Greer v. Miller
| Decision Date | 26 June 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-2064,85-2064 |
| Citation | 483 U.S. 756,107 S.Ct. 3102,97 L.Ed.2d 618 |
| Parties | James GREER, Warden, Petitioner v. Charles "Chuck" MILLER |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Respondent and two other men (including Randy Williams) were charged with kidnaping, robbery, and murder. Williams entered into a plea agreement and testified at respondent's separate Illinois court trial that each of the men participated in the crime and that each shot the victim. Respondent testified on direct examination that he had taken no part in the crime, but that the other men had come to him after the murder was committed, seeking his advice. At the beginning of respondent's cross-examination, the prosecutor asked him: "Why didn't you tell this story to anybody when you got arrested?" Defense counsel immediately objected and, out of the jury's hearing, requested a mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor's question violated respondent's right to remain silent after arrest. The judge denied the motion, but immediately sustained the objection and instructed the jury to "ignore [the] question, for the time being." The prosecutor did not pursue the issue further, nor did he mention it during his closing argument. The judge's instructions to the jury included a caution to "disregard questions . . . to which objections were sustained." Respondent was convicted, but the Illinois Appellate Court reversed the conviction. The court rejected the State's argument that if the prosecutor's question about respondent's postarrest silence was prohibited by Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91, the error was harmless under the standards of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the prosecutor's improper question did not require reversal of the conviction under the circumstances of this case. Respondent then sought habeas corpus relief in the Federal District Court, which denied the petition. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that because respondent had received Miranda warnings at the time of his arrest, the prosecutor's question violated respondent's constitutional right to a fair trial. The court further held that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman.
Held: The prosecutor's question concerning respondent's postarrest silence does not require reversal of the conviction. Pp. 761-767.
(a) No Doyle violation occurred in this case. Doyle held that permitting the use for impeachment purposes of a defendant's silence at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, which contain an implicit assurance that silence will carry no penalty, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Here, respondent received the "implicit assurance" of Miranda warnings. However, the trial court did not permit the inquiry that Doyle forbids. Instead, the court explicitly sustained an objection to the only question that touched upon respondent's postarrest silence. No further questioning or argument with respect to his silence occurred, and the court specifically advised the jury that it should disregard any questions to which an objection was sustained. The prosecutor was not allowed to undertake impeachment on, or permitted to call attention to, respondent's silence. Pp. 761-765.
(b) The prosecutor's misconduct in attempting to violate the rule of Doyle did not so infect the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. The Illinois Supreme Court's finding, under Chapman, that the prosecutor's question was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt indicates that it would find no due process violation under the facts here. The sequence of events—a single question, an immediate objection, and two curative instructions—clearly indicates that the prosecutor's improper question did not violate respondent's due process rights. Moreover, the Illinois Supreme Court's determination that the properly admitted evidence was sufficient to prove respondent's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt further supports the conclusion that there was no due process violation. Pp. 765-767.
789 F.2d 438, reversed and remanded.
BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. ----.
Mark L. Rotert, Chicago, Ill., for petitioner.
Gary R. Peterson, Springfield, Ill., for respondent.
The question before us is whether a prosecutor's question at trial concerning a criminal defendant's postarrest silence requires reversal of the defendant's conviction.
In 1980, Neil Gorsuch was kidnaped, robbed, and murdered after leaving a bar in Jacksonville, Illinois. Three men were charged with the crimes: Randy Williams, Clarence Armstrong, and the respondent, Charles Miller. Williams confessed, and later entered into a plea agreement under which most of the charges against him were dropped in return for his testimony at the separate trials of Armstrong and Miller.
At Miller's trial, Williams testified that he, his brother, and Armstrong had met Gorsuch in a tavern on the evening of February 8. Armstrong offered the victim a ride back to his hotel, and the four men left together at about 1:30 a.m. After Williams' brother was dropped off, Armstrong began beating Gorsuch in the back seat of the car. According to Williams' testimony, the group stopped briefly at Williams' parents' home to pick up a shotgun, and the men then drove to the trailer home where Miller was staying. Williams testified that Miller joined the group, and that they then traveled to a bridge on an isolated road. Williams stated that once there each of the three men shot Gorsuch in the head with the shotgun.
Respondent Miller took the stand on his own behalf and told a different story. On direct examination he testified that he had taken no part in the crime, but that Armstrong and Williams had come to the trailer home after the murder was committed seeking Miller's advice. Miller testified that Armstrong confessed that he and Williams had beaten and robbed Gorsuch, and that they had killed him to avoid being identified as the perpetrators.
The prosecutor began his cross-examination of Miller as follows:
"Q: Why didn't you tell this story to anybody when you got arrested?" App. 31.
Defense counsel immediately objected. Out of the hearing of the jury, Miller's lawyer requested a mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor's question violated Miller's right to remain silent after arrest. The trial judge denied the motion, but immediately sustained the objection and instructed the jury to "ignore [the] question, for the time being." Id., at 32. The prosecutor did not pursue the issue further, nor did he mention it during his closing argument. At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, defense counsel did not renew his objection or request an instruction concerning the prosecutor's question. Moreover, the judge specifically instructed the jury to "disregard questions . . . to which objections were sustained." Id., at 47. Miller was convicted of murder, aggravated kidnapping, and robbery, and sentenced to 80 years in prison.
On appeal the State argued that if the prosecutor's question about Miller's postarrest silence was prohibited by this Court's decision in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), the error was harmless under the standards of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).1 The Illinois Appellate Court rejected the argument and reversed the conviction, concluding that the evidence against Miller "was not so overwhelming as to preclude all reasonable doubts about the effect of the prosecutor's comment." State v. Miller, 104 Ill.App.3d 57, 61, 59 Ill.Dec. 864, 857-858, 432 N.E.2d 650, 653-654 (4th Dist.1982). The Supreme Court of Illinois disagreed and reinstated the trial court's decision. State v. Miller, 96 Ill.2d 385, 70 Ill.Dec. 849, 450 N.E.2d 322 (1983). The court noted that the prosecutor's question was an isolated comment made in the course of a lengthy trial, that the jury had been instructed to disregard the question, and that the evidence properly admitted was sufficient to establish Miller's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., at 396, 70 Ill.Dec. at 854, 450 N.E.2d, at 327. It therefore held that the error did not require reversal of the conviction.
Miller then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Federal District Court for the Central District of Illinois. The District Court denied the petition, finding "no possibility that the prosecutor's questioning on post-arrest silence could have contributed to the conviction." App. to Pet. for Cert. C-3. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the District Court's decision, United States ex rel. Miller v. Greer, 772 F.2d 293 (1985), as did the full court on reargument en banc. United States ex rel. Miller v. Greer, 789 F.2d 438 (1986). The en banc court found that because Miller had received Miranda 2 warnings at the time of his arrest for the offenses in question, "[t]he prosecutor's reference to Miller's silence at the time of his arrest . . . violated his constitutional right to a fair trial." 789 F.2d, at 442. The court further held that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California, supra, because "[t]he evidence against Miller was not overwhelming, his story was not implausible, and the trial court's cautionary instruction was insufficient to cure the error." 789 F.2d, at 447. Three judges dissented, concluding that under the harmless-error...
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