Gregg v. Bohemian Club
| Jurisdiction | United States,Federal,California |
| Parties | ANTHONY GREGG, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BOHEMIAN CLUB, et al., Defendants. |
| Decision Date | 19 January 2024 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
| Docket Number | 23-cv-02760-AMO |
Re: Dkt. Nos. 34, 35
Before the Court are Motions to Dismiss from Defendants Pomella LLC (“Pomella”) and Bohemian Club. The Motions are suitable for decision without oral argument. Accordingly, the hearing set for January 25, 2024, is VACATED. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). Having read the parties' papers and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, the Court hereby GRANTS both Motions to Dismiss.
This is a putative class action involving wage and hour claims. Plaintiffs bring this action against Defendants Monastery Camp, Bohemian Club, and Pomella LLC, alleging they jointly employed Plaintiffs as valets. To properly assess the motions to dismiss, the Court accepts as true and draws from the allegations in the First Amended Complaint (ECF 5 “FAC”). See Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).
The Bohemian Club hosts three of its main annual events to gather members to celebrate the arts at the Bohemian Grove in Monte Rio, California.[1] FAC ¶¶ 19, 22. While attending events hosted at the Grove, Bohemian Club members stay at one of “more than 100” different “camps.” FAC ¶ 28.
Each camp typically has a “captain” who is in charge of the finances, decision making, and operations of the camp including hiring and firing staff such as valets. FAC ¶¶ 28, 31. The camps “collect hundreds of thousands of dollars in member dues, and hire, fire, pay, and dictate nearly every aspect of their valets' employment.” FAC ¶ 31. The camps “are not independent legal entities making their own hiring decision, but a part of a joint venture as designed by Bohemian Club.” FAC ¶ 58.
Because Bohemian Club members include high-level executives, famous artists, and prominent government officials, the Bohemian Club “vets” all individuals who may enter the Grove, including the staff at each camp. FAC ¶¶ 33, 41-43. Bohemian Club also imposes rules on attendees, including camp staff. For example, Bohemian Club places restrictions on the use of communal phones and prohibits camp staff from attending the events put on for its members. FAC ¶¶ 48, 51. The Bohemian Club also requires camp staff to wear badges, prohibits the use of personal phones, and limits camp staff to designated areas. FAC ¶¶ 41, 48, 51.
Defendant Monastery Camp, an unincorporated “association of gentlemen,” is one of the more than 100 camps at the Grove. FAC ¶ 29. Monastery Camp is one of the most prestigious and well-known camps at the Grove. FAC ¶ 33. Monastery Camp employed Plaintiff Anthony Gregg as a valet from 2006 to 2022, Plaintiff Shawn Granger as a valet in 2018, and Plaintiff Wallid Saad as a valet from 2015 to 2022. FAC ¶¶ 9-11. William Dawson was the Camp Captain for Monastery and was accordingly in charge of Monastery's finances and its staff. FAC ¶ 34. Monastery Camp utilized the services of Defendant Pomella LLC to run payroll for its staff. FAC ¶¶ 46, 52, 70.
Dawson “directed Plaintiffs to falsify payroll records and to work off-the-clock.” FAC ¶ 34. Plaintiff Anthony Gregg instructed other valets to misrepresent the hours they worked. FAC ¶ 74. Gregg directly communicated with Dawson and described the ways Gregg endeavored to intentionally deceive Pomella and Pomella's CEO, Mica Talmor. Id. Gregg misled Talmor about the hours Monastery Camp valets worked on several occasions. See, e.g., FAC ¶ 86.
Plaintiffs allege a violation of Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. 201, et seq, along with various California wage and hour state law claims for failure to pay minimum wage, provide meal periods, provide paid rest breaks, pay wages at termination, provide accurate wage statements, California Unfair Business Practices, and a PAGA claim. See FAC. Plaintiffs allege that they worked seven days a week, and approximately 15 hours a day for the duration of the 2019, 2021, and 2022 seasons. FAC ¶ 15.
Monastery Camp answered the FAC. ECF 32. Bohemian Club and Pomella both filed the now-pending Motions to Dismiss. ECF 34, ECF 35.
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests for the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in the complaint. Ileto v. Glock, 349 F.3d 1191, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2003). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires that a complaint include a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), a complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if the plaintiff fails to state a cognizable legal theory, or has not alleged sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013).
While the court is to accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint, legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual factual allegations, need not be accepted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). The complaint must proffer sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 558-59 (2007) (citations and quotations omitted). A claim is facially plausible when the “plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not ‘show[n]' - that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679.
Both Bohemian Club and Pomella argue that Plaintiffs' first six causes of action, all arising under the California Labor Code or the FLSA, fail because Plaintiffs' allegations do not support liability against them as joint employers. To be liable for labor violations under both California and federal law, a defendant must be an employer. See Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal.4th 35, 49 (2010); Bonnette v. Cal. Health and Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983), abrogated on other grounds by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). “The joint employer doctrine recognizes that ‘even where business entities are separate, if they share control of the terms or conditions of an individual's employment, both companies can qualify as employers.'” Johnson v. Serenity Transp., Inc., No. 15-cv-02004-JSC, 2016 WL 270952, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2016) (quoting Guitierrez v. Carter Bros. Sec. Servs., LLC, 2014 WL 5487793, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2014)). “At the pleadings stage, although the ‘plaintiff is not required to conclusively establish that defendants were her joint employers . . . [the plaintiff] must at least allege some facts in support of this legal conclusion.'” Lesnik v. Eisenmann SE, 374 F.Supp.3d 923, 942 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (citation omitted). The Court analyzes Plaintiffs claims under California law before doing so under FLSA.
To establish a joint employer relationship, a plaintiff must be able to demonstrate that each defendant was able to “(a) exercise control over the wages, hours or working conditions, or (b) to suffer or permit to work, or (c) to engage, thereby creating a common law employment relationship.” Martinez, 49 Cal.4th at 64. The test is disjunctive: Plaintiffs need only plead facts sufficient to meet one of these tests. See id. The Court considers the sufficiency of the pleading under each of the three tests below.
The first inquiry is whether, as pleaded, Bohemian Club and/or Pomella exercised control over the wages, hours, or working conditions of Plaintiffs. The California Supreme Court has concluded that unless an entity has the power to hire and fire the workers, that entity will not qualify as a joint employer. Patterson v. Domino's Pizza, LLC, 60 Cal.4th 474, 484-88, 500-03 (2014) (). Here, Plaintiffs have not alleged that Bohemian Club or Pomella had the power to hire or fire Plaintiffs or any other member of the putative class. Plaintiffs also fail to aver that Bohemian Club or Pomella controlled their wages or hours. Though Plaintiffs note that Bohemian Club expressly encouraged the camps to abide by wage and hour laws, Plaintiffs do not allege that Bohemian Club or Pomella influenced the amount or manner in which they were paid. FAC ¶¶ 44, 45. Plaintiffs, to the contrary, only allege that the camp had the power to “hire, fire, pay, and dictate nearly every aspect of their valets' employment” (FAC ¶ 31), and they allege that it was a camp captain who proposed to pay them “under the table” (FAC ¶ 80). Further, the FAC does not allege that either Bohemian Club or Pomella controlled when Plaintiffs' workdays began and ended.
Though Plaintiffs allege that “Defendant Bohemian Club exercised substantial, direct, and immediate control over class members' essential terms and conditions of employment,” FAC ¶ 77, those allegations are conclusory, fall short of the pleading standards, and need not be accepted as true. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). Ultimately the collective...
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