Greer v. State

• Decision Date: 03 July 1908
• Citation: 156 Ala. 15,47 So. 300
• Parties: GREER v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

47 So. 300

156 Ala. 15

GREER v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

July 3, 1908

Appeal from City Court of Mobile; O. J. Semmes, Judge.

Tom Greer was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree, and he appeals. Affirmed.

The testimony of Eliza Johnson was that deceased was her husband and that she was present when he died, and that he lived about ten minutes after she reached him. He said that he had something to say to her before he died. The solicitor asked her: "Do you know whether at that time he believed he was going to die?" Witness replied: "I called him three times before he answered, and asked him if he knew me and he said, 'Yes,' and I asked, 'What was my name?' and he said, 'Eliza,' and I asked him 'What this man cut you for?' and he said, 'He cut me to death.' " Defendant objected to this testimony. The solicitor then asked witness if deceased said anything indicating that he thought he was going to die, and witness answered: "That was all he said." The solicitor then asked: "Did he say who cut him?" Witness answered: "He said this man cut him to death [pointing to defendant]."

The following charges were refused defendant: "(1) Defendant is authorized under the statute to testify in his own behalf and the jury have the right to give full credit to his own statement. (2) Gentlemen of the jury, I charge you that you must find defendant not guilty of his conduct upon a reasonable hypothesis is consistent with innocence. (3) Gentlemen of the jury, I charge you that if you have a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant acted in self-defense or not you should find him not guilty. (4) The court charges the jury that the law is that not only must the jury have justifying reasons for a conclusion of guilt, not only must they be able to say upon reason that defendant is guilty, but their conclusion to this effect must be so reasonable to their minds as to exclude all doubts of its correctness to a moral certainty. (5) Gentlemen of the jury I charge you that if defendant, after getting into a difficulty with deceased in the house, honestly declined the combat, and for the bona fide purpose of getting away from deceased, and thus escaping any further trouble with him, retreated to and down the street, but that deceased, armed with an ax or brick, pursued him, and that deceased struck or attempted to strike defendant with the ax or brick in such a manner as to endanger his life, or as to inflict upon him great bodily harm, then his right of self-defense revived; and if the circumstances by which defendant was then surrounded were such as to endanger in a reasonable mind the honest belief that deceased was about to inflict upon defendant some great bodily harm, and they did induce in the mind of defendant this belief, and also the honest and reasonable belief that further retreat could not be attempted without increasing his danger, then defendant had the right to stop and repel the attack of deceased, even to the extent of taking his life, and if you believe that these were the circumstances under which defendant killed deceased, then you must find him not guilty. (6) Gentlemen of the jury, I charge you that if defendant, after getting into the said difficulty in the house," etc., continuing as in charge 5, except that, where the word "endanger" is used in charge 5, the word "engender" appears in charge 6.

Leslie D. Sheldon and Tisdale J. Touart, for appellant.

Alexander M. Garber, Atty. Gen., for the State.

SIMPSON J.

The appellant...