Greider v. Duckworth

• Citation: 701 F.2d 1228
• Decision Date: 11 March 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-1487,82-1487
• Parties: 12 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1338 James R. GREIDER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Jack DUCKWORTH, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

Page 1228

701 F.2d 1228

12 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1338

James R. GREIDER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Jack DUCKWORTH, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 82-1487.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued Jan. 25, 1983.

Decided March 9, 1983.

As Amended March 11, 1983.

Karen Plant, Chicago, Ill., for petitioner-appellant.

David L. Steiner, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, Ind., for respondent-appellee.

Before BAUER, CUDAHY and POSNER, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge.

Greider appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence that he was sane at the time the crime was committed. The district court found that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Greider was sane at the time of committing the crime. We affirm.

I.

Greider testified that on January 31, 1977, while under the influence of drugs, he took a taxi to the apartment of Richard Dingman. Greider carried wrapped in a jacket a sawed-off shotgun which he intended to give Dingman to trade for drugs. Greider was also armed with an automatic pistol, housed in his belt, which he described as a Garcia, 380 caliber semi-automatic. Greider recalled that Dingman picked up the shotgun, aimed the gun and released the safety. In the statement given police, Greider recalled that "[he] pulled [his] gun out, that was in [his] belt and shot him. As [Dingman] started to slump down, [Greider] shot him again." At trial, Greider described the scene as he "recalled hearing two loud explosions." When Paula Luciente, the second victim, walked toward Greider, she was shot in the face. In Greider's statement to the police, he said "when she came at me, I just pointed the gun at her and shot her. It was in the front part of the face." When Greider testified at trial he said that "when Luciente walked toward [him, he] heard another explosion." Greider stated that Luciente was standing about four feet away from him. However, powder marks were detected around the entry wound on Luciente's head. Greider recalled checking Dingman for vital signs. He did not check Luciente because she lay in a large pool of blood.

After the shooting, Greider walked to the apartment of some friends. The friends were not at home. Greider returned to Dingman's apartment, retrieved the shotgun and automatic pistol, and walked to his home. There, he unloaded the guns and placed them under a mattress.

Later that evening, he talked to his fiancee, Sandra Dockstader, told her what he had done, and said that he had no right to live. Greider slashed his arm. He went next door and asked a neighbor, Theodore Jurick, to drive him to the hospital. Jurick drove Greider to the emergency room of St. Catherine's Hospital and remained during Greider's treatment.

The following day, February 1, 1977, Greider drove to South Bend to purchase drugs, but could not make a buy. On February 2, 1977, Greider's fiancee, Sandra Dockstader, drove him to Indianapolis to enroll in Cognition House, a drug rehabilitation center. It was from this center that Greider phoned the Hammond police to report the murders. Greider never denied committing the murders. He interposed as a defense that from Friday, January 28, through Monday, January 31, he ingested an excessive amount of heroin and valium and as a result he was insane at the time the crimes were committed. The court appointed three psychiatrists to examine Greider.

Each physician testified that after examining Greider they were of the opinion that Greider was suffering from a toxic psychosis due to the drugs ingested, and that Greider was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. A clinical psychologist testified that Greider was an "explosive personality" as exemplified by his three or more suicide attempts. The state offered no expert testimony.

A jury found Greider guilty of two counts of murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he challenged his conviction charging that the state failed to present evidence sufficient to rebut his defense that he was insane at the time the crime was committed. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction finding that all the facts and circumstances surrounding the shootings were sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's conclusion that Greider was sane at the time he fired the gun. Greider v. State, 385 N.E.2d 424 (Ind.1979).

Greider filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence that he was sane at the time the crime was committed. The district court reviewed the trial transcript and determined that the state of Indiana's summation of the evidence was an accurate statement of the relevant facts. The district court concluded that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Greider was sane at the time of committing the crime. The writ was denied. Greider appealed.

II.

A.

