Gregory v. United States
| Decision Date | 18 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL ACTION 4:96-cr-22(01) |
| Parties | COURTNEY FLOYD GREGORY, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
Before the Court is Petitioner Courtney Floyd Gregory's (“Petitioner”) pro se Reinstated Motion to Reduce Sentence Pursuant to the Formerly Incarcerated Reenter Society Transformed Safely Transitioning Every Person Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018) (“FIRST STEP Act”). Pet'r's Reinstated Mot. Reduce Sentence FIRST STEP Act, ECF No. 473 (“Pet'r's Mot.”). For the reasons stated herein, Petitioner's Motion is GRANTED.
On April 29, 1996, Petitioner was named alongside three co-defendants in a twenty-three count Indictment. Indictment ECF No. 11; see FIRST STEP Act Presentence Invest. Report ¶ 1, ECF No. 475 (“PSR”). Petitioner was charged only with Count One: Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute 50 Grams or More of Cocaine Base, Cocaine, and Marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, from on or about January 1984 and continuously thereafter up to and including April 29, 1996. See PSR at ¶ 1. On August 26, 1996, Petitioner and his co-defendants went to trial. Id. at ¶ 2. On September 9, 1996, the jury found Petitioner guilty of Count One. Jury Verdict, ECF No. 131. On January 21, 1997, the Court sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment. J., ECF No. 161. On February 5, 2019, Petitioner filed a pro se letter motion seeking relief under the FIRST STEP Act. Pet'r's Letter Mot. FIRST STEP Act, ECF No. 415 (“Pet'r's Letter Mot.”). On July 15, 2019, the Court denied the motion. Mem. Op. & Order Deny'g Pet'r's Letter Mot. FIRST STEP Act, ECF No. 448 (“Mem. Op. & Order”).
On May 24, 2021, Petitioner filed the instant Motion, requesting “compassionate release and reduction in sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) due to new law and changes in the circumstances.” Pet'r's Mot. at 1. On June 4, 2021, the Court appointed the Federal Public Defender (“FPD”) to represent Petitioner in this matter. Order June 4, 2021, ECF No. 474. The Court also directed the FPD, the United States Attorney's Office, and the United States Probation Office to respond. Id. On June 7, 2021, the Court received a copy of Petitioner's presentence investigation report. See PSR. On July 19, 2021, the Government filed a response in opposition. Resp't's Mem. Opp'n Pet'r's Reinstated Mot. FIRST STEP Act, ECF No. 478 (“Resp't's Mem. Opp'n”). On November 5, 2021, Petitioner responded through counsel. Pet'r's Mem. Supp. Pet'r's Reinstated Mot. FIRST STEP Act, ECF No. 482 (“Pet'r's Mem. Supp.”). In his response through counsel, Petitioner argues there are three mechanisms through which the Court may evaluate his Motion: (1) a motion for relief under § 404(b) of the FIRST STEP Act; (2) a motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e); or (3) a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Pet'r's Mem. Supp. at 1-2, 9.
On November 24, 2021, and February 23, 2022, Petitioner filed motions to file supplemental exhibits in support of his Motion. Pet'r's Mot. Suppl. Evid. Admin. Req. Compass. Release, ECF No. 484 (“Pet'r's Mot. Suppl.”); Pet'r's Second Mot. Suppl. Evid. Admin. Req. Compass. Release, ECF No. 486 (“Pet'r's Second Mot. Suppl.”). The Court granted both motions. Order Grant'g Pet'r's Mot. Suppl. Evid. Admin. Req. Compass. Release, ECF No. 485; Order Grant's Pet'r's Second Mot. Suppl. Evid. Admin. Req. Compass. Release, ECF No. 487. Accordingly, this matter is ripe for judicial determination.
