Grega v. Vroman
| Decision Date | 22 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | 1:22-CV-00145-RAL |
| Parties | NATHANIEL GREGA, Plaintiff v. DAVID VROMAN, P.B.P.P. ET AL, STATE PAROLE OFFICER; MS. ALBAUGH, CASE MANAGER/COUNSELOR S.C.I. CAMBRIDGE SPRINGS; JESSICA BICKEL, PATIENT EXPERIENCE ST. VINCENT HOSPITAL/ AHN; AND OFFICER IN CHARGE, MILLCREEK POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Three motions are pending before the Court: Defendants Vroman and Albaugh's motion to dismiss Plaintiff s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 22), Defendant Bickel's motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 33), and Plaintiff Nathaniel Grega's motion to join his wife as a plaintiff to this action (ECF No. 31). For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant both motions to dismiss and deny Plaintiffs motion.
Plaintiff Nathanial Grega commenced this pro se civil rights action against David Vroman, a state parole officer, and Ms. Albaugh, a counselor at the State Correctional Institution (“SCI”) at Cambridge Springs, by filing a Complaint and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF No. 1. After the Court granted Grega's IFP motion and the Clerk of Court docketed his Complaint (ECF Nos. 4, 5), Vroman and Albaugh moved to dismiss the claims against them pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). ECF No. 13. This prompted Grega to file an Amended Complaint as a matter of right pursuant Rule 15(a)(1)(B). ECF Nos. 19.[1] The Amended Complaint again named Vroman and Albaugh as Defendants. It also added Jessica Bickel, “Patient Experience/St. Vincent Hospital/A.H.N.,” and an unnamed “Officer in Charge” at the Millcreek Police Department as Defendants. Grega claims generally that the Defendants violated his First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He also appears to assert a civil rights conspiracy claim, false arrest/false imprisonment claim, and state law assault and fraud claims. He asserts these claims against each Defendant in his/her individual capacity and seeks punitive damages and “[o]ne house on 1803 Millfair Rd. Erie PA 16505.” ECF No. 19, p. 5.
Vroman and Albaugh have again moved to dismiss the claims of the Amended Complaint against them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). ECF No. 22. Grega filed a response in opposition to their motion (ECF No. 28) and then moved to add his wife as a plaintiff in this action (ECF No. 31). Thereafter, Bickel also moved to dismiss the claims against her pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). ECF No. 33. Grega then filed what the Court has construed as his response in opposition to Bickel's motion.[2],[3] ECF No. 41.
The Court's standard of review requires that it accept the factual allegations of Grega's Amended Complaint as true. In doing so, the Court must attempt to unscramble the Amended Complaint and its supplements' litany of disconnected, frequently nonsensical, and sometimes fanciful allegations, many of which appear to complain about the treatment of Grega's wife, rather than actions against or involving Grega.
As to Defendant Vroman, the Amended Complaint alleges that he “conspired to violate Plaintiffs (sic) 1st, 4th, 5th, 14th Ammendment (sic) to the U.S. constitution (sic) to any communication to Plaintiffs (sic) wife, March of 2020 to November 2020.” ECF No. 19, § 11(D). The Amended Complaint further alleges that Vroman violated his First Amendment and due process rights when he “acted under color of law using force of a GPS at 1823 Clifford Drive asked for him not to put a GPS on my wife, No violation or warning on ticket.” Id. Additionally, the Amended Complaint avers that on February 7, 2022, Vroman “conspire[ed] to commit fraud with [Bickel][4] and the Erie District Office, arresting wife and coerc[ing] to waive rights to a board hearing without husband present.” Id. Vroman was Grega's wife's parole officer and Albaugh was a counselor at SCI-Cambridge Springs, where Grega's wife was incarcerated.[5] See ECF No. 28, p. 2.
Regarding the other Defendants, the Amended Complaint alleges essentially nothing. Instead, it alleges that:
The Amended Complaint lists various locations where certain events apparently occurred. These include Grega's mother's house, St. Vincent Hospital, SCI-Cambridge Springs, and Mead's Motel. The Amended Complaint also lists dates and times when certain events apparently occurred: March 2020 to November 19, 2020 at 11:00 A.M.; January 26, 2022 at 1:00 P.M. to February 7,2022 at 11:00 A.M.; February 7, 2022 to May 7, 2022[6]; and May 7, 2022 to present. ECF No. 19, p. 4. But the Amended Complaint includes no meaningful allegations to link these locations and dates and times to each other or to describe any conduct of a Defendant or Defendants relative to the locations and dates. The Amended Complaint includes only conclusions of law to describe the conduct of Vroman and even less regarding the conduct of the other Defendants. Thus, the Amended Complaint discloses no material facts upon which the Court can identify a claim under the First, Fourth, Fifth, or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution or any other federal or state law.
Grega's brief in opposition to Defendants' motions to dismiss does nothing to clarify the ramblings of his Amended Complaint. Therein, Grega states:
Dereliction of Duty, During Entire Court Proceeding as to obstruction of Justice, when I am at my home, place where I stay, get removed on 10-20-22, and receive 3 criminal charges that was falsified by O.I. C. on 1-26-22, & 10-20-22 by the Millcreek Police Department. FRAUD to benefit personally, as a showcase of 20 years of charges which video surveillance entire City of Erie on 10-20-22 clearly shows from 9:30 am to 12 pm I was by myself and from 1pm to 10-19-22 to 9:30 am 10-20-22, wife was able to go any where (sic) any time. She spent the entire evening & morning until 12 am with husband.
Grega has also filed a “Definitive Statement/CONCISE STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS.” ECF No. 41. Even if the Court were to consider this document as a supplement to his Amended Complaint or as a proposed second amended complaint, it would do nothing to support a viable claim on Grega's behalf. The Court will not recount the specifics of this filing. It is sufficient to note that it is comprised of factually unsupported and disconnected allegations akin to those raised in Grega's Amended Complaint.
A. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Kostv. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). The “court[] generally considerfs] only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim” when considering the motion to dismiss. Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 222 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig, 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir.1997)).
In making its determination under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662. Furthermore, a complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 ().
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. See Twombly, 550 U.S at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as explained in the complaint. See California Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”). Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has...
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