Greenwood v. Greenwood

• Court: Maine Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: CORNISH, J.
• Citation: Greenwood v. Greenwood, 113 Me. 226, 93 A. 360 (Me. 1915)
• Decision Date: 25 March 1915
• Parties: GREENWOOD v. GREENWOOD.

93 A. 360

113 Me. 226

GREENWOOD

v. GREENWOOD.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

March 25, 1915.

Appeal from Supreme Judicial Court, Androscoggin County, in Equity.

Bill by Erving M. Greenwood against Bertha M. Greenwood. Decree dismissing the bill, and plaintiff appeals. Appeal and bill sustained.

Argued before SPEAR, CORNISH, KING, BIRD, and HANSON, JJ.

McGillicuddy & Morey, of Lewiston, for appellant. Newell & Woodside, of Lewiston, for appellee.

CORNISH, J. This is a bill in equity brought by a husband against his wife under chapter 48 of the Public Laws of 1913 to enforce the reconveyance of certain real estate deeded by him to her on April 10, 1914. This statute provides as follows:

"Sec. 2. A wife may bring a bill in equity against her husband for the recovery, conveyance, transfer, payment or delivery to her of any property, real or personal or both, exceeding one hundred dollars in value, standing in his name or to which he has the legal title, or which is in his possession, or under his control, which in equity and good conscience belongs to her and which he neglects and refuses to convey, transfer, pay over or deliver to her, and, upon poper proof, may maintain such bill. And a husband shall have the same right to bring and maintain a bill in equity against his wife for the purposes aforesaid, subject to the limitations aforesaid. Marriage shall be no bar to the maintenance of a bill in equity by a wife against her husband, or by a husband against his wife, brought for the purposes aforesaid," etc.

The facts upon which these proceedings are based as found by the sitting justice are these:

"Prior to April 19, 1914, the plaintiff became very much disturbed by the misconduct of the defendant, and told her, in substance, that he would not stand it; that something had got to be done. Thereupon she asked him if he would be willing to give her the property, meaning the farm in question, she to take care of the children. He assented. Two or three days later, namely, April 10, 1914, they went together to the office of an attorney, who drafted, and they signed, the following agreement:

"'Whereas, Erving M. Greenwood has this day conveyed to Bertha M. Greenwood certain land in Turner, Androscoggin county, Maine, and in consideration of said conveyance the parties mutually agree as follows: Said Erving M. Greenwood is about to go away and leave his family, and it is agreed that the children of the parties are to remain in the custody of the mother. Bertha M. Greenwood, without interference from the said Erving M. Greenwood, and that the said Bertha M. Greenwood is not to demand or receive from the said Erving M. Greenwood any further aid in the care, education, and maintenance of said children.'

"And at the same time, in consideration in part, at least, of this agreement, the plaintiff gave the defendant a deed of the farm in question. It was then understood that the plaintiff should sell his personal property within a reasonable time and leave the home. He sold some or all of the personal property to the defendant, but he did not leave. He remained in the house and family, and has carried on the farm until the present time (November 7, 1914) exactly as he was accustomed to do prior to April 10th. For two or three weeks after April 10th the defendant purchased the family supplies. After that the plaintiff did; and he has since supported wife and children as husbands and fathers usually do. The defendant did not refuse to carry out her part of the agreement, but, in view of the voluntary action of the plaintiff, above stated, she has had no occasion to do so. It is not shown that the parties have made any other definite agreement in the premises. Things have simply gone on without any express agreement."

The sitting justice decided that the plaintiff had not shown a case of which the court in equity has cognizance under the statute aforesaid and dismissed the bill. From this decree the plaintiff appealed. The question therefore is sharply raised whether, under the undisputed facts in this case (the defendant having introduced no evidence) and the findings of the sitting justice, the plaintiff can invoke the aid of this remedial statute.

The written agreement is in the nature of an agreement for separate support, and, while in express terms the mother binds herself to maintain the children only, and does not include herself, we think the clear intendment of the parties and the fair construction and purport of the instrument as a whole, in view of all the surrounding facts and circumstances, was that the mother was thenceforth to support the family, excluding the husband, and that the homestead farm was conveyed to her for that purpose. Thenceforth the husband was to look out for himself and the mother for herself and her children. The validity of an agreement for the separate support of the wife alone has been upheld in this state in Carey v. Mackey, 82 Me. 516, 20 Atl. 84, 9 L. R. A. 113, 117 Am. St. Rep. 500, where an action of debt on bond given by the husband to the wife for her separate support was held maintainable by the wife after she had obtained a divorce, and this is in accord with the general current of English and American authority.

Whether an agreement like that in the case at bar, under which the mother attempts also to assume the burden of the care and maintenance of their minor children, and to relieve the father from his fixed legal liability therefor, without the sanction of the court, can be upheld, may well be doubted. Grime v. Borden, 166 Mass. 198, 200, 44 N. E. 216; Wright v. Leupp (1905) 70 N. J. Eq. 130, 62 Atl. 464, 465. As between the father and the children he was not thereby relieved of the duty of their maintenance, a duty imposed by their very relationhip, and which they had in no way surrendered. There is ground for holding that such a contract offends public policy. The wife may under certain conditions discharge her husband from liability for her own support, but she has no authority to act for her children either in cutting off or transferring right of parental support to which they are legally entitled. The state has an interest in the welfare of the child, and in all divorce proceedings that welfare is held to be superior to the wishes of the parent, and governs the court in its decrees as to custody and maintenance. This jealous regard for the rights of the child should look askance at contracts between parents attempting to shift the legal responsibility. The relation between husband and wife is one thing; that between parent and child is quite another. But it is unnecessary to decide that question in the...