Gregory v. DiCenzo
Decision Date | 17 June 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 96-491-A,96-491-A |
Citation | 713 A.2d 772 |
Parties | Yolanda J. GREGORY v. Rhonda A. DiCENZO et al. ppeal. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Guy R. Bissonnette, for Plaintiff.
Linn Foster Freedman and Mark C. Hadden, Providence, for Defendant.
Before WEISBERGER, C.J., and LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS and GOLDBERG, JJ.
This case originally came before the Supreme Court on December 8, 1997, pursuant to an order directing the plaintiff, Yolanda J. Gregory (Yolanda), to appear and to show cause why this appeal should not be summarily decided. On December 12, 1997, this Court issued a second order directing the defendant, Rhonda A. DiCenzo (DiCenzo), to appear and to show cause why this appeal should not be sustained. After hearing the arguments of counsel on April 6, 1998, and reviewing the memoranda of the parties, we conclude that cause has not been shown, and we shall therefore decide the case at this time. The facts are not in dispute.
On October 5, 1990, Yolanda was involved in a motor-vehicle collision with DiCenzo. Suit was not filed in Yolanda's name, however, until September 23, 1993. Of paramount importance in this case is the fact that on August 13, 1993, five weeks prior to the filing of the complaint, Yolanda died from causes unrelated to the collision. Nonetheless, suit was filed in Yolanda's name on September 23, 1993. On December 8, 1993, counsel for Yolanda filed a suggestion of death pursuant to Rule 25(a)(2) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. On April 12, 1996, counsel moved to amend the complaint to substitute Yolanda's husband, Guy Gregory (Guy), and the estate as the named plaintiff. The motion also indicated that Guy had been appointed executor on or about May 16, 1994.
Prior to the filing of the motion to amend, DiCenzo filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that since Yolanda was not alive at the time the complaint was filed, the court did not have jurisdiction over this matter. DiCenzo maintained that Rule 25 is of no assistance in this case and that summary judgment would be appropriate. The trial justice agreed, and on July 9, 1996, he granted DiCenzo's motion for summary judgment and denied the motion to amend the complaint to substitute a party. The trial justice found that at no time from that in which the complaint was originally filed on September 23, 1993 (five weeks after Yolanda's death), to the present had there been a legally existing party-plaintiff and that Rule 25 was unavailable since this rule is operative only when the substitution is for someone who is a party to a pending action. In the words of the trial justice, "[s]ubstitution is not possible if one who was named as a party, in fact, [has] died before the commencement of the action."
On appeal Yolanda's counsel alleges that the trial justice overlooked Rule 17 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, which, when read in conjunction with Rule 25, permits the substitution sought. We disagree.
Rule 17, "Parties plaintiff and defendant--Capacity," provides in part:
Rule 25, "Substitution of Parties," provides in part:
Yolanda's counsel argues that the trial justice erred in denying the motion to amend the complaint since the claim was not extinguished by the death of the named party-plaintiff. Although counsel is correct in asserting that pursuant to G.L.1956 § 9-1-6, a cause of action for damages survives the death of the injured party, counsel's reliance upon Rules 17 and 25 is misplaced since these rules relate to the amendment and substitution of parties in actions that were properly commenced in the name of a living party. Neither rule has any applicability in circumstances in which a complaint is brought in the name of a deceased person. The appropriate procedure to be utilized in that instance is contained within § 9-1-21. 1 This procedure, however, was never utilized.
In cases wherein a party for whom a cause of action has accrued dies prior to the commencement of suit, § 9-1-21 provides that "the action may be commenced * * * at any time not more than one year after the appointment of the executor or administrator of the person so dying, and not afterwards." It is undisputed that Guy was appointed executor of his late wife's estate on May 16, 1994. Thus pursuant to § 9-1-21 Guy had until May 16, 1995, to commence this cause of action in the name of a proper party. This commencement did not occur. Indeed, the motion to amend the complaint, seeking to substitute the executor as the proper party, was not made until April 12, 1996, eleven months after the expiration of the time period set forth in § 9-1-21. Therefore, the trial justice was without authority to grant the motion to amend the complaint and substitute the executor as the proper party. Accordingly the trial justice was correct in granting DiCenzo's motion for summary judgment.
Yolanda's counsel also relies upon the case LesCarbeau v. Rodrigues, 109 R.I. 407, 286 A.2d 246 (1972), in which the named defendant died after the action had commenced and counsel for the plaintiff took no steps to secure the appointment of an administrator or executor to be substituted as the proper defendant. This Court upheld the order of the trial justice conditionally dismissing the action unless the plaintiff substituted the appropriate party within six months. We stated:
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...action was a "nullity"). Other states having statutes or rules similar to the federal rule have held likewise. See Gregory v. DiCenzo, 713 A.2d 772 (R.I. 1998) (lawsuit brought on behalf of deceased plaintiff void); Jenkins v. Estate of Thomas, 800 P.2d 1358 (Colo. App. 1990) (no jurisdicti......
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