in the state of Michigan to operate a motor vehicle, but it is not in accordance with law to run it at that rate of speed, providing life and limb would be endangered by running at that rate. The rate of speed must always be reasonable and proper, having due regard to the existing conditions at the time and place; the lives and safety of the public being the test and the criterion.’

The question as to the speed of the cars of both defendants, in so far as the same was made applicable, was properly submitted.

Appellant further contends that a new trial should be granted because information came to the jury during the trial that he was insured against personal injury. In the examination of a juror on his voir dire, the following occurred:

‘Q. Do you...

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6 cases
  • Richards v. School Dist. of City of Birmingham
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • 3 de junho de 1957
    ...car A for his proximate negligence in injuring party C when the facts clearly showed that A hit B and that B alone hit C. Greenwod v. Faber, 234 Mich. 217, 207 N.W. 911; Parks v. Starks, 342 Mich. 443, 70 N.W.2d Defendant refers to a domino-like action in the collapse of the stand and conte......
  • Galtney v. Wood
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • 2 de janeiro de 1928
    ...Loggins, 119 So. 833. Neither bears out his contention here. See, also, Harris v. P. Koenig Coal Co. (Mich.), 194 N.W. 511; Greenwold v. Faber (Mich.), 207 N.W. 911; Gibbs v. Barton, and McDavid v. Barton (N. J.), A. 439; Fitzgerald v. DeMott (N. J.), 128 A. 545; Jones v. Sinsheimer (Ore.),......
  • Marth v. Lambert
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • 20 de outubro de 1939
    ...cases upon this subject see: Link v. Fahey, 200 Mich. 308, 166 N.W. 884;Church v. Stoldt, 215 Mich. 469, 184 N.W. 469;Greenwold v. Faber, 234 Mich. 217, 207 N.W. 911;Sutzer v. Allen, 236 Mich. 1, 209 N.W. 918;Oliver v. Ashworth, 239 Mich. 53, 214 N.W. 85;Holloway v. Nassar, 276 Mich. 212, 2......
  • Vaas v. Schrotenboer
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • 1 de março de 1951
    ...However, such an inquiry may properly be addressed to jurors, in good faith. Link v. Fahey, 200 Mich. 308, 166 N.W. 884; Greenwold v. Faber, 234 Mich. 217, 207 N.W. 911; Holloway v. Nassar, 276 Mich. 212, 267 N.W. 619; Fedorinchik v. Stewart, 289 Mich. 436, 286 N.W. 673; Marth v. Lambert, 2......
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