Gregory v. Otac, Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 February 2003
• Docket Number: No. CIV. H-01-3353.,CIV. H-01-3353.
• Citation: 247 F.Supp.2d 764
• Parties: Robert B. GREGORY Plaintiff v. OTAC, INC. and Hardee's Food Systems, INC. Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

247 F.Supp.2d 764

Robert B. GREGORY Plaintiff v. OTAC, INC. and Hardee's Food Systems, INC. Defendants

No. CIV. H-01-3353.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

February 19, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Philip B. Malter, Malter and Mickum Chtd., Riva, MD, for Plaintiff.

Robert J. Lynott, Thomas and Libowitz PA, Roy W. Anderson, Jr., Law Offices of Jonathan P. Stebenne, Baltimore, MD, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ALEXANDER HARVEY, II, Senior District Judge.

I

Plaintiff Robert B. Gregory ("Gregory") is disabled and requires a walker to ambulate. On March 20, 2000, he fell and was injured after leaving a Hardee's Restaurant ("the Restaurant") located in Princess Anne, Maryland. In this civil action, Gregory has sued the present and former owner of the Restaurant seeking injunctive relief and compensatory damages.

Suit has been brought under the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S. § 12101, et seq. ("the ADA") and under Maryland common law. Named as defendants in the case are Otac, Inc. ("Otac"), a Maryland corporation, and Hardee's Food Systems, Inc. ("Hardee's Food Systems"), a North Carolina corporation.¹

Counts I, II and III assert claims under the ADA. It is alleged in Count I that defendants discriminated against plaintiff Gregory on the basis of his disability in denying him full and equal enjoyment of the services of the Restaurant by failing to make a curb cut or entrance ramp from the disabled parking place used by Gregory when he had lunch at the restaurant. In Count II, it is alleged that defendants discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of his disability by not providing him with a continuous, unobstructed path of travel which connects the entrance and other parts of the restaurant to its disabled parking areas. Count III alleges that defendants discriminated against Gregory on the basis of his disability by failing to properly maintain a safe path of travel as that term is employed by regulations promulgated under the ADA. Count IV presents a claim of negligence under Maryland law and alleges that defendants were negligent in violating provisions of the ADA and regulations promulgated thereunder.

Pursuant to the Court's Scheduling Order, as amended, the parties have engaged in discovery. Presently pending is a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants. The parties have submitted memoranda and exhibits in support of and in opposition to the pending motion, including excerpts from depositions and photographs.

Following its review of the parties' memoranda and the exhibits which have been submitted, this Court has concluded that no hearing is necessary for a decision on the pending motion for summary judgment. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons to be stated herein, defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted.

II Background Facts

Plaintiff Gregory has in past years suffered several strokes and is an individual with a disability within the meaning of the ADA. Defendant Otac owns and operates the Hardee's Restaurant located at 30362 Mount Vernon Road, Princess Anne, Maryland. Defendant Hardee's Food Systems formerly owned and operated the Restaurant. By Agreement dated July 31, 1996, various Hardee's restaurants, including the one at issue here, were sold to Otac.²

In a prior action brought by him in this Court, Gregory claimed that he had been illegally discharged by his employer in violation of the ADA. Gregory v. Crown Cork & Seal Company (USA), Inc., Civil No. 99-264.³ In his Memorandum Opinion and Order entered in Civil No. S-99-264 on January 10, 2000, Judge Smalkin, in granting in part and denying in part defendant's motion for summary judgment, noted that Gregory had previously suffered two strokes which left him partially paralyzed and severely limited his movement and his working endurance and ability. (Slip op. at 1). Judge Smalkin further noted that Gregory had a heart condition which had required a quadruple bypass. Id. In the Joint Pretrial Order entered in that case, counsel for Gregory stated that his disability included hemiparesis on the right side of his body and balance problems and that he was "severely disabled in his walking capability." (Joint Pretrial Order approved by Judge Smalkin on March 20, 2000, at p. 1).

Following a dental appointment in a nearby location, Gregory and his sister, Beverly Ann Trader ("Trader"), visited and had lunch at the Restaurant on March 20, 2000. Trader drove her vehicle with Gregory in the passenger seat. Situated alongside the restaurant were two parking spaces reserved for the handicapped. When Trader and Gregory arrived in her car, the parking space to the left was occupied by a van, and Trader accordingly parked in the reserved space to the right. To the left of and alongside the space occupied by the other vehicle, access to the Restaurant had been provided for use by disabled customers by way of a ramp.

At the time, Gregory was using a walker to assist him in moving about. Rather than walking around the van which occupied the other reserved space and using the ramp, Gregory, after alighting from the passenger side of the car, chose to use his walker and proceed to the Restaurant by way of a more direct route. With his walker, he proceeded over the raised curb located in front of Trader's car and entered the Restaurant where he and Trader had lunch.

Upon leaving the Restaurant, Gregory once again made no attempt to use the available ramp located alongside the other parked vehicle. Using his walker, he proceeded to descend the curb in the vicinity of Trader's car. When he placed his walker in front of him on the other side of the curb, the walker slipped causing him to fall on the pavement and suffer injuries, including a fracture of his right arm and contusions of his scalp and knee. According to Gregory, when he descended from the curb to the parking area, his walker slid out from under him causing him to fall. He later noticed that grease and oil stain drops were located in the area where his walker slipped.

Emergency personnel arrived, and Gregory was taken by an ambulance to the hospital. He here seeks equitable relief requiring defendants to comply with regulations promulgated under the ADA, as well as compensatory damages, attorneys' fees and costs.

Ill

Summary Judgment Principles

A party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Harwich v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 958 (4th Cir.1984). Where, as here, the plaintiff must bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, "the burden on the moving party [at the summary judgment stage] may be discharged by `showing'— that is, pointing out to the district court— that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

One of the purposes of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to require a plaintiff, in advance of trial and after a motion for summary judgment has been filed and properly supported, to come forward with some minimal facts to show that a defendant may be liable under the claims alleged. See Rule 56(e). If the nonmoving party "fail[s] to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof," then "the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment." Catrett, All U.S. at 322, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

While the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 364 (4th Cir.1985), "when the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)."`A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a fact issue; there must be evidence on which a jury might rely.'" Barwick, 736 F.2d at 958-59 (quoting Seago v. North Carolina Theatres, Inc., 42 F.R.D. 627, 640 (E.D.N.C. 1966), aff'd, 388 F.2d 987 (4th Cir.1967)). A genuine issue of material fact cannot be created "through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another." Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir.1985). Moreover, only disputed issues of material fact, determined by reference to the applicable substantive law, will preclude the entry of summary judgment. "Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

In the absence of a minimal showing by a plaintiff that the defendant may be liable under the claims alleged, a defendant should not be required to undergo the considerable expense of preparing for and participating at a trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has stated that, with regard to motions for summary judgment, the district courts have "an affirmative obligation... to prevent `factually unsupported claims and defenses' from proceeding to trial." Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir.1987) (quoting Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548).

Applying these principles to the facts of record here, this Court has concluded that defendants' motion for summary judgment must be granted.

IV

Applicable Principles of Law

By its express terms, the purpose of the ADA is:

(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;

(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities;

(3) to ensure...