Greif v. Betsy Ross Ice Cream Co.

• Decision Date: 11 June 1941
• Citation: 20 A.2d 597,19 N.J.Misc. 397
• Parties: GREIF v. BETSY ROSS ICE CREAM CO.
• Court: New Jersey Court of Common Pleas

20 A.2d 597

19 N.J.Misc. 397

GREIF

v. BETSY ROSS ICE CREAM CO.

Court of Common Pleas of New Jersey Monmouth County.

June 11, 1941.

Appeal from Workmen's Compensation Bureau.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by J. Leonard Greif, claimant, opposed by the Betsy Ross Ice Cream Company, employer. From an order of the Workmen's Compensation Bureau granting an award, the employer appeals.

Affirmed.

Fleming & Potter and Russell Fleming, all of New Brunswick, for petitioner-appellee.

Reid, Kelly & Flaherty and Edwin J. O'Brien, all of Newark, for respondent-appellant.

GIORDANO, Judge.

This appeal involves the construction of Chapter 280, P.L.1931, now known as Revised Statutes 34:15-51, N.J.S.A. 34:15-51, and specifically whether the payment of a medical bill by an employer constitutes an agreement to pay compensation so as to toll the running of the time for filing a petition for compensation.

The petitioner sustained a compensable accident on September 1, 1938. No compensation for temporary or permanent disability was paid or demanded by the petitioner. On January 11, 1939 at the request of petitioner, respondent reimbursed him in the sum of $25, the cost of a surgical belt and on February 6, 1939 the petitioner was reimbursed in the sum of $9.19, the cost of bandages and adhesives. The petition in question admittedly was not filed until October 4, 1940, more than two years after the occurrence of the accident, but within two years of the time the respondent reimbursed petitioner for the cost of the surgical belt.

The Workmen's Compensation Law is social legislation and should so be treated. It is remedial in nature and its basic principle is indemnity. The theory is that compensation is one of the necessary expenses of the business against which the employer must protect himself. The act is a declaration by the legislature of a public policy and the fundamental basis under the procedure of the Workmen's Compensation Act rests upon a contract between employer and employee either by express or implied consent, and to warrant a recovery under the act it must appear that the injury was caused by accident, which for the purpose of this appeal is not disputed; that the accident arose out of the employment, which here is not disputed, and that the accident arose in the course of the employment which is also not disputed.

The question presented is one of law. The pertinent provision of the Compensation Act involved and the particular part of section 34:15-51 of Revised Statutes, N.J.S.A. 34:15-51, which calls for an interpretation reads as follows: "Every claimant * * * shall * * * file a petition in duplicate with the secretary of the bureau in his office, at the state house, in Trenton, within two years after the date on which the accident occurred, or in case an agreement for compensation has been made between the employer and the claimant, then within two years after the failure of the employer to make payment pursuant to the terms of such agreement; or in case a part of the compensation has been paid by the employer, then within two years after the last payment of compensation. Any payment made in accordance with the provisions of article 2 of this chapter (§ 34:15-7 et seq.) shall constitute an agreement for compensation."

Prior to the enactment of the foregoing amendment our courts repeatedly held that medical aid did not constitute an agreement for compensation, and such payment, of course, had no effect upon extending the jurisdictional limitation.

The legislature by the passage and the adoption of the amendment in question broadened the scope of the act by substituting the word any payment or payments in the place of the word a payment or payments. By virtue of the amendment, section 34:15-51 is now in complete harmony with sections 34:15-14, 34:15-15 and 34:15-16 of the Revised Statutes, N.J.S.A. 34:15-14 to 34:15-16, and should be so treated.

When the Workmen's Compensation Law was first enacted it contained no time limitation on filing original claim petitions, and an award could be reviewed for changing in disability any time after expiration of one year from its making. P.L.1911, p. 143, Sec. 21, N.J.S.A. 34:15-27; P.L.1913, c. 174, p. 314, N.J.S.A. 34:-15-41, first introduced a statute of limitations requiring that a claim petition be filed within one year from the date of accident. In 1918 (P.L.1918, c. 149, Sec. 5, p. 431) the statute was amended so that it ran not only from the date of the accident but also from (1) the failure of an employer to pay pursuant to agreement between himself and the employee, and (2) "in case compensation has been paid By such employer, then within one year after the last payment of compensation." P.L.1921, c. 229, p. 731, further amended the statute by...