Gregory v. Rock Island County Jail
| Decision Date | 27 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | 21-4039 |
| Parties | CORY GREGORY, Plaintiff, v. ROCK ISLAND COUNTY JAIL, et. al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
MERIT REVIEW ORDER
This cause is before the Court for merit review of the Plaintiff's claims. Shortly after Plaintiff filed her initial complaint, she submitted a second proposed complaint which was filed as a Motion for Leave to Amend. [3]. The motion is granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. [3].
The Court is required by 28 U.S.C. §1915A to “screen” the Plaintiff's amended complaint and through such process to identify and dismiss any legally insufficient claim, or the entire action if warranted. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §1915A.
Plaintiff says she is a transgender woman currently incarcerated at the Rock Island County Jail (RICJ). Plaintiff clarifies she is a convicted prisoner who was sentenced to the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), but she is at RICJ awaiting a resentencing hearing. (Amd. Comp., p. 3, 4). Her amended complaint identifies eight Defendants including the jail Sheriff Gerald Bustos, Captain Lape, Lieutenant Browne, and Officers Roark, O'Melia, Rollins, and John Doe.
The Court first notes Plaintiff cannot sue the RIJC because it is a building and not a person or policymaking unit of government which can be sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C §1983. See Smith v. Knox County Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012) (). Therefore, the Court will dismiss Defendant Rock Island County Jail.
Plaintiff says she was diagnosed with gender dysphoria in May of 2019. Plaintiff was transferred from IDOC to the jail on November 13, 2020 and she immediately informed staff of her transgender status as well as her current hormone replacement therapy. Plaintiff also asked to be housed in a female cell block.
Plaintiff was initially housed in a COVID-19 quarantine cell in a men's cell block and an officer advised Plaintiff if she made an issue of her transgender status, the jail practice would be to place the Plaintiff in isolation.
On November 20, 2020, Plaintiff stopped a nurse to ask for her medications, but Defendant Officer Roark interrupted and advised Plaintiff she would receive no special treatment and would instead “be treated like all the ‘other male inmates.'” (Comp, p. 5). The Defendant then verbally taunted Plaintiff.
The only direct reference in the amended complaint to hormone replacement therapy is on November 25, 2020. Plaintiff says she was denied the medications resulting in severe cramps, nausea and vomiting. Plaintiff requested medical assistance, but she was denied. Plaintiff does not say who denied her care or if she asked for additional medical care. She also does not clearly indicate if this was an ongoing problem. More important, she does not identify a denial of hormone replacement therapy as an intended claim in her list of “counts.” (Amd. Comp., p. 14-22, Counts I- IX).
Plaintiff was moved to a medical watch cell on November 21, 2020. On November 23, 2020, Defendant O'Melia threatened to make Plaintiff's life a “living hell.” (Amd. Comp, p. 6). Plaintiff says the officer banged on her cell door and made derogatory comments during his rounds. Plaintiff says she filed ”numerous requests” to move to a different cell, but Plaintiff also admits she was moved to a different area the very next day. (Amd. Comp., p. 6).
On November 24, 2020, Plaintiff moved to fourth floor segregation cell. Plaintiff says she had not received a disciplinary ticket, nor had she broken any jail rules. Nonetheless, she was subjected to segregation restrictions including limited out of cell time, limited social access, limited commissary, and limited phone time. Plaintiff further claims jail staff continued to harass her.
Plaintiff also complains about the isolation she experienced, but at times her claims are contradictory. For instance, Plaintiff states she was “the only inmate in this unit, having no human contact” and the complete isolation impacted her mental health. (Amd. Comp., p. 7). However, Plaintiff also says she faced “constant sexual harassment” from inmates as well as correctional staff and was “in constant fear for her safety.” (Amd. Comp., p. 8). While not explicitly clear, it appears Plaintiff was isolated from other inmates, but occasionally did have concerning contacts with other inmates.
For instance, medical watch inmates used the showers on her living unit on November 29, 2020. The inmates called her derogatory names and one inmate stood naked in Plaintiff's door and “masturbated for over 20 minutes, expressing the sexual things he wished to do to Plaintiff.” (Amd. Comp, p. 8). Plaintiff says Officer John Doe observed the incident, but he did not intervene.
