Gresham v. Caruso

• Decision Date: 27 October 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:10-cv-196
• Parties: MICHAEL GRESHAM, Plaintiff, v. PATRICIA L. CARUSO, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

MICHAEL GRESHAM, Plaintiff,

v.PATRICIA L. CARUSO, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 2:10-cv-196

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION

Dated: October 27, 2011

Honorable Gordon J. Quist

OPINION

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis without payment of an initial partial filing fee. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. No. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff's action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Factual Allegations

Plaintiff Michael Gresham, an inmate at the Ionia Maximum Correctional Facility, filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants MDOC DirectorPatricia Caruso, the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), Mailroom Administrator J. Bolton, Mailroom Staff T. Dusseaut, Mailroom Business Office Staff T. Maynard, S. Paul, Resident Unit Manager Ben Mercier, Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor Chad A. Lancour¹ , Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor Mark Pokley, Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor Nicole Dahl, Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor Karen Gieson, Acting Inspector L. Marshall, Administrative Assistant Sarah Schroeder, James Alexander, Warden Robert Napel, Grievance Manager Richard Russell, Unknown Parties John and Jane Doe Defendants, Sergeant Unknown Makela, Sergeant Unknown Burnett, Sergeant Unknown Tasson, Resident Unit Manager Ken Niemisto, Inspector Shane Place, Sergeant Unknown Sunholm, Hearing Investigator Rick H. Mohr, Governor Granholm, Governor Snyder, Corrections Officer Unknown Kangas, Unknown Verville, Unknown Karki, Resident Unit Officer P. Lay, Resident Unit Officer Ron Segoi² , Hearing Officer Thomas O. Mohrman, Hearings Administrator Matthew D. Young, and Hearings Administrator Richard B. Stapleton.

In his amended complaint (docket #16), which is somewhat incoherent, Plaintiff fails to allege any specific facts with regard to the majority of the listed Defendants. Plaintiff asserts that on August 12, 2010, he received a false misconduct ticket from Defendant Kangas. Plaintiff states that this ticket was in retaliation for Plaintiff's prior conduct in filing grievances and lawsuits. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Mohr destroyed Plaintiff's statement, that Defendants Verville and Karki "harassed" him, and that Defendants Lay and Segoi refused to allow him to attend his hearing. Plaintiff was found guilty of the misconduct ticket by Defendant Mohrman on August 20, 2010, and his appeal was subsequently denied by Defendants Young and Stapleton.

In support of his complaint, Plaintiff attaches a copy of the misconduct hearing report for the misconduct he received on August 12, 2010. Plaintiff was charged with threatening behavior. In the Evidence/Statements section of the report, Defendant Mohrman notes:

Per [Resident Unit Officers] Sego and Lay, the prisoner when asked said he was not going to his hearing which I take as a refusal and hold this hearing without the prisoner present.

This hearing officer then read the misconduct; entered a not guilty and noted the prisoner was interviewed but declined to give a statement on the charge.

The prisoner had requested video but the video has no audio so would not tell me if the prisoner did or did not make the comment.

Defendant Mohrman found Plaintiff guilty of threatening behavior, stating:

The prisoner is guilty of the charge based upon the report which is logical and persuasive. The officer came to the prisoner's cell because he was yelling and had clothing and sheets on the bars. The prisoner got upset. The prisoner told the officer fuck you. He then threw an orange juice container at the officer. The act of throwing something at a statement member was done to make him believe he would be attacked and physically injured and abused.

As a result of his misconduct conviction, Plaintiff was sentenced to 30 days detention and 30 days loss of privileges. (See docket #16, attachment #1.)

Plaintiff claims that Defendants' conduct violated his right to be free from retaliation, as well as his due process rights. For relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as equitable relief.

Discussion

I. Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if "'it fails to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp.v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."). The court must determine whether the complaint contains "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a "'probability requirement,' . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not 'show[n]' - that the pleader is entitled to relief." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).

Initially, the court notes that Plaintiff has named the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) as a Defendant in this case. Plaintiff may not maintain a § 1983 action against the Michigan Department of Corrections. Regardless of the form of relief requested, the states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O'Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1993). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). In numerous unpublished opinions, the Sixth Circuit has specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., McCoy v. Michigan, 369 F. App'x 646, 653-54 (6th Cir. Mar. 12, 2010); Turnboe v. Stegall, No. 00-1182, 2000 WL1679478, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000). In addition, the State of Michigan (acting through the Michigan Department of Corrections) is not a "person" who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613 (2002) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)). Therefore, the Court dismisses the Michigan Department of Corrections.

As noted above, Defendant Mohrman was employed as a hearing officer during the pertinent time period. The Sixth Circuit, recognizing that a Michigan hearings officer has adjudicatory functions spelled out by statute in the nature of an administrative law judge, has held that hearings officers are entitled to absolute judicial immunity in relation to actions within the officer's authority. Shelly v. Johnson, 849 F.2d 228, 229 (6th Cir. 1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 791.251-255. See also Williams v. McGinnis, Nos. 02-1336, 02-1837, 2003 WL 245352, at *2 (6thCir. Jan. 31, 2003) (recognizing that Michigan's prison hearings officers are entitled to absolute immunity); Thompson v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., No. 01-1943, 2002 WL 22011, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 2, 2002) (same); Gribble v. Bass, No. 93-5413, 1993 WL 524022, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 16, 1993) (same). Plaintiff's action fails because Defendant Mohrman is absolutely immune under the circumstances of this case.

Much of Plaintiff's complaint is incoherent, conclusory and unsupported by specific factual allegations. Plaintiff makes generalized conclusory allegations regarding the failure of supervisors to take corrective action when notified of their subordinates'...