Greer v. St. Tammany Parish Jail, Civ. A. No. 88-2809.

• Decision Date: 31 August 1988
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 88-2809.
• Citation: Greer v. St. Tammany Parish Jail, 693 F.Supp. 502 (E.D. La. 1988)
• Parties: James Edward GREER v. ST. TAMMANY PARISH JAIL, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

693 F. Supp. 502

James Edward GREER v. ST. TAMMANY PARISH JAIL, et al.

Civ. A. No. 88-2809.

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.

August 31, 1988.

James Edward Greer, pro se.

Walter Reed, Dist. Atty., David Dickson, Asst. Public Defender, 22nd Judicial Dist., for St. Tammany Parish Jail.

ORDER AND REASONS

CHARLES SCHWARTZ, Jr., District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the Magistrate's Findings and Recommendation and on Greer's objections thereto. For the following reasons, the Court adopts in part and rejects in part the Magistrate's recommendation, sustains in part and overrules in part Greer's objections thereto, and rules as follows.

I.

On July 18, 1988, plaintiff (James Edward Greer) filed pro se a complaint on the standardized "form to be used by a prisoner in filing a complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983." Named as sole defendant is the St. Tammany Parish Jail.¹ Part IV of the form, Statement of Claim, reads in full as follows:

I have been in jail over 7 months awaiting trial.

They have withheld medication as punishment.

I was refused emergency treatment, after having been knocked out by another inmate. I was bleeding from two cuts on the back of my head, requested to see a doctor, and was told I would have to wait until the nurse came in the next day.

The warden stopped my medication for a skin disease saying the jail would not supply over-the-counter medication. It was two weeks before I was allowed to see a dermatologist who prescribed a prescription medication.

Part V of the form, Relief, reads in full as follows:

Grant a writ of habeas corpus.

Put a stop to the cruel and unusual punishments at St. Tammany Parish Jail.

On July 18, 1988, the Magistrate granted Greer's application to proceed in forma pauperis.

A week later, on July 25, 1988, prior to any answer being filed or other appearance by defendants being made, the Magistrate issued a Findings and Recommendation. Suggesting that the complaint "contains a mixed petition for habeas relief and civil rights relief," the Magistrate states that Greer "must first exhaust his habeas claims in the state courts." The Magistrate recommends that the entire matter be dismissed without prejudice.

Three days later, on July 28, 1988, Greer filed timely, verified objections to the Magistrate's Findings and Recommendation. The objections make no reference to the claim for improper medical attention, but expound in detail upon the habeas claim.

In his objections, Greer states the following: He has been in jail since about September 1987² and has not yet been tried for the crime of which he has been accused.³ Between October 7, 1987 and May 11, 1988, Greer wrote 17 letters to his assigned public defender but has not received one single written response. Among these was one dated April 6, 1988, wherein he asked his counsel to file a speedy trial motion under La.C.Cr.P. art. 701 in order to have him released from jail pending his criminal trial.

In his objections, Greer further stated the following: He saw his counsel in person on April 7, 1988,⁴ April 11, 1988,⁵ and May 16, 1988;⁶ his counsel refused to file a speedy trial motion or otherwise to assist in Greer's criminal defense. By letter dated April 11, 1988, Greer asked the state court judge to fire his assigned counsel and to appoint other counsel for him. On April 19, 1988, Greer received from the Clerk of Court a certified letter stating that his "letter had been denied."

Finally, Greer states that the only telephone calls a prisoner in the St. Tammany Parish Jail is permitted to make are collect calls, but that the St. Tammany public defender's office does not accept collect calls.

Greer explains three reasons for his failure to exhaust his state court remedies for his habeas claim: (1) ignorance of the law, (2) inadequate counsel for his criminal defense, and (3) inadequate access to counsel for his criminal defense

Nowhere does the record reveal whether Greer sought habeas relief from either of the applicable state appellate courts (namely, the Louisiana Supreme Court and the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the First Circuit). Nor it is even clear whether Greer or his counsel has specifically demanded of the state trial court a speedy trial.

II.

