Greer v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.

• Decision Date: 11 September 2017
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:15–cv–01066–EPG
• Parties: Becky GREER, Timothy C. Budnik, Rosario Saenz, Ian Carty, Haley Markwith, Marcia Garcia Pesina, and Monica Muldrow, individually and as Class Representatives, Plaintiffs, v. PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, IBEW Local 1245, and Does 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

265 F.Supp.3d 1053

Becky GREER, Timothy C. Budnik, Rosario Saenz, Ian Carty, Haley Markwith, Marcia Garcia Pesina, and Monica Muldrow, individually and as Class Representatives, Plaintiffs,

v.PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, IBEW Local 1245, and Does 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants.

Case No. 1:15–cv–01066–EPG

United States District Court, E.D. California.

Signed September 11, 2017

Filed September 12, 2017

Charles Swanston, Fitzpatrick, Spini & Swanston, Salinas, CA, Erin Tsitidis Huntington, Michael S. Helsley, Dylan J. Crosby, Patrick D. Toole, Wanger Jones Helsley PC, Fresno, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Robert G. Hulteng,Joshua D. Kienitz, Aurelio J. Perez, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Matthew Richard Dardenne, DLA Piper LLP, San Francisco, CA, Philip C. Monrad, Leonard Carder, LLP, Oakland, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT IBEW LOCAL 1245'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANT PG & E'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION AND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL BRIEFING

(ECF Nos. 159 and 161)

14 Day Deadline for Additional Briefing

Erica P. Grosjean, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Defendants Pacific Gas and Electric Company ("PG & E") and IBEW Local 1245 ("IBEW") have filed motions for summary judgment that together challenge the Court's jurisdiction to proceed on Plaintiffs' Becky Greer, Timothy C. Budnik, Rosario Saenz, Ian Carty, Haley Markwith, and Maria Garcia Pesina, individually and as "Class Representatives," ("Plaintiffs") claims.

Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that PG & E failed to pay wages due under the collective bargaining agreement because PG & E failed to give them credit for their "directly related clerical job experience." Plaintiffs assert breach of contract claims as well as various related labor code violations and similar claims. Defendants generally challenge the Court's ability to proceed on these claims on the basis that they have already been finally resolved between PG & E and the union, IBEW, as part of the dispute resolution process provided in the governing collective bargaining agreement. PG & E raised this challenge at the motion to dismiss stage, but the Court allowed the claims to proceed based on factual allegations in the complaint about the lack of finality of PG & E and IBEW's resolution and breach of IBEW's duty of fair representation. Defendants raise their jurisdictional defense again in the context of their motions for summary judgment based on a developed factual record.

The Court will grant Defendants' motion in part and deny in part as it related to the causes of action One and Eight in the Third Amended Complaint, which concern the breach of contract claim and breach of the duty of fair representation claim. As explained more below, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs are precluded under the law from challenging the contractual interpretation of "directly related clerical job experience" that resulted from the resolution of Grievance 21052. The resolution regarding contractual interpretation, as reflected in Pre–Review Committee Number 21052 letter of November 24, 2013, was a final and binding decision under the CBA. It resulted from a properly filed grievance and proceeded through the first four steps of the grievance process. It properly addressed an ambiguity in the CBA regarding the meaning of "directly related clerical job experience," and does not clearly contradict the terms of the CBA. While the Court understands Plaintiffs' arguments regarding why the interpretation that resulted from that process too narrowly defined applicable experience, the Court must defer to the result of the CBA grievance process under the law. Moreover, the Union did not breach its duty of fair representation because the Union properly investigated the issue, proceeded through the grievance process, and used its judgment. Although it did not confer with individual employees before agreeing to the resolution, the employees did not have any unique relevant information and the Union was not legally obligated to solicit their opinions on an issue of CBA contractual interpretation.

