Gresham v. State, 84-305

Decision Date25 October 1985
Docket NumberNo. 84-305,84-305
Citation708 P.2d 49
PartiesWalter GRESHAM, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

Leonard D. Munker, Public Defender, and Martin J. McClain, Appellate Counsel, Wyoming Public Defender Program, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., and Thomas A. Maurer, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, Justice.

This appeal is from a judgment and sentence rendered after a jury trial in which appellant was found guilty of the crime of incest in violation of § 6-4-402, W.S.1977. The only issue on appeal is whether or not the trial court properly handled the voir dire process. Specifically, appellant contends that the court's questions and comments to the jurors during the voir dire prevented the selection of fair-minded jurors.

We affirm.

The jury consisted of twelve people and one alternate. Each side had eight peremptory challenges, and fifteen of the sixteen peremptory challenges were used. The appellant did not object at any time to the manner in which the voir dire was conducted or to the judge's rulings on challenges for cause. Appellant refers to the judge's questions and comments during the voir dire examination of five prospective jurors to sustain his contention that such prevented the selection of fair and impartial jurors. Four of these five were taken off the jury by peremptory challenges and the other was excused by the judge for cause. Only two of the five were challenged for cause, both times by the appellee and not the appellant.

Because of the nature of the issue here presented, and although quite lengthy, we set forth the questions and comments of the court in context which form the grounds for appellant's contention. Mr. Helling and Mr. Bath were the prosecuting attorneys and Mr. McKinney was defense counsel.

1. Prospective juror Sanchez said that he knew appellant as a neighbor.

"MR. HELLING: Do you think that would cause you to be biased one way or the other in this case?

"MR. SANCHEZ: I think it would, sir.

"MR. HELLING: Okay. Do you think it would be fairer, say, if you served on another jury in--where--

"MR. SANCHEZ: Yeah, I would rather serve on another jury.

"MR. HELLING: And you believe you are biased?

"MR. SANCHEZ: Yeah.

"MR. HELLING: Your Honor, I would move for Mr. Sanchez's exclusion at this time.

"THE COURT: Mr. Sanchez, just because you're his neighbor, does that mean you couldn't be fair?

"MR. SANCHEZ: I guess I could be. I guess I could be fair.

"THE COURT: You're to judge it on the evidence you hear in this courtroom, ignoring the fact that he's your neighbor. You're here to try to do justice, not to be for or against your neighbor.

"MR. SANCHEZ: Well, I'm not against him or for him.

"THE COURT: All right, then, do you think you could be fair?

"MR. SANCHEZ: Yes, I do.

* * *

* * *

"MR. MCKINNEY: * * * Mr. Sanchez, in response to a question asked of you by the Prosecutor, you indicated that you are a neighbor and you felt that might bother you. Now, my question goes to this extent. The panel in entirety has been asked if they know any of the facts of this case. But, I presume as a neighbor, that you have had the opportunity to view members of the Gresham family, being a neighbor. Now, do you, being a neighbor, feel that you can receive the evidence as presented from that chair, and not supply any evidence of your own observations? Do you feel that you can sit and not do that?

"MR. SANCHEZ: I think I could."

2. Prospective juror Renz said that he knew appellant and his brother "through work."

"MR. HELLING: Through work. Do you think that you could be fair and impartial?

"MR. RENZ: I don't know.

"MR. HELLING: You don't know? What problem would you have?

"MR. RENZ: That I know him would probably--along with his brother would probably have--I don't know.

"THE COURT: Mr. Renz, I'm going to ask you the same question I asked Mr. Sanchez. Just the fact that you know him, don't you think you could sit here and listen to the evidence in the case and decide it fairly? That's all we're asking you to do.

"MR. RENZ: Yeah, I probably could.

"THE COURT: All right.

* * *

* * *

"MR. HELLING: Is there anything else that anyone here feels that should be brought out at this time as to a reason why they would be unable to serve on the jury because of some type of physical problem or some type of bias that has not been inquired into at this point?

"MR. RENZ: I'm having one problem of hearing. I was hoping the sound would be better here than what it was back there. Some of your words are not clear, and even the Judge's words, I have a hard time making his out.

"MR. HELLING: Do you feel that there would be a good possibility that you might miss some of the testimony, then?

"MR. RENZ: I'm concerned about it, yes.

"MR. HELLING: Would you like to be excused at this time?

"MR. RENZ: Pardon me?

"MR. HELLING: Would you like to be excused as a result of your hearing?

"MR. RENZ: I think it would only be fair to everybody that I would be excused because of my hearing.

"THE COURT: You seem to be hearing okay to me, Mr. --

"MR. RENZ: Well, like I said, there are words that I think I hear right, then maybe I don't. Now, yes, I would like to serve on the jury.

