Greer v. State

Decision Date28 June 2001
Docket NumberNo. 41S00-0003-CR-00228.,41S00-0003-CR-00228.
Citation749 N.E.2d 545
PartiesTimothy GREER, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Richard L. Tandy, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Karen Freeman-Wilson, Attorney General of Indiana, Andrew L. Hedges, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

SULLIVAN, Justice.

Defendant Timothy Greer pled guilty to felony murder for shooting a man while robbing a gun store. He was sentenced to life in prison without parole. We find that the trial court did not err by allowing the State to present evidence regarding the details of the crime during the sentencing hearing. We also find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in balancing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

Background

The record indicates that on October 4, 1997, Defendant and two juvenile accomplices robbed a gun store in Greenwood, Indiana. Defendant drove the two juveniles to the gun store, and after walking in, told the clerk, Stephen Stapleton, to put his hands up. While Stapleton had his hands up, Defendant shot him multiple times without provocation. Stapleton died as a result of these gunshots.

Several days after the killing, the State charged Defendant with the knowing murder of Stapleton.1 Indiana law authorizes the State to seek a sentence of death or of life without parole "by alleging, on a page separate from the rest of the charging instrument, the existence of at least one of the aggravating circumstances" listed in the statute governing the imposition of such sentences.2 In May, 1998, the State made the requisite filing to seek a death sentence, alleging that Defendant intentionally killed Stapleton while committing a robbery. (Intentionally killing while committing robbery is an aggravating circumstance listed in the death penalty statute.3) The State also amended the charging information to add felony murder,4 conspiracy to commit robbery, and robbery counts.5

In October, 1999, the State made the requisite filing to seek a sentence of life without parole, again alleging as the aggravating circumstance that Defendant intentionally killed Stapleton while committing a robbery. At the same time, Defendant and the State entered into and filed a plea agreement. Under its terms, Defendant pled guilty to Felony Murder and admitted the charged aggravating circumstance of intentionally killing while committing robbery.6 In exchange, the State dropped all other charges and agreed not to seek the death penalty. The plea agreement stipulated that "[t]he parties may present evidence relevant to the aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances listed in" the statute governing a sentence of life without parole. (Id.) The parties also agreed that the trial court could decide to sentence Defendant either to life without parole or to a term of years. (Id.)

Unlike a case in which the State seeks a sentence of life without parole that goes to trial, there is no sentencing phase before a jury when a defendant pleads guilty to the underlying murder. Rather, sentencing is conducted entirely by the court.7 Under the statute, the court is required to find that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the aggravating circumstances set forth in the statute.8 The court must then weigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances so proven against any mitigating circumstances that it finds to exist.9 A sentence of life without parole is only permissible if the court finds that the aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances.10 At the sentencing hearing in this case, the State presented witnesses and evidence regarding the details of the crime and Defendant presented evidence in an effort to demonstrate the existence of mitigating circumstances. The trial court subsequently sentenced Defendant to life in prison without parole.

Discussion
I

Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by permitting the State to present testimony at the sentencing hearing regarding certain facts of the crime. Defendant argues that the testimony of the State's witnesses led the court to consider non-statutory aggravating circumstances.

A sentence of life imprisonment without parole is imposed under the same standards and is subject to the same requirements as the death penalty. Pope v. State, 737 N.E.2d 374, 382 (Ind.2000), reh'g denied; Nicholson v. State, 734 N.E.2d 1047, 1048 (Ind.2000), reh'g denied; Rawley v. State, 724 N.E.2d 1087, 1091 (Ind. 2000); Ajabu v. State, 693 N.E.2d 921, 936 (Ind.1998). Defendant contends that the trial court considered non-statutory aggravating circumstances in violation of Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 955 (Ind.1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1077, 116 S.Ct. 783, 133 L.Ed.2d 734 (1996). In Bivins, this Court held that the aggravating circumstances in a capital case are narrowed to those charged by the State and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. "When the death sentence is sought, courts must henceforth limit the aggravating circumstances eligible for consideration to those specified in the death penalty statute, Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-9(b)." Id.

