Gregg v. Allen-Bradley Co., ALLEN-BRADLEY

CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
Writing for the CourtBefore MERRITT and JONES, Circuit Judges, and THOMAS; NATHANIEL R. JONES
Citation801 F.2d 859
Decision Date23 September 1986
Docket NumberALLEN-BRADLEY,No. 85-1277
PartiesProd.Liab.Rep.(CCH)P 11,133 Steven GREGG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.CO., Defendant-Appellee.

Page 859

801 F.2d 859
Prod.Liab.Rep.(CCH)P 11,133
Steven GREGG, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ALLEN-BRADLEY CO., Defendant-Appellee.
No. 85-1277.
United States Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit.
Argued April 22, 1986.
Decided Sept. 23, 1986.

Robert V. Seymour (argued), Southfield, Mich., for defendant-appellee.

Page 860

Paul A. Rosen, Goodman, Eden, Millender & Bedrosian, Detroit, Mich., Julie A. Gibson (argued), for plaintiff-appellant.

Before MERRITT and JONES, Circuit Judges, and THOMAS, Senior District Judge. *

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Steven Gregg initiated this case in the state court of Michigan. On defendant Allen-Bradley's motion, the case was subsequently removed to the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Gregg alleged that he was injured because of an unsafe foot switch manufactured by Allen-Bradley and attached to a die press on which he was working. On October 30, 1984, Allen-Bradley filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that there was no issue of material fact that the foot switch had anything to do with Gregg's injury. After considering the parties' briefs and oral arguments, the district court granted the motion. We affirm.

Gregg was employed as a die-setter at Sheller-Globe Corporation in Livonia, Michigan. His responsibilities included the repair and installation of die sets used to form steel parts. The allegedly defective foot switch was used to operate one of Sheller-Globe's mechanical power presses, Cleveland Press # 18.

Cleveland Press # 18 had been manufactured in 1949. Sheller-Globe purchased it in used condition in 1971. The press had two different modes of operation: the run/continuous mode and the inch mode. The particular mode of operation was selected by turning a key selector switch located on the control panel on the side of the press. For the press to operate in the run mode, the key had to be turned to the left; to operate in the inch mode, the key had to be turned to the right.

In the run mode, the press was activated by an electrical foot switch attached to the bottom of the press. Once activated, the ram would go from the top of the press, down to the bottom of the press and back to rest at the top of the press. The foot switch attached to Cleveland Press # 18 was allegedly manufactured and sold by Allen-Bradley.

One point of contention in this case is the operation of the press while in the inch mode. All testimony in the depositions and affidavits indicated that the inch mode on Cleveland Press # 18 is activated by an inch button located on the control panel on the side of the press, and could only be activated by hand. When the inch button is pressed, the ram moves to the bottom of the press and back to the top in small separate increments. The electrical foot switch could not activate the press while in the inch mode because the inch circuit bypasses the circuitry that controls operation of the foot switch.

On August 30, 1978, the machine operator of Cleveland Press # 18 experienced a problem with a part that became lodged in the lower die. The operator sought the assistance of Gregg to fix the problem. Gregg first went to the central box and turned the selector key to the inch mode. He then went to the back of the press where he increased the air pressure in order to eject the part. According to his testimony, he wanted to inspect the dies for damage so he began removing bolts that held the lower die in place. While removing the bolts, the ram came down and crushed his right hand. Gregg cannot remember stepping on the foot switch. However, he theorizes that the only way he could have activated the press was if he stepped on the foot switch.

Gregg and his wife later filed suit against Allen-Bradley under theories of negligence and breach of warranty. They alleged that the electrical foot switch manufactured and sold by Allen-Bradley was a proximate cause of his injuries essentially because there was not a safeguard around the foot switch to protect someone from

Page 861

inadvertently activating the press. Allen-Bradley filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that the foot switch could not activate the press while in the inch mode and therefore could not have been the proximate cause of the accident. The district court found no genuine issue of material fact as to this point. It further found that the undisputed facts revealed that the foot switch was not a proximate cause of Gregg's injuries and, therefore, granted the motion.

Summary judgment is an appropriate means of disposing of a case where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The burden is on the moving party to show conclusively that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 60, 63 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 986, 100 S.Ct. 495, 62 L.Ed.2d 415 (1979). The district court must view the evidence with all...

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613 practice notes
  • White v. Tamlyn, Civil Action No. 96-CV-40097.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Michigan)
    • March 31, 1997
    ...States, 991 F.2d 292, 296 (6th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 976, 114 S.Ct. 467, 126 L.Ed.2d 419 (1993); Gregg v. Allen-Bradley Co., 801 F.2d 859, 861 (6th Cir.1986). And, "if the adverse party does not respond, summary judgment, if appropriate shall be entered against the adverse party......
  • Kerr v. Hurd, Case No. 3:07-cv-297.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of Ohio
    • March 15, 2010
    ...of a factual dispute is not enough." Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir.1992) (quoting Gregg v. Allen-Bradley Co., 801 F.2d 859, 863 (6th Cir.1986)). Therefore a court must make a preliminary assessment of the evidence, in order to decide whether the plaintiff's evidence c......
  • Valente v. UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON, Case No. 3:08-cv-225.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. Southern District of West Virginia
    • January 4, 2010
    ...of a factual dispute is not enough." Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir.1992) (quoting Gregg v. Allen-Bradley Co., 801 F.2d 859, 863 (6th Cir.1986)). Therefore a court must make a preliminary assessment of the evidence, in order to decide whether the plaintiff's evidence c......
  • Little Hocking Water Ass'n, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Case No. 2:09-CV-1081
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. Southern District of Ohio
    • March 10, 2015
    ...of a mere possibility of a factual dispute is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment) (citing Gregg v. Allen-Bradley Co., 801 F.2d 859, 863 (6th Cir. 1986)).IV. AnalysisA. RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B)—Count I The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") "is a compreh......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
612 cases
  • White v. Tamlyn, Civil Action No. 96-CV-40097.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Michigan)
    • March 31, 1997
    ...States, 991 F.2d 292, 296 (6th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 976, 114 S.Ct. 467, 126 L.Ed.2d 419 (1993); Gregg v. Allen-Bradley Co., 801 F.2d 859, 861 (6th Cir.1986). And, "if the adverse party does not respond, summary judgment, if appropriate shall be entered against the adverse party......
  • Kerr v. Hurd, Case No. 3:07-cv-297.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of Ohio
    • March 15, 2010
    ...of a factual dispute is not enough." Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir.1992) (quoting Gregg v. Allen-Bradley Co., 801 F.2d 859, 863 (6th Cir.1986)). Therefore a court must make a preliminary assessment of the evidence, in order to decide whether the plaintiff's evidence c......
  • Valente v. UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON, Case No. 3:08-cv-225.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. Southern District of West Virginia
    • January 4, 2010
    ...of a factual dispute is not enough." Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir.1992) (quoting Gregg v. Allen-Bradley Co., 801 F.2d 859, 863 (6th Cir.1986)). Therefore a court must make a preliminary assessment of the evidence, in order to decide whether the plaintiff's evidence c......
  • St. Marys Foundry v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, No. 01-4183.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
    • June 16, 2003
    ...S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The "mere possibility" of a factual dispute cannot create a triable case. Gregg v. Allen-Bradley Co., 801 F.2d 859, 863 (6th Cir.1986). To avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff "must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support [his or her] claim ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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