Plaintiff also says she used the gym one time and male inmates in a nearby block called her various names including “faggot.” (Amd. Comp., p. 7). The only other “out of cell time” was to “shower and clean her area.” (Amd. Comp., p. 7). On December 9, 2020, Plaintiff informed Defendant Officer Rollins she wanted to shower, but the Defendant laughed and told Plaintiff she could only shower if she “sucked his dick.” (Amd. Comp., p. 8).
Plaintiff made several requests to be moved out of segregation and into a female housing unit, but her requests were denied. Defendant Lape told Plaintiff she could not be housed with female inmates because she had not undergone Gender Reassignment Surgery. Therefore, Plaintiff says she has remained in “complete isolation.” (Amd. Comp., p. 9).
Plaintiff alleges this segregated isolation confinement is the jail administrator's policy and practice for addressing transgender inmates. Plaintiff further states there is no legitimate penological purpose for her placement. Plaintiff maintains her only appropriate housing placement is with female inmates.
Plaintiff further argues the Defendants are fully aware her segregated confinement is harmful to her mental health status. In support of this contention, Plaintiff points in part to the Defendants' failure to comply with the polices of the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA). For clarification, prisoners cannot sue under the PREA because there is no private right of action. See Winners v. Hyatt, 2021 WL 1165140, at *2 (N.D.Ind. March 25, 2021). In addition, “prison staff's failure to follow internal policies pertaining to PREA reports does not state a claim.” Id. citing Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003).
Nonetheless, Plaintiff also states she was at greater risk to suffer mental health issues in isolation because she suffers from bipolar disorder and anxiety. Plaintiff notes this information is in her medical records which were sent to the jail. Defendants Bustos and Lape continued to deny numerous requests for any mental health care or treatment for gender dysphoria. (Amd. Comp., p.12, 13). Plaintiff does not name any medical staff, but instead she claims these two administrators have final say over any medical care provided.
Based on the facts alleged, Plaintiff has identified nine separate counts. (Amd. Comp., p. 14-22). The first three counts allege official capacity claims based on a violation of Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Count I alleges Defendants Bustos and Lape violated Plaintiff's equal protection rights in their official capacities when they refused to place Plaintiff in a women's unit, “discriminating against Plaintiff on the basis of her gender identity.” (Amd. Comp, p. 14-15).
Count II alleges Defendants Lape and Bustos violated Plaintiff's equal protection rights in their official capacities because they have allowed Plaintiff to be “continually subjected” to verbal harassment based on her gender identity. (Amd. Comp., p. 15).
Count III again alleges Defendants Lape and Bustos violated Plaintiff's equal protection rights in their official capacities by subjecting Plaintiff to isolation based on her gender identity.
The Court also notes Count VIII further alleges an official capacity or “Monell Claim” against Defendants Bustos and Lape based on an unlawful policy or practice of improperly housing transgender inmates, allowing constant harassment, and failing to properly train staff.
For clarification, an official capacity claim against the Rock Island County Sheriff is effectively a suit against the County. See Holloway v. Delaware County Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1071 (7th Cir. 2012) citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). A local government entity such as the county is liable for damages only if a plaintiff can show an alleged constitutional deprivation occurred as a result of an official policy, custom, or practice. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Suing the Sheriff in his official capacity is sufficient to state a claim, but suing additional Rock Island County employees in their official capacities is unnecessarily redundant. See Robinson v. Sappington, 351 F.3d 317, 340 (7th Cir. 2003).
Consequently, Plaintiff has adequately alleged three claims against Defendant Sheriff Bustos in his official capacity in Counts I, II, III, and VII based on the alleged facts. Plaintiff claims Defendant Bustos violated Plaintiff's equal protection rights based on: 1) a policy and practice of placing transgender inmates in segregated confinement; 2) a policy and practice of allowing officers and inmates to sexually harass transgender inmates; and 3) a failure to properly train staff to supervise transgender inmates.
Plaintiff's Count IV is...
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