When a court imposes a sentence of imprisonment, that is considered a final judgment on the matter. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b). It is well established that “[t]he law closely guards the finality of criminal sentences against judicial ‘change of heart.'” United States v. Goodwyn, 596 F.3d 233, 235 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Layman, 116 F.3d 105, 109 (4th Cir. 1997)). A “court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed” except in limited circumstances, including “to the extent otherwise expressly permitted by statute.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (“Fourth Circuit”) has held that motions under the FIRST STEP Act “fall under § 3582(c)(1)(B), ” constituting “a distinct exception to finality.” United States v. Chambers, 956 F.3d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 2020).
Before 2010, federal drug statutes “imposed upon an offender who dealt in powder cocaine the same sentence it imposed upon an offender who dealt in one one-hundredth that amount of crack cocaine.” Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 263 (2012). The 100-to-l crack-to-powder cocaine mandatory minimum disparity inflicted disproportionate and unjust effects on Black offenders. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 98 (2007). Congress eventually passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which reduced the crack-to-powder cocaine disparity from 100-to-l to 18-to-l. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat 2372 (2010) (“Fair Sentencing Act” or “FSA”). Specifically, Section 2 of the FSA raised the quantity of crack cocaine required to trigger a 10-year mandatory minimum from 50 grams to 280 grams, and raised the quantity required to trigger a 5-year mandatory minimum from 5 grams to 28 grams. Id. Section 3 eliminated mandatory minimum sentences for simple possession convictions. Id. The FIRST STEP Act of 2018, in part, made these sections retroactive, thereby allowing incarcerated individuals sentenced before the passage of the FSA to petition the sentencing court “to bring [their] pre-2010 sentences ‘in line' with post-2010 sentences.” Chambers, 956 F.3d at 670 (); see also FIRST STEP Act at § 404, 132 Stat, at 52222. When evaluating such a motion, the court undertakes two overarching inquiries: first, the court must determine whether the sentence is eligible for review; and, if so, the court must then conduct a complete review on the merits. See United States v. Lancaster, 997 F.3d 171, 174 (4th Cir. 2021).
“[A] district court presented with a First Step Act motion to reduce a sentence must first determine whether the sentence qualifies for reduction - i.e., whether it is ‘eligible' for consideration ‘on the merits.'” Lancaster, 997 F.3d at 174 (quoting United States v. Gravatt, 953 F.3d 258, 262 (4th Cir. 2020)). A sentence is eligible for review if it meets three explicit criteria set forth in the FIRST STEP Act. Id. First, the sentence sought to be reduced must be for a “covered offense, ” meaning “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, that was committed before August 3, 2010.” FIRST STEP Act at § 404(a), 132 Stat, at 5222. Second, the motion for reduction must be addressed to the court that imposed the relevant sentence. See id. at § 404(b), 132 Stat, at 5222; see also Lancaster, 997 F.3d at 174. Third, the sentence must not have been “previously imposed or previously reduced” pursuant to the FSA, and the petitioner must not have previously filed a motion under § 404 that was “denied after a complete review of the motion on the merits.” Id. at § 404(c), 132 Stat, at 5222.
If a sentence qualifies for review on the merits, a district court then has discretion to decide whether to impose a reduced sentence “as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.” Id. at § 404(b), 132 Stat, at 5222 (internal citation omitted). The district court's discretion to grant such relief is broad. See id. at § 404(c), 132 Stat, at 5222 (). Albeit broad, the Fourth Circuit has mandated several steps district courts must take to ensure that the evaluation of the merits is “procedurally and substantively reasonable.” United States v. Codington, 995 F.3d 347, 358 (4th Cir. 2021).
First in retroactively applying the FSA, the court must determine the new statutory range set by any amended statutory minimums and maximums. See id. at 357 (); see also Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120, 134 (2016) (). Second, a district court must recalculate the Sentencing Guidelines range by correcting original Guidelines errors and applying intervening case law made retroactive to the original sentence. Chambers, 956 F.3d at 670; Codington, 995 F.3d at 355. Third and finally, the court must reconsider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Codington, 995 F.3d at 355. In so doing, courts are able “to more comprehensively shape sentencing decisions and even depart downward from the new Guidelines range.” Id. (emphasis in original). Indeed, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3661, courts may also consider post-sentencing conduct. Chambers, 956 at 674-75 (...
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