Defendant's plea agreement stated that he would "admit to and agree that, as an aggravating circumstance under [Ind. Code] § 35-50-2-9(b)(1)(G), he committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim while committing robbery." During the sentencing hearing, the State presented evidence and called two witnesses. It also introduced photographs of the victim and robbery scene, a list of the weapons that were stolen and subsequently recovered, and an autopsy photo showing the victim's wounds. The State indicated that it called its first witness, Officer John Laut, "to be the sponsor of [the] photographs, autopsy and weapons list." The State also called one of Defendant's accomplices to testify "as to what took place inside the gun store when the robbery took place."

There is no indication that the trial court considered non-statutory aggravating circumstances by hearing the testimony of the two State witnesses. Indeed, the court in its sentencing order explicitly said that it had considered "nothing else in aggravation" other than the charged aggravating circumstance.

We believe this information was properly presented to the trial court for at least two reasons. First, although Defendant stipulated that he had intentionally killed Stapleton while committing robbery, the trial court still had an independent obligation under the statute to find that the State had proved the existence of the aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. See Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9 (1998). It was certainly prudent, if not necessary, for the State to make such a showing independent of Defendant's statement. Second, in determining whether life without parole is an appropriate sentence, the court must weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See id. Moreover, the trial court must issue a detailed explanation of the factors and the weighing process that lead to its determination to impose the sentence. See Harrison v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1243, 1262 (Ind.1995), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1088, 120 S.Ct. 1722, 146 L.Ed.2d 643 (2000). To perform its weighing responsibilities and to issue a sufficiently detailed order, the trial court needed to know the details of Defendant's crime. The testimony and evidence presented by the State was relevant to that end.

II

Defendant contends that the trial court improperly sentenced him. Specifically, he argues that the trial court either did not recognize, or give enough weight to, certain mitigating circumstances.

As described in Part I, supra, the trial court's duty when considering whether to impose a sentence of life without parole following a guilty plea includes the following steps. First, the trial court must find that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of the aggravating circumstances listed in the death penalty statute exists.11 Second, the trial court must find that any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the aggravating circumstance or circumstances.12 Third, the trial court must make a record of its reasons for selecting the sentence that it imposes. See Harrison v. State, 644 N.E.2d at 1262

. In arriving at its own separate determination as to whether the death penalty is an appropriate punishment, the sentencing court is to point out its employment of this process in specific and clear findings. Id. The trial court's statement of reasons (i) must identify each mitigating and aggravating circumstance found, (ii) must include the specific facts and reasons which lead the court to find the existence of each such circumstance, (iii) must articulate that the mitigating and aggravating circumstances have been evaluated and balanced in determination of the sentence, and (iv) must set forth the trial court's personal conclusion that the sentence is appropriate punishment for this offender and this crime. Id.

At the sentencing hearing, Defendant argued that the following mitigating circumstances existed: Defendant had no significant history of prior criminal conduct; Defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance when the murder was committed; the "victim was a participant in, or consented to, [D]efendant's conduct;" Defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another person and his participation was relatively minor; Defendant was acting under the substantial domination of another person; Defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication.

The trial court considered each of the purported mitigating circumstances in a careful and complete sentencing order that complied in all respects with applicable law....

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6 cases
  • Clark v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • May 19, 2004
    ...aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances and make a record of the reasons supporting the sentence. Greer v. State, 749 N.E.2d 545, 549 (Ind.2001). As explained in Harrison v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1243, 1262 (Ind.1995) (citations The trial court's statement of reasons (i)......
  • Leone v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • October 22, 2003
    ...aggravating circumstances to be greater than the weight of any mitigating circumstances that exist. Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9; Greer v. State, 749 N.E.2d 545, 549 (Ind.2001). I believe the Court should revise the sentence imposed here because weight of the sole aggravating circumstance does not,......
  • Highbaugh v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • August 15, 2002
    ...circumstance specified in the death penalty statute beyond a reasonable doubt. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(b) (West 2000); Greer v. State, 749 N.E.2d 545, 549 (Ind.2001).2 The State proved that Highbaugh took property of value. The charging information stated that Highbaugh took "bags and con......
  • Salyers v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • March 13, 2007
    ...or life without parole. Highbaugh v. State, 773 N.E.2d 247, 251 (Ind.2002) (citing Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(b) (2004); Greer v. State, 749 N.E.2d 545, 549 (Ind.2001)). When imposing a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, the trial court's statement of (i) must identify each mitigating......
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