Grennier v. State

• Decision Date: 28 October 1975
• Docket Number: No. S,S
• Citation: Grennier v. State, 70 Wis.2d 204, 234 N.W.2d 316 (Wis. 1975)
• Parties: Richard Leroy GRENNIER, Plaintiff-in-Error, v. STATE of Wisconsin, Defendant-in-Error. tate 225.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 316

234 N.W.2d 316

70 Wis.2d 204

Richard Leroy GRENNIER, Plaintiff-in-Error, v.STATE of Wisconsin, Defendant-in-Error.

No. State 225.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Oct. 28, 1975.

Howard B. Eisenberg, State Public Defender, Alvin E. Whitaker, Asst. State Public Defender, Madison, for plaintiff-in-error.

Bronson C. LaFollette, Atty. Gen., David J. Becker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Madison, for defendant-in-error.

HEFFERNAN, Justice.

Grennier was found guilty by a jury of the first-degree murder of a teen-age girl.On this appeal he seeks a reversal of the judgment and of the order denying him postconviction relief.He bases his request for a new trial on the ground that the confession given at the Oak Creek Police Department should have been excluded from evidence because the Miranda admonitions given did not explicitly advise him of the right to counsel at state expense during the interrogation.He also claims that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct of the defendant caused the death of the victim, and that he was denied due process of law when the same jury sequentially determined that the defendant was guilty of the intentional acts charged and then determined that the defendant was criminally responsible for those acts.

Grennier also contends that there has been a miscarriage of justice and that a new trial should be ordered.

We conclude that each of these issues must be decided adversely to the defendant's contentions.The judgment and the order are affirmed.

The record shows that the defendant Grennier was apprehended by two Milwaukee policemen at the scene of a burglary on West Wisconsin Avenue.Immediately upon the apprehension of the defendant, Patrolman Kubacki informed him of his constitutional rights in accordance with Miranda.He was not interrogated at that point in respect to the burglary.However, en route to the city jail, Grennier spontaneously informed the police officers that he had killed a 'teenage chick' some time before and that the body had already been found.It is undisputed that this statement was completely volunteered.

The initial arrest took place at about 3:00 a.m. on the morning of January 23, 1973.At 6:50 a.m., Grennier was questioned at the Milwaukee Police Department after again being advised, correctly, of his rights under Miranda.A confession was then made admitting the burglary for which the defendant had been apprehended.

When the confession in respect to the burglary was completed, one of the police officers asked the defendant about the statement made in the squad car in respect to the killing of a girl.The police officer again informed the defendant of his rights under Miranda and asked him if he wished to make a statement about the girl's death.The defendant began to make a statement about the murder when the officer stopped him.Interrogation was interrupted for a few minutes so that Detective Ronald Mehl, who was more familiar with the murder case, could be present.

After Mehl arrived, the defendant was again fully advised of his rights under Miranda.Thereafter, the defendant made a lengthy and detailed verbal statement admitting the killing of a young girl in Oak Creek the previous June.This oral confession was completed at 10:20 a.m. on the morning of January 23, 1973.At 10:45 a.m., after once more being advised of his rights under Miranda, the defendant made a written statement regarding the burglary.

Because the murder occurred within the jurisdiction of the Oak Creek Police Department, the defendant was then taken to Oak Creek, where he was questioned by detectives of that department.He was there again advised of his rights--the state contends according to Miranda--and he then signed a waiver stating that he knew his rights and that he wished to proceed with the interrogation without the presence of a lawyer.

An oral confession was commenced by the defendant at 12:40 p.m.At that juncture, one of the Oak Creek policemen asked the defendant if he would permit a stenographic reporter to take down the statement.Grennier consented.Shortly before the stenographic confession was made, the defendant again was advised of his rights under the Oak Creek version of Miranda.He again made a detailed confession of the murder of the girl in Oak Creek.This confession was substantially a repetition of that given to the Milwaukee Police Department.

