Gregory v. Corrigan, 66614

• Decision Date: 26 February 1985
• Docket Number: No. 66614,66614
• Parties: Honorable Ellis GREGORY, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Honorable William CORRIGAN, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 840

685 S.W.2d 840

Honorable Ellis GREGORY, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Honorable William CORRIGAN, et al., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 66614.

Supreme Court of Missouri,

En Banc.

Feb. 26, 1985.

F. Wm. McCalpin, Michael A. Vitale, St. Louis, for defendants-appellants.

Alan G. Kimbrell, St. Louis, for plaintiffs-respondents.

PER CURIAM.

This case arises out of a dispute within the Twenty-first Judicial Circuit concerning local rules of court. At issue is the validity of two of the circuit's local court rules. It has reached this Court by virtue of an appeal from a declaratory judgment by a special trial judge appointed by this Court to hear the case. The trial judge found both rules to be null and void. We affirm in part and reverse in part, finding one of the two rules valid.

The disputed rules were adopted by a majority of the circuit judges in an en banc meeting of the Twenty-first Judicial Circuit on June 3, 1984. Local Rule 100.1.1(4) ¹ limits candidates for presiding judge to those whose nominations are seconded by a majority of the circuit judges. Local Rule 100.1.2(3) ² vests in the presiding judge certain administrative powers. Among these are the authority to assign division clerks, direct the circuit clerk to establish an office for the maintenance of court files and transfer the operation of the traffic control offices for case assignments to the circuit clerk. By reason of Mo. Const. art. V, § 15.1, only circuit judges make the rules of court, so that the associate circuit judges did not participate in the adoption of these two local rule amendments.

On July 20, 1984, twelve of the thirteen associate circuit judges of the Twenty-first Judicial Circuit instituted this suit, naming as defendants thirteen of the twenty circuit judges of the circuit. The plaintiffs sought declarations that the two amended rules were invalid. They also sought to enjoin enforcement of the new rules. The circuit judges moved for dismissal of the cause, but their motion was overruled. The trial court sustained a motion for temporary injunctive relief and subsequently ruled in favor of the plaintiffs as to the validity of the local court rule amendments. We granted expedited review.

On appeal to this Court, the circuit judges initially challenge as error the trial court's refusal to dismiss the case on a jurisdictional basis. Defendants assert that this issue should have been presented to the Supreme Court in the first instance by a petition for review.

We note that the present case involves the validity of the constitution and statutes of this state. Thus, arguably, this case falls within the Supreme Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction, pursuant to Mo. Const. art. V, § 3 (as amended). Further, this case is one in which the trial judge was appointed by order of this Court under our supervisory powers, and we now take jurisdiction to review his findings irrespective of the procedural avenue which has been followed. In view of the need for judicial economy, we will not dismiss this cause merely to permit the plaintiffs to institute another action by some other means, particularly when both parties request review by this Court. We recognize and direct that it would be better that future disputes of this sort be presented in the first instance to the Supreme Court and this Court may consider them administratively under its supervisory powers. ³

In disposing of the merits of this case, it is necessary for this Court to determine whether the disputed rules comport with applicable constitutional or statutory provisions. Appellants have argued that Mo. Const. art. V, § 15.3 and § 478.240.2, RSMo 1978, authorize the enactment and implementation of Rule 100.1.2(3). We agree.

As previously stated, Local Rule 100.1.2(3) is the amended provision which vests in the presiding judge the authority to more effectively administer the workings of the circuit court by assigning clerical personnel, establishing a centralized filing office, and transferring the supervision of the traffic control offices. These powers coincide with those set forth in Article V, § 15.3, which states that the presiding judge has "general administrative authority over the court and its divisions," subject, of course, to the rule making authority of the circuit judges under Mo. Const. art. V, § 15.1. Similarly, § 478.240.2 states that the presiding judge has the prerogative "to assign any judicial or court personnel anywhere in the court." These provisions clearly reflect the intent that the presiding judge is to have administrative control, again subject to the rule making authority of the circuit judges, not just over the business of the circuit judges, but over the entire court, including the divisions. Any other reading of these enactments runs counter to the primary objective sought to be achieved by the 1976 amendments to the Missouri Constitution.

