Grenard v. State Employees' Appeals Com'n, 2-285A38

• Decision Date: 25 June 1986
• Docket Number: No. 2-285A38,2-285A38
• Citation: 494 N.E.2d 341
• Parties: Pamela GRENARD, Appellant (Petitioner Below), v. STATE EMPLOYEES' APPEALS COMMISSION, Appellee (Respondent Below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 341

494 N.E.2d 341

Pamela GRENARD, Appellant (Petitioner Below), v. STATE EMPLOYEES' APPEALS COMMISSION, Appellee (Respondent Below).

No. 2-285A38.

Court of Appeals of Indiana Second District.

June 25, 1986.

Fred O. Towe, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Cynthia S. Stanley, Deputy Atty. Gen., Office of Attorney General, Indianapolis, for appellee.

SHIELDS, Judge.

Pamela Grenard initiated an action to obtain a hearing before the State Employee's Appeals Commission (SEAC) on the merits of her employee complaint. When her action was dismissed on SEAC's motion, she perfected this appeal.

We reverse.

Grenard was employed by the Indiana Employment Security Division (IESD) in the position of Accountant IV. In August, 1983, Grenard submitted applications to the State Personnel Department for Accountant III and/or Accounting Supervisor VI positions with IESD. These applications were rejected by the State Personnel Department due to her lack of supervisory experience. In October, 1983, acting on advice from the State Personnel Department, Grenard resubmitted the applications along with memoranda from her former supervisors at the State Department of Public Welfare (SDPW) stating she performed supervisory and Accounting IV duties while employed by SDPW as an Accountant. On January 3, 1984, the State Personnel Department advised Grenard that her work experience with the SDPW did not qualify her for the positions for which she was applying and her applications were again rejected.

Grenard then began the employee complaint procedure pursuant to Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 4-15-2-35 (Burns Repl.1982), ¹ claiming her work experience with SDPW should be credited as experience which qualified her for positions of Accountant III and/or Accountant Supervisor VI. Grenard's immediate supervisor and the appointing authority denied Grenard's complaint because it related to experience within another state agency prior to Grenard's employment with IESD. Grenard appealed to the State Personnel Director who also denied her complaint. The Director's letter of denial stated Grenard's complaint did not relate to her current employment and, consequently, her complaint neither concerned a change in the status of her employment nor related to a condition of her employment. Therefore, Grenard did not have access to the complaint procedure. ² Grenard subsequently appealed to the State Employee's Appeals Commission (SEAC) and requested a hearing. On March 24, 1984, Grenard received a letter from SEAC denying her request for a hearing. This denial, too, was based upon the position Grenard's failure to receive credit for her past work experience with SDPW did not relate to a change in her status or to a condition of employment, and, therefore, the subject matter jurisdiction requirements of Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 4-15-2-35 (Burns Repl.1982) had not been met.

On April 6, 1984, Grenard filed an action in the trial court against SEAC. In response, SEAC filed a Motion to Dismiss predicated on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court granted SEAC's Motion to Dismiss on the basis of Indiana Rule of Trial Procedure 12(B)(1), lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(B)(6), failure to state a claim for relief including failure to name the real party in interest. Grenard appeals, presenting the issue whether the trial court erred by granting SEAC's motion to dismiss.

Grenard first argues the trial court erred in dismissing her action against SEAC on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. She argues her employee complaint involves a condition of her employment which she deems unsatisfactory. SEAC argues to the contrary.

The employee complaint procedure allows "[a]ny regular employee [to] file a complaint if his status of employment is involuntarily changed or if he deems conditions of employment to be unsatisfactory." I.C. Sec. 4-15-2-35. Grenard contends the failure to have her prior work experience credited towards the minimum qualifications of positions for which she was applying constitutes a condition of employment which she deems unsatisfactory. Thus, according to Grenard, her complaint comes within the scope of the statutory complaint procedure and, having performed the requisite steps of that procedure, she is entitled to a hearing before the SEAC.

When construing legislation, this court must reasonably interpret the statutory language to determine the legislative intent and purpose. Frost v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, (1982) Ind.App., 432 N.E.2d 459; Skirvin v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division (1976), 171 Ind.App. 139, 355 N.E.2d 425. The statutory complaint procedure is part of the State Personnel Act (Act), Ind.Code Ann. Secs. 4-15-2-1 to 4-15-2-46 (Burns Repl.1982 & Supp.1985), a comprehensive enactment governing employees in State service. The initial section of the Act, I.C. Sec. 4-15-2-1, calls for liberal construction of the Act to effectuate its purposes "to increase governmental efficiency, to insure the appointment of qualified persons to the state service hereinafter defined solely on the basis of proved merit, to offer any person a fair and equal opportunity to enter such state service, and to afford the employees in such state service an opportunity for public service and individual advancement according to fair standards of accomplishment based upon merit principles." The personnel system established by the Act is based upon "merit and scientific methods relating to the appointment, compensation, promotion, transfer, layoff, removal and discipline of employees and to other incidents of state employment." Id.

Based upon the foregoing principles, and existing caselaw, we conclude the term "conditions of employment" includes any state, circumstance, situation, etc. the employee encounters in his employment that reasonably relates to the employment relationship or environment. Among other things, the term includes hours of employment, administration of employee benefits, rules which regulate the manner in which employees perform their work and the amount of work expected, holiday and vacation time, and sick leave. Thus, in State Employees' Appeals Commission v. Brown (1982), Ind.App. 436 N.E.2d 321, the trial court concluded the failure to include county welfare employees in medical and dental insurance programs offered to other State employees constituted an "unsatisfactory condition of employment." On appeal, this court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding the statutory complaint procedure is "broad enough to include the issue of insurance benefits." 436 N.E.2d at 334. In State v. Martin (1984), Ind.App., 460 N.E.2d 986, the court found an unsatisfactory condition of employment existed when six prison teachers were given fewer working hours than other teachers of the same status who were required to work longer hours for the same pay. Similarly, the court found the disparity in awarding back pay to some teachers and denying it to others created an unsatisfactory condition of employment. 460 N.E.2d at 991. See Indiana Veteran's Home v. Orr (1982), Ind.App., 439 N.E.2d 1374; Fromuth v. State ex rel. Indiana State Employees' Association (1977), 174 Ind.App. 280, 367 N.E.2d 29.

Grenard's employee complaint focuses on her determined ineligibility for consideration for promotion due to insufficient prior work experience. Promotion and advancement are commonly based upon enumerated criteria which include experience of a specified type for a specified duration. In that situation, an employees' opportunity to advance "according to fair standards of accomplishment based upon merit principles" is necessarily delayed or denied if the employee is wrongfully or arbitrarily denied credit for prior experience. ³ The determination whether an employee is or is not eligible for promotion and advancement based upon an experience criteria is at least a de facto categorization made by the employer and consequently is a circumstance, i.e., a condition, of the employee's present employment. Thus, the subject of Grenard's complaint constitutes a condition of employment which she deems unsatisfactory, and the trial court erred when it dismissed Grenard's action on the ground the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the SEAC did not have subject matter jurisdiction.

Next, Grenard contends the trial court erred in dismissing her action against SEAC on the theory she failed to name a necessary party. Conversely, SEAC argues Grenard's appointing authority, IESD, is a necessary party to her petition for review. SEAC focuses on the language in the Administrative Adjudication Act that "[a]ll persons who were parties to the hearing before the agency shall be made parties...