Gregg v. United States
| Decision Date | 29 October 1926 |
| Docket Number | No. 3738.,3738. |
| Citation | 15 F.2d 8 |
| Parties | GREGG v. UNITED STATES et al. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Raymond L. Walker, of Chicago, Ill., for appellant.
Clarence W. Nichols, of Indianapolis, Ind., for appellee Shelton and others.
Before ALSCHULER, EVANS, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
Appellant, by this suit, seeks to recover upon a war risk insurance policy for the sum of $10,000, covering the life of Joseph Rastus Gregg, who was killed in action. The United States of America, one of the appellees, admits liability and stands ready to pay the sums due, according to the terms of the policy, to such person or persons as the court shall direct. Appellees, other than the United States, are adverse claimants, who collected upon the policy until this suit was brought. They are the mother and half brothers and sister of the deceased soldier, whom the District Court found to be the legal beneficiaries.
The facts are few and hardly in dispute. The assured was born out of wedlock, and lived with appellant, a great-aunt by marriage, from the time he was 18 months old until his death, save for the short period he was in the war service. His mother, one of the appellees, married when the assured was 4 or five years old, but her duties doubtless prevented her from ever taking her child, who, a little later, went with "Grandma Gregg," as appellant was called, into Indiana, where he remained until he was 17 or 18 years old, and from which place he enlisted. During the years he resided in Indiana, he never saw nor heard of his mother. Appellant, during all these years, stood in loco parentis to the assured.
Deceased was almost illiterate and was somewhat subnormal mentally. Appellant was also illiterate. It is fairly inferable that the deceased did not know his mother was alive; certainly he did not know her name or her residence; and he, of course, did not know of the existence of his half brothers and sister. He never carried any name other than Gregg, taken from or given by "Grandma" Gregg, appellant herein.
The testimony concerning the application for insurance came from the officers of his company, who had reason to recall the circumstances surrounding the execution of the application and the issuance of the policy. When deceased was asked who the beneficiary should be, he replied, "Grandma Gregg." Assured was told that the law required him to name his parents, and, if he did not have parents, or did not care to name them, he should name his estate. The "company clerk" labored under the impression that appellant was the heir at law of the assured, and told the assured he would mail the policy to her (which was done), and she "would be the one to receive the insurance, if anything should occur."
Solution of the questions here presented calls for a consideration of the general purpose and object of this war-time legislation. The government was exercising its extraordinary war power, and recruiting soldiers through the draft system. It was not only anxious to care for dependents, but insisted that they should be protected so far as possible. Insurance was made well nigh compulsory. The duration of the war, however, was unknown, and the extent of the human loss uncertain. The Congress, therefore, limited its obligation to those who were or who might be dependent upon the soldier. It also provided that its liability be a somewhat varying one, for it reserved the right to amend the act which created and fixed its liability. In these respects the insurance contracts under consideration differed from the ordinary life insurance contracts. While the United States acted as the insurer, it was at the same time occupying the position of a guardian toward the insured and the beneficiary — doubly so in the instant case where the ward was only 17 years old, illiterate, and somewhat subnormal.
The act originally provided that the only beneficiaries that could be designated were "the spouse, child, grandchild, parent, brother or sister." If the soldier had no such relative, then the liability of the government was expressly limited. Compiled Stats. § 514uuu. The injustice and the shortsightedness of this limitation was early recognized, and on December 24, 1919, Congress enlarged the list of those who might be named as beneficiary. Section 4 (4a) of the amendment (Comp. St. § 514mmm) provides:
"The terms `father' and `mother' include stepfathers and stepmothers, fathers and mothers through adoption, and persons who have stood in loco parentis to a member of the military or naval forces at any time prior to his enlistment or induction for a period of not less than one year: Provided, that this subdivision shall be deemed to be in effect as of October 6, 1917."
Appellant came within the...
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