The 1976 amendments to the judicial article create a three tier court system consisting of the Supreme Court, Courts of Appeals, and the Circuit Courts. Mo. Const. art. V, § 1 (1945, as amended 1976). Probate, magistrate and municipal courts are abolished as separate entities and incorporated into the circuit system as divisions of the circuit courts. Mo. Const. art. V, § 27.2(a), (b) (1945, as amended 1976). The constitutional amendments did not fashion associate circuit courts. Instead, the former magistrates were enveloped into the circuit system as associate circuit judges to be assigned to particular divisions of the circuit court. Therefore, when the constitution refers to the authority of the presiding judge over the circuit court and its divisions, it is unequivocally referring to tribunals of the associate circuit judges.

Plaintiffs counter that the disputed Local Rule 100.1.1(3) cannot be valid since other constitutional provisions allegedly preserve administrative authority in the associate circuit judges. For instance, plaintiffs cite Mo. Const. art. V, § 27.3, which reads, in part, that the "practice, procedure, filing fees and administration of causes heard by associate circuit judges within the jurisdiction of former magistrate and probate courts shall be and remain the same as in the court abolished." This argument is flawed, however, by the fact that the quoted language has been lifted from a subsection which outlines the types of cases over which associate circuit judges can preside.

It is manifest that words used in constitutional provisions must be viewed in context. Buechner v. Bond, 650 S.W.2d 611, 613 (Mo. banc 1983). When Article V, § 27.3 is read in its entirety, it becomes evident that the framers were preserving for the associate circuit judges the judicial authority to adjudicate the rights of litigants, as had been done in the magistrate courts. We also note that the drafters of this subsection did not state that the associate circuit judges were to have the same administrative powers as the former magistrates. The provision refers, instead, to "administration of causes " (emphasis added). Since all words used in constitutional provisions are presumed to have some purpose, State Highways & Transportation Com'n v. Director of Revenue, 672 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Mo. banc 1984); Buechner v. Bond, supra, we must interpret this language as a limitation on the powers of the associate circuit judges.

Furthermore, the plaintiffs' reading of this constitutional subsection would place it directly in conflict with Article V, § 15.3 which specifically bestows in the presiding judge general administrative authority over the divisions. Since we are to attempt to harmonize all provisions of the constitution, State ex. inf. Martin v. City of Independence, 518 S.W.2d 63, 66 (Mo.1974), the plaintiffs' contentions in this regard must be rejected.

Likewise, we are not persuaded that Article V, § 27.10(a) and various statutory provisions preclude the presiding judge from reassigning division clerks and their deputies to the circuit clerk's supervision. The state constitution states only that the "selection" of the clerk and deputies of the respective divisions shall continue in the same manner as had been the practice in the magistrate courts. Nothing in the constitution dictates that once selected, the clerks must remain under the supervision of the associate circuit judge.

Certainly, if the division clerks remained under the supervision of the associate circuit judges, the concept of a unified court system would be undermined. Because it is our view that each section of the judicial article must be construed as consistent with the concept of a unified court system, the term "selection" in this instance cannot be interpreted beyond its literal meaning. To the extent that there exist contrary statutory provisions, those statutes must give way to mandates of the constitution.

With respect to Local Rule 100.1.1(4), however, we agree with the trial court that the rule is invalid. This is the provision which states that candidates for presiding judge must receive a second to their nomination from a majority of the circuit judges. This rule conflicts with that portion of the constitution which reads that:

The circuit and associate circuit judges in each circuit shall select by secret ballot a circuit judge from their number to serve as presiding judge.

Mo. Const. art. V, § 15.3 (1945, as amended 1976). The constitution could not be more explicit in requiring that both circuit and associate circuit judges participate in the election of a presiding judge. Because the...