Greer v. Marriott, 1 Div. 224

Decision Date04 February 1936
Docket Number1 Div. 224
PartiesGREER et al. v. MARRIOTT.
CourtAlabama Court of Appeals

Rehearing Denied March 3, 1936

Appeal from Circuit Court, Mobile County; Claude A. Grayson, Judge.

Action for damages by Henderson R. Marriott against Autrey Greer and others, individually and as partners under the firm name of Autrey Greer & Sons. From a judgment for plaintiff defendants appeal.

Reversed and rendered.

Certiorari denied by Supreme Court in Greer v. Marriott (1 Div 917) 167 So. 599.

Pillans Cowley & Gresham, of Mobile, for appellants.

Harry T. Smith & Caffey, of Mobile, for appellee.

SAMFORD Judge.

After a careful reading of the evidence and the "fine spun" theories of counsel for appellants and appellee, in the two elaborate briefs filed by them, which have tended more to mystify than to clarify the mind of the court in passing on the questions involved, we reach the following conclusions:

The Old Shell road runs approximately east and west; the width of the pavement on said road at the time of the accident was 16 feet; that said road is crossed by several streets west of Mobile street and Mobile street crosses this road forming acute angles in the northwest and southeast intersections said street being 25 feet in width, according to the map, and is much traveled. Old Shell road was a much-traveled thoroughfare by people in automobiles going to and coming from the city of Mobile. The defendants' heavy-duty Ford truck was traveling east along the Old Shell road and on the south side thereof at a rate of speed of 14 to 15 miles per hour; upon arrival at Mobile street, and without holding out his hand to indicate his intention, the driver turned sharply to the left and partially across the north side of Old Shell road and in the direction of the right or east side of Mobile street. As the driver of the truck began the turn, he saw plaintiff's car for the first time, and in an effort to avoid a collision swerved back south into Old Shell road, and stopped on said road on the east of Mobile street.

The plaintiff, driving a '29 Graham 8 sedan, was following defendants' truck at a rate of speed of 28 to 30 miles per hour; when from 50 to 75 feet west of Mobile street plaintiff sounded his horn and without any indication from the driver of the truck that the horn had been heard by him, drew to the left and undertook to pass the truck within the intersection of the two streets; when in close proximity to the truck plaintiff saw truck turn, and, being too late to stop, at the rate of speed he was going, swerved suddenly to the left off the pavement, striking a telephone pole on the side of the road, resulting in the damage to plaintiff's car complained of in this action.

(1) We hold on the facts that defendants' driver was guilty of simple negligence in that he failed to comply with Acts 1927, § 63, pp. 348, 372, the provisions of which section applicable to this case being as follows:

"(a) The driver of any vehicle upon a highway before starting, stopping, backing or turning from a direct line shall first see that such movement can be made in safety and if any pedestrian may be affected by such movement, shall give a clearly audible signal by sounding the horn, and whenever the operation of any other vehicle may be affected by such movement shall give a signal as required in this section, plainly visible to the driver of such other vehicle of the intention to make such movement.
"(b) The signal herein required shall be given either by means of the hand and in the manner herein specified, or by an approved mechanical or electrical signal device, except that when a vehicle is so constructed or loaded as to prevent the hand and arm signal from being visible both to the front and rear the signal shall be given by a device of a type which has been approved by the Department.
"Whenever the signal is given by means of the hand and arm, the driver shall indicate his intention to stop or turn by extending the hand and arm horizontally from beyond the left side of the vehicle. Before backing, warning should be given by sounding horn or ringing bell or by other mechanical signals. Any person violating any provisions of this section shall be guilty of a
...

To continue reading

Request your trial
13 cases
  • Holman v. Brady, 6 Div. 831.
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • June 5, 1941
    ... ... Benson, supra; Greer v. Marriott, 27 Ala.App. 108, ... 167 So. 597, certiorari denied 232 Ala ... the court in charging the jury to the effect that: "In ... Count 1 of the complaint the plaintiff likewise claims that ... the defendant's ... ...
  • Self v. Baker
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • November 7, 1957
    ...on account of Christian's contributory negligence, and four cases are cited to support that contention. The first is Greer v. Marriott, 27 Ala.App. 108, 167 So. 597, 598. In the statement of the facts in that case, it appears that '* * * plaintiff * * * undertook to pass the truck within th......
  • Rayborn v. Freeman, 44818
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • March 25, 1968
    ...because a man entered the left lane more than 100 feet from the intersection. As stated by the Alabama court, in Greer v. Marriott, 27 Ala.App. 108, 110, 167 So. 597, 598 (1936): (The) passing of one car by another going in the same direction is one continuing act, from the time the rear ca......
  • Simpson v. Glenn
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • February 2, 1956
    ...Ala. 592(6), 35 So.2d 332; Cosby v. Flowers, 249 Ala. 227, 30 So.2d 694; Clift v. Donegan, 237 Ala. 304, 186 So. 476; Greer v. Marriott, 27 Ala.App. 108, 167 So. 597, certiorari denied 232 Ala. 194, 167 So. 599; Newell Contracting Co. v. Berry, 223 Ala. 111, 134 So. 868; Smith v. Baggett, 2......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT