Greenwood v. Holbrook

• Decision Date: 27 November 1888
• Citation: Greenwood v. Holbrook , 111 N.Y. 465, 18 N.E. 711 (N.Y. 1888)
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: MARY MACKAY GREENWOOD, Respondent, v. EDMUND F. HOLBROOK et al., Executors, etc., Respondents; ISAAC J. GREENWOOD, Appellant.

111 N.Y. 465

18 N.E. 711

GREENWOOD

v.HOLBROOK et al.¹

Court of Appeals of New York.

November 27, 1888.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, First department.

The plaintiff is the widow of Isaac John Greenwood. He died on the 14th of May, 1865, leaving a widow; two daughters,-Sarah B., wife of William A. Martin, and Eliza Jane, wife of William W. Wright, and two sons, Isaac J. Greenwood and Langdon Greenwood. He also left a will by which he gave to the plaintiff during her natural life, or until she again married, the net rents and profits of all his real estate and the net interest and income of his personal estate. It was offered for probate, and opposition made thereto by his daughters and Langdon Greenwood; but the opposition was withdrawn in pursuance of an agreement made September 28, 1865, between the plaintiff, the four children, and the husbands of the two daughters. It recited the facts above stated, and in consideration thereof the plaintiff on her part covenanted with the other parties that during her widowhood she would pay over to each of the four children of John Greenwood one equal eighth part of the net income of all the real and personal estate left by him, (with certain exceptions not material here,) beginning from the decease of the testator, provided they kept certain promises on their part, (not now important;) and she further agreed that in case of the death of either of the said four children during her widowhood she would pay the one-eighth part of said income thereby agreed to be paid to the child so dying to his or her legal representatives, so long as the said covenants and agreement shall be observed, performed, and fulfilled as above mentioned. The agreement was to take effect when the will was admitted to probate and by its terms is declared to be binding on the parties to it, ‘and their respective heirs, executors, and administrators.’ The will was thereupon admitted to probate. In April, 1880, Eliza Jane Wright died, leaving her husband surviving, but no issue. By her will her husband was appointed executor, and she bequeathed to him all her estate, including such interest as she had acquired from her father. The husband died, and the defendants Holbrook and Foote were appointed the executors of his will. Upon this appeal that share alone is in question. The plaintiff retains the one-eighth share of net income to which, if living, Eliza Jane would be entitled. The defendants Holbrook and Foote claim it. The defendants Isaac and Langdon, brothers of Eliza Jane, also claim her share. The plaintiff brought this action to have the rights of the defendants determined as they are declared by the clause of the agreement above quoted. After trial at special term a decree was made adjudging the share of each child to be personal property, and as such subject to her testamentary disposition, and accordingly that the share of Eliza Jane passed under her will to her husband, William W. Wright, and that, as executors of his will, Holbrook and Foote were entitled to it. Isaac J. Greenwood appealed from that judgment to the general term, where it was affirmed, and from the judgment of affirmance he appeals to this court.

PECKHAM and GRAY, JJ., dissenting.

Robert S. Rudd, (James M. Hunt, of counsel,) for appellant.

Clifford A. Hand, for respondents.

DANFORTH, J., ( after stating the facts as above.)

We differ from the conclusion of the court below, (42 Hun, 633,) and are of opinion that the proper construction of the agreement in question requires us to hold that the phrase ‘legal representatives' contained in it means ‘next of kin’ to the child dying, and not the executors or administrators of that child. It must be conceded that it might mean either, and numerous cases are referred to in support of the contention of each party. No one case is, however, so like the present as to require its adoption, and little instruction would be given by an analysis of the decisions. Each judgment stands upon the construction or interpretation due to the words under examination, as they are looked at in the light of circumstances surrounding the parties to the instrument, and the situation of persons intended to be benefited. The agreement in this case was induced by a will, in the provisions of which every party to the agreement was concerned. It relates to property which, except for the agreement, would not go to the defendants, but to the plaintiff, if distributed under the will, or, if that was set aside, would pass according to its nature under the statute of distribution or descent. Both the will and statutes must have been in the minds of the parties, and we may naturally expect some aid from their provisions. The testator gave to his wife ‘the net rents and profits of his real estate,’ and ‘the net interest and income’ of all of his personal estate, for life, or until she again married. Upon her remarriage the rents, profits, income, and interest above referred to were by the terms of the will to go during the remainder of her life to her, his sons, and his daughters, one-third to each class, and in case of the death of either of his sons or daughters during the lifetime of his wife, leaving issue, that issue were to take the share which the parent would have taken, and, if there was no issue, then the surviving son or daughter, as the case might be, was to take that share and enjoy it until the wife's death. Upon her death the property was to be divided among the children, each to hold the share given during life, and after the death...