The first task for the Court is to determine what claims Greer is actually making. As the Fifth Circuit has explained in Jackson v. Torres:⁷

The rule in this Circuit is that any challenge to the fact or duration of a prisoner's confinement is properly treated as a habeas corpus matter, whereas challenges to conditions of confinement may proceed under Section 1983. The relief sought by the prisoner or the label he places upon the action is not the governing factor.⁸

The Court must conclude that Greer is pursuing two distinct claims, or causes of action: (1) a claim challenging the fact or duration of imprisonment (viz., a § 2241 claim for habeas relief from an alleged excessive detention before trial), and (2) a claim challenging the physical conditions of that imprisonment (viz., a § 1983 claim for improper medical attention).

Concluding that Greer's complaint is an impermissible "mixed petition"⁹ by raising both habeas and non-habeas claims, the Magistrate recommends that Greer's entire complaint be dismissed, without prejudice to re-urge his two claims in this Court after he has exhausted his state court remedies on the habeas claim. Binding authority, however, rejects this analysis.

At times, a single complaint by a prisoner may raise both claims that should be properly treated initially as a habeas matter and claims that may be properly treated initially as a § 1983 matter.¹⁰ In these cases, the Fifth Circuit has instructed the following:

In instances in which a petition combines claims that should be asserted as an initial matter in habeas with claims that properly may be pursued as an initial matter under § 1983, and the claims can be so separated, federal courts should do so, entertaining the § 1983 claims.¹¹

In short, it is improper to dismiss an entire complaint on grounds of non-exhaustion merely because the complaint raises both habeas and non-habeas claims.

The two claims Greer makes are wholly independent. Unlike the § 1983 claims in the cases cited by the Magistrate,¹² Greer's claim for improper medical attention in no way turns on whether he is convicted or acquitted or on whether he is ultimately successful or unsuccessful on his habeas claim. Even if Greer is acquitted, he may still have a viable claim for monetary damages from the improper medical attention he allegedly received in jail.¹³ Thus, whether or not plaintiff's habeas claim is ripe for federal review at this time, his § 1983 claim for improper medical attention is properly before this Court.

For these reasons, as to the claim for improper medical attention, the Court rejects the Magistrate's recommendation, sustains Greer's objections thereto, and holds that this claim should not be dismissed for any alleged failure by Greer to exhaust his state habeas remedies. As to this claim, then, the Court hereby directs defendants to file an answer or other responsive pleading within 20 days of the entry of this order and hereby directs the Magistrate to proceed accordingly, with an evidentiary hearing if necessary or appropriate.¹⁴

III.

Having retained in all events the claim for improper medical attention, the Court must separately address various issues concerning the habeas claim.

A.

Where a prisoner in a state prison is not "in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court" (in other words, where the prisoner has not yet been convicted by a state court), a habeas corpus petition by such a prisoner is properly brought not under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, but rather under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).¹⁵

Greer's pro se complaint does not explicitly refer to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); the sole statutory reference in his complaint is the pre-printed reference to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under these circumstances, however, the Court construes his habeas claim as seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).¹⁶

B.

Being a "fundamental" right "incorporated" into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment¹⁷ guarantee to a speedy trial applies equally to criminal prosecutions brought in state courts.¹⁸ The right attaches to an accused person upon arrest, indictment, or information, whichever occurs first.¹⁹

To determine whether the right has been violated, a court must undergo on an ad hoc basis the flexible²⁰ balancing test announced in Barker v. Wingo,²¹ which identified four factors for this balancing: length of delay, the reasons for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.²² As to the last factor, prejudice, the Supreme Court has generally identified three interests: to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration, to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused, and to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.²³

In the vast majority of federal opinions addressing an accused's right to a speedy trial, the court was considering the issue only after the accused had been convicted.²⁴ Rare has been the case addressing the issue before an accused is convicted.²⁵

There are generally two types of relief sought by an accused who asserts a pre-trial habeas petition:

An attempt to dismiss an indictment or otherwise prevent a prosecution is of the first type, while an attempt to force the state to go to trial is of the second. While the former objective is normally not attainable through federal habeas corpus, the latter is, although the requirement of exhaustion of state remedies still must be met.²⁶

The former challenges the validity of the delay, while the latter challenges the present effects of the delay.²⁷ In other words, a federal court may generally consider a habeas petition for pretrial relief from a state court only when the accused does not seek a dismissal of...