The same cannot be said of the individual determinations as to which employees qualified for a higher rate of pay under the CBA, which followed from the Grievance 21052 resolution. When it came to who was entitled to the wage increase, the Union (and PG & E) completely side-stepped the grievance process. Instead, they agreed on a list of qualifying employees informally between themselves and then prohibited any employees from filing a grievance challenging that decision. Under the terms of the CBA, such a decision is not treated as final and binding. Moreover, Plaintiffs have raised disputes of fact regarding whether the Union engaged in an adequate investigation to make such determination. They agreed to look only at resumes submitted at the time of application, without the knowledge of the relevant criteria, even though documents indicate the Union itself conceded that the resumes were not sufficiently detailed to conduct the evaluation required by the CBA and Grievance 21052 guidance. Moreover, the Union never sought any employee input, even though the employees would have relevant information about their background to help determine whether they possessed relevant experience. The Union agreed to further limit qualifying experience based on criteria outside, and arguably contradicting, the CBA and Grievance 21052 guidance. Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendants' motions to the extent they seek to preclude Plaintiffs from challenging their entitlement to the wage increase under the terms of the CBA as interpreted by the Pre–Review Committee Number 21052 resolution letter.

As to the remaining arguments raised in the summary judgment motions, the Court seeks supplemental briefing regarding whether and to what extent the parties believe summary judgment as to other causes of action is appropriate consistent with this decision.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 10, 2015, Plaintiffs Becky Greer, Timothy C. Budnik, Rosario Saenz and Ian Carty, as individuals and on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, filed suit against PG & E alleging various claims based on underpayment of wages for a purported class. (ECF No. 1). Named Plaintiffs and the purported class members were hired by PG & E as "Customer Service Representative I's." The complaint alleged that PG & E's job postings for Customer Service Representative I advertised an entry level hourly wage of $23.88 per hour. Plaintiffs' complaint also alleged that Plaintiffs and Proposed Class all had previous experience ranging from at least six (6) months of customer service experience to greater than two (2) years experience. When hired, however, Plaintiffs were told that they would have a starting pay rate of $18.76 per hour. However, their base salary may be increased as detailed in the "International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) Collective Bargaining Agreement" ("CBE"). That agreement provided for elevated rates of pay based on more than 6 months of prior "directly related clerical job experience." Plaintiffs alleged various causes of action claiming that they did not receive wages commensurate with their amount of "directly related clerical job experience."

A First Amended Complaint ("1AC") was filed on August 28, 2015 alleging eleven causes of action against PG & E. (ECF No. 11). IBEW was not named as defendant in the original complaint or the 1AC.

PG & E moved to dismiss all eleven claims against it on September 25, 2015 on the basis that they were preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) ("§ 301"), Plaintiffs had failed to allege that IBEW breached its duty of fair representation, and even if they had, the Section 301 claims would be time-barred. (ECF No. 13). PG & E argued: "Plaintiffs concede that this very dispute was grieved and resolved by the IBEW under the CBA's grievance procedures, but assert that they were treated incorrectly by the collectively bargained settlement." (ECF No. 13, p. 3) (internal citations omitted). PG & E argued as a matter of law: "Before bringing a suit governed by Section 301, an individual plaintiff is first required to exhaust the grievance and arbitration remedies provided in the CBA. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 163 ; Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox , 379 U.S. 650 [85 S.Ct. 614, 13 L.Ed.2d 580] (1965). 'Subject to very limited judicial review, [the employee] will be bound by the result according to the finality provisions of the agreement[,]' unless he or she can show the union has breached its duty of fair representation. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164 ; accord Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185–86 [87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842] (1967)." (ECF No. 13, p. 7).

On December 28, 2015, the Court issued an order granting, in part, and denying, in part, PG & E's motion to dismiss the 1AC. (ECF No. 31). The Court explained in relevant part:

Defendant's motion to dismiss first argues that the case should be dismissed because Plaintiffs failed to allege that the Union breached its duty of fair representation. Defendant claims "[a]bsent this necessary element, Plaintiffs' claims under Section 301 must be dismissed because the FAC fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted." (Motion to Dismiss 1:14–15, ECF No. 13.). This is an incorrect statement of the law because it glosses over the underlying question of whether the grievance procedure used here was intended to be final without judicial review.

Defendant relies on DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters et al. , 462 U.S. 151 [103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476] (1983), but the Court in that case rested its decision on the fact that Plaintiff was challenging the results of a grievance process that resulted in an individual hearing, which, "[u]nder the collective bargaining agreement ... [was] final and

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