"THE COURT: You may serve. I think you're hearing all right."

3. Prospective juror McGrew indicated that she was acquainted with Gordon Grant, a contemplated witness.

"MR. HELLING: And how do you know Mr. Grant?

"MRS. MCGREW: He's been a friend of ours through the church for years, and he worked with us through DPASS.

"MR. HELLING: Okay. If his name were to come up or if he were to eventually testify as a witness, would you be biased one way or another concerning his testimony?

"MRS. MCGREW: I'd tend to believe him, yes.

"MR. HELLING: Okay. Do you think that it would be fair for you to sit on this jury, if Mr. Grant did appear as a witness? Or do you think that you would be biased towards Mr. Grant?

"MRS. MCGREW: I probably would be biased towards him.

"THE COURT: Mrs. McGrew, Mr. Grant is not on trial; he's not the Plaintiff; he's just a witness. Don't you think you could listen to the witnesses fairly and impartially without favoring one witness over another?

"MRS. MCGREW: I probably could. I'd have to hear them.

"THE COURT: That's the whole idea. That's why you're here, to hear it.

"MRS. MCGREW: I just would believe Mr. Grant.

"THE COURT: No matter what he said, you'd believe him?

"MRS. MCGREW: No, because--

"THE COURT: All right. Now, wait a minute, that's the point I'm getting at. Supposing everything--the testimony of everybody else was just opposite to Mr. Grant's, would you still believe him?

"MRS. MCGREW: I don't know.

"THE COURT: Then you think you could be fair?

"MRS. MCGREW: Yes.

"THE COURT: And listen to the evidence?

"MRS. MCGREW: I believe so.

"THE COURT: All right.

* * *

* * *

"MR. HELLING: Is there anyone here that feels that they would not be able to sit fairly and impartially on an incest case? Yes, Mrs. McGraw?

"MRS. MCGREW: McGrew.

"MR. HELLING: McGrew, I'm sorry. Do you feel that you would be biased one way or the other?

"MRS. MCGREW: Yes, I do.

"THE COURT: Mrs. McGrew, the man is only charged with incest. They've got to prove he's guilty of it. Don't you think you could listen to the evidence and decide whether he's guilty or not? Is--the mere fact that a charge has been made doesn't mean anything. Do you understand that?

"MRS. MCGREW: I do.

"THE COURT: Well, don't you think you could sit and listen to the evidence?

"MRS. MCGREW: Yes, I could do that.

"THE COURT: All right.

* * *

* * *

"MR. MCKINNEY: * * * I notice, Mrs. McGrew, that you started to raise your hand concerning a question that Mr. Helling, the Prosecutor, had asked. But, apparently he didn't see you. I think it was a question pertaining to being a victim of a crime. And my question would be, simply, along the lines that the Court and Mr. Helling have asked. If you, or close friends, or family have been a victim of a crime, in your own personal opinion, do you feel that you can still--even though this is a criminal trial--receive the evidence from that chair and not be swayed by the fact that you or members of your family have suffered under a crime, not be swayed by that and still judge those facts impartially; do you feel that you can do that?

"MRS. MCGREW: Yes, I do."

4. The court did not question prospective juror Wilson or make any comment to him. The following was presented in appellant's brief to demonstrate "the participant's fear of angering the judge by contending that a juror might be biased." A comment characterized by appellee as "mere speculation."

"MR. HELLING: Mr. Wilson, you heard all the questions that were asked, have you?

"MR. WILSON: Yes.

"MR. HELLING: Did you know any of the people that were mentioned?

"MR. WILSON: No.

"MR. HELLING: I note on your questionnaire that you thought that you might not be able to serve because your job is too confining?

"MR. WILSON: Yes, it is.

"MR. HELLING: Could you explain that?

"MR. WILSON: I'm on call twenty-four hours a day, and any time I got a rig having any problems I've got to be there.

"MR. HELLING: Okay. Would that have any affect on your ability to be fair and impartial?

"MR. WILSON: Well, no, but I just--I'm awful busy.

"MR. HELLING: Would it have an affect on your ability to pay attention?

"MR. WILSON: Oh, no.

"MR. HELLING: I also note on your questionnaire, I believe you indicated that you had some type of prejudice.

"MR. WILSON: Yes, sir, I do.

"MR. HELLING: Could I ask what that prejudice is?

"MR. WILSON: Well-- "MR. HELLING: Okay, I'll withdraw that. I'll just ask if your prejudice would have any effect on this case or your ability to--

"MR. WILSON: It probably wouldn't, no.

"MR. HELLING: Your Honor, I pass this juror for cause.

"MR. MCKINNEY: Mr. Wilson, you've been...

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