Greider argues that the evidence at trial was constitutionally insufficient to support his conviction given the unrebutted testimony of three court-appointed psychiatrists as well as that of lay witnesses that Greider was legally insane at the time the offense was committed. Our standard of review in a federal habeas corpus proceeding where the claim is that the petitioner has been convicted upon insufficient evidence was articulated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), in which the Court described the inquiry as "whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.... This ... standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Id. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789. ¹

B.

The general rule at common law and in Indiana was that voluntary intoxication was not a defense in a criminal proceeding. In order for intoxication to relieve a defendant from responsibility, the crime charged must have involved specific intent, and the defendant must have been so intoxicated as to be incapable of entertaining the required specific intent. Bates v. State, 409 N.E.2d 623, 625 (Ind.1980), citing Larkin v. State, 393 N.E.2d 180 (Ind.1979); Snipes v. State, 261 Ind. 581, 307 N.E.2d 470 (1974). See also James v. State, 265 Ind. 384, 354 N.E.2d 236 (1976).

The court in Carter v. State, 408 N.E.2d 790, 799 (Ind.App.1980), noted that the defense of voluntary intoxication has been applied to the classic specific intent cases, (1) offenses wherein the crime depended on the intent, purpose, aim, or goal with which an act was done, and (2) those offenses wherein the knowledge of an attendant circumstance is a material element of the crime. In such applications the defense of voluntary intoxication may be a factor for reducing an offense from first degree murder to second degree murder. See Aszman v. State, 123 Ind. 347, 24 N.E. 123 (1890). ²

Specific intent is an element of first degree murder, and, as an element of the offense must be independently proven. See Hooker v. State, 387 N.E.2d 1354 (Ind.App.1979) quoting from 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law Sec. 32 (1961). Although Indiana decisions have not defined specific intent, Carter v. State, 408 N.E.2d at 794, the courts have held that the existence of the requisite intent is a question of fact for the jury. Greider, 385 N.E.2d at 426; citing Preston v. State, 259 Ind. 353, 287 N.E.2d 347 (1972). See also Horton v. State, 265 Ind. 393, 354 N.E.2d 242 (1976); Norris v. State, 419 N.E.2d 129 (Ind.1981): "The trier of fact must resort to reasonable inferences based upon examination of the surrounding circumstances to infer the existence of knowing or intentional conduct." Id. at 132. Consequently, the jury is permitted to infer malice from the intentional use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death. Oates v. State, 429 N.E.2d 949, 951 (Ind.1982); Bond v. State, 403 N.E.2d 812, 820 (Ind.1980); Zickefoose v. State, 270 Ind. 618, 388 N.E.2d 507, 509 (Ind.1979). ³ And, the jury may infer purpose to kill in the act of killing. Bond v. State, 403 N.E.2d at 820, citing Kerns v. State, 265 Ind. 39, 349 N.E.2d 701 (1976) and cases cited therein. ⁴

The Greider court, however, did not rely on these inferences but instead applied the common law view whereby when one voluntarily becomes intoxicated, guilt is attached to the intoxication itself, and is then transferred to the criminal act, supplying the required culpability. Greider, 385 N.E.2d at 426. See also Snipes v. State, 261 Ind. 581, 307 N.E.2d 470 (1974); Emler v. State, 259 Ind. 241, 286 N.E.2d 408 (1972). ⁵

C.

The second prong of the voluntary intoxication defense is that the defendant must have been so intoxicated as to be incapable of entertaining the required specific intent. ⁶ In application, this defense raises questions of mental disease and goes to the degree of abuse of alcohol or drugs. See Anderson v. State, 177 Ind.App. 603, 380 N.E.2d 606 (Ind.App.1978). While temporary mental incapacity induced by voluntary intoxication is generally not a defense, the law will not hold an accused responsible for his acts where the ingestion of intoxicants has been abused to the point that it has produced mental disease such that the accused is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or is unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Jackson v. State, 402 N.E.2d 947, 949 (Ind.1980).

Initially, in Indiana the defendant has the burden of proving his intoxication defense. Bates v. State, 409 N.E.2d 623, 625 (Ind.1980); Myers v. State, 422 N.E.2d 745, 751 (Ind.App.1982). After defendant has raised the issue of sanity, the state has the burden of proving...