Grenon v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 7117.

• Decision Date: 02 July 1932
• Docket Number: No. 7117.,7117.
• Citation: 161 A. 229
• Parties: GRENON v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

161 A. 229

GRENON

v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

No. 7117.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 2, 1932.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; G. Frederick Frost, Judge.

Action of assumpsit by Alexis J. Grenon against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Directed verdict for defendant, and plaintiff brings exception.

Exception overruled, and case remitted for entry of judgment on verdict.

See, also, 161 A. 230.

Higgins & Yaraus, of Woonsocket, for plaintiff.

Tillinghast, Morrissey & Flynn, of Providence, for defendant.

STEARNS, C. J.

This is an action of assumpsit to recover disability benefits claimed to be due to plaintiff on two policies of insurance. In the superior court at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence the defendant rested its case and moved for the direction of a verdict. This motion was granted, and the case is in this court on plaintiff's exception to the direction of the verdict.

The facts are undisputed. On January 28, 1927, plaintiff, a resident of the city of Woonsocket, applied for and obtained from defendant two policies insuring his life; one in the amount of $15,000, the other in the amount of $10,000. Each policy contained a supplementary contract attached to and made a part of the life insurance policy, the relevant parts of which are as follows:

"Total and Permanent Disability. Waiver of Premiums and Payment of Monthly Income. Supplementary contract attached to and made part of Life Insurance Policy Numbered * * * issued on the life of Alexis J. Grenon, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. In consideration of * * * payable annually as an additional premium herefor. * * *

"The company agrees that upon receipt by the company at its home office in the City of New York of due proof, on forms which will be furnished by the company, on request that the insured has, while said policy and this supplementary contract are in full force and prior to the anniversary date of said policy nearest to the sixtieth birthday of the insured, become totally and permanently disabled, as the result of bodily injury or disease occurring and originating after the issuance of said policy, so as to be prevented thereby from engaging in any occupation and performing any work for compensation or profit, and that such disability has already continued uninterruptedly for a period of at least three months, it will, during the continuance of such disability:

"1. Waive the payment of each premuim falling due under said policy and this supplementary contract, and,

"2. Pay to the insured, or a person designated by him, * * * a monthly income of $10 for each $1000 of insurance. * * *

"Such waiver shall begin as of the anniversary of said policy next succeeding the date of the commencement of such disability, and such payments shall begin as of the date of the commencement of such disability, provided, however, that in no case shall such waiver begin as of any such anniversary occurring, nor shall such payments begin, as of a date, more than six months prior to the date of receipt of the required proof."

December 3, 1928, plaintiff became ill with neurasthenia. This illness continued until July 3, 1929, when plaintiff recovered. During this seven months' illness it is admitted that plaintiff was unable to work. In May, 1929, plaintiff filed with defendant a statement of his claim for total and permanent disability containing the required certificate of his physician. In this certificate it was stated that plaintiff was not confined to his house; that he spent his time in the fresh air was unable to work because of nervousness that his disability was not permanent; that he was much improved when last seen by the physician on April 15, 1929, and "prognosis is good."

Defendant refused to pay plaintiff's claim on the ground that the proof did not show total and permanent disability. This action was begun by writ of summons issued April 7, 1931.

The question...