Prior to trial, the defendant's counsel asked that a Goodchild (State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis.2d 244, 133 N.W.2d 753) hearing be held to determine whether the confession was voluntary and whether the admonitions required by Miranda were properly given.The trial judge, following a hearing, wrote a lengthy and detailed memorandum opinion in which he found all the confessions, with the exception of one not involved in these proceedings, to be voluntary and in full compliance with the requirement of Goodchild and of Miranda.Thereafter, he made formal and detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law in which he concluded, on the basis of the record, that in respect to each of the confessions Grennier was:

'. . . properly and meaningfully advised, beyond a reasonable doubt, of his constitutional rights relating to his right to remain silent, his right to retain counsel and to have counsel present if he chooses to respond to the questions asked of him, his right to have counsel appointed for him if he be without funds, and his right to terminate the interviews at any time he chooses.'

The trial judge also concluded:

'That from the totality of circumstances all of such statements, interviews, confessions, written or oral, were made freely, voluntarily and understandingly by the defendant, without promise or coercion, are trustworthy in character and therefore are constitutionally antiseptic.'

On this appeal we review the findings and conclusions of the trial judge in light of the facts of record.We recently said in Blaszke v. State(1975), 69 Wis.2d 81, 86, 230 N.W.2d 133, 136:

'Under Wisconsin procedure, the burden is on the state to establish the voluntariness of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt.State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke(1965), 27 Wis.2d 244, 264, 133 N.W.2d 753.In State v. Carter(1966), 33 Wis.2d 80, 90, 91, 146 N.W.2d 466, we said, in respect to a Goodchild hearing held for the purpose of determining Miranda compliance, that this court on review would not upset a trial court determination unless it appeared that the findings made were against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.'

In conformance with that test, we conclude that each of the confessions was properly admissible.They were voluntarily made, and the state sustained its burden to show voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.

In respect to the confessions elicited by the Milwaukee Police Department, there was no contention that the Miranda warnings were inadequate.Rather, it is argued by Grennier that his mental and physical condition at the time of the confessions was such that they could not be voluntary.

In support of that position, Grennier points out that, during the interrogation process, he told his questioners that he needed help.Police Officer Domagalski testified that, at the outset of the interrogation, the defendant was disturbed.Early in the interrogation, the defendant's eyes were glassy and bloodshot, and on one occasion he said he was unable to write.

This court has repeatedly stated the standards that must be met to find a confession voluntary.We have said:

"The essential question, in determining the voluntariness of a confession, is whether the confession was coerced, or the product of improper pressures exercised by the police.To be admissible into evidence, a confession must be the voluntary product of a free and unconstrained will, reflecting deliberateness of choice."Pontow v. State(1973), 58 Wis.2d 135, 137, 205 N.W.2d 775, 776.

The determination that the confession is voluntary, rather than the result of coercion, must be reached under the 'totality of circumstances' standard.McAdoo v. State(1974), 65 Wis.2d 596, 223 N.W.2d 521;Blaszke v. State(1975), 69 Wis.2d 81, 230 N.W.2d 133.Under that 'totality of circumstances' test, we have said:

'Whether a confession is voluntary 'under all of the circumstances' and therefore in conformance with constitutional standards and safeguards calls for a very careful balancing of the personal characteristics of the confessor with the pressures to which he was subjected in order to induce his statements.'State v. Walace(1973), 59 Wis.2d 66, 81, 207 N.W.2d 855, 863.

In Wallace, the court went on to delineate a number of factors that should be considered in determining whether a confession is voluntary.

Wallace held that this court must consider the personal characteristics of the defendant, his age, his education and intelligence, his physical and emotional condition, and his prior experience with the police.Those characteristics are to be balanced against the police tactics and pressures that may have been used to induce the confession--such factors as the length and conditions of interrogation, the psychological and physical pressures, and the inducements, methods, and strategems which may have been used by the police.Under Wallace, it is relevant whether the confessant was unlawfully arrested and whether he was apprised of his right to counsel and his privilege against self incrimination.

The record shows that Grennier was twenty-four years old, had an eleventh grade education, but also the equivalent of a high school diploma.His IQ was rather high--119.He had had considerable prior experience with the police, having been arrested for battery, disorderly conduct, intoxication, and burglary.

There was evidence that at times the defendant seemed very nervous, but during most of the interrogations there was evidence that he appeared calm and collected.Although there was...