Grether v. Indiana State Bd. of Dental Examiners

• Decision Date: 10 June 1959
• Docket Number: No. 29706,29706
• Citation: 239 Ind. 619,159 N.E.2d 131
• Parties: James Craig GRETHER, Appellant, v. INDIANA STATE BOARD OF DENTAL EXAMINERS, Lovenia P. Darnell, Nana Riley, Appellees.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 131

159 N.E.2d 131

239 Ind. 619

James Craig GRETHER, Appellant, v. INDIANA STATE BOARD OF DENTAL EXAMINERS, Lovenia P. Darnell, Nana Riley, Appellees.

No. 29706.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

June 10, 1959.

Rehearing Denied June 30, 1959.

Milford M. Miller, William C. Welborn, Evansville, for appellant.

Edwin K. Steers, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Webber, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees.

LANDIS, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Vanderburgh Circuit Court affirming an order of the appellee State Board of Dental Examiners which had revoked appellant's license to practice dentistry in the State of Indiana.

The first contention we shall consider on this appeal is appellant's contention that the court erred in its conclusion of law number three that all the procedural requirements of the Administration Adjudication Act ¹ have been fully complied with by appellee, Indiana State Board of Dental Examiners, in such revocation proceedings.

Appellant's contention in substance is that under such statute he was entitled to at least 15 days' notice of such hearing before appellee board but that the notice was served on him only 14 days prior to such hearing contrary to § 25 of such act (Burns' § 63-3025, 1951 Replacement, being Acts 1947, ch. 365, § 25, p. 1451). Appellant had previously raised this question by filing a motion to quash with appellee board under a special appearance but such motion was overruled. Section 25 of the act relied on by appellant is as follows:

'In matters where no order or determination can be made requiring a person to do or refrain from doing an act including, but not in limitation thereof, the issuance of licenses, assessment or determination of taxes or other liability, or the determination of status any agency may notify the person or persons who will be affected by any initial determination by such agency by registered letter, return receipt requested, or in person, that as a result of an investigation made by such agency a certain determination is recommended, and on the expiration of a time fixed but not less than fifteen days, such determination will be made unless objections are filed within said time. * * *.' (Emphasis added.)

Appellee concedes appellant was not given such 15 day notice but contends the 15 day provision above cited does not here apply and urges that the 14 day notice was sufficient under § 6 of the act (Burns' § 63-3006, 1951 Replacement, 1957 Cum.Supp.) which is as follows:

'In all cases in which the agency is the moving party it shall give at least five days notice in writing, by registered or certified mail with return receipt requested, addressed to the person or persons against whom an order or determination may be made at their last known place of residence, or place of business, which notice shall set forth therein a sufficient statement of the matters of fact or law to advise such person of the matters in issue and to be heard or determined by said agency, together with notice of the time and place of such hearing. Said statement may be informal and need not conform to the requirements of a pleading in court. Whenever the hearing involves the claim, averment or complaint of, or is made by, a private person, a copy or the substance thereof shall be included in or exhibited with such notice.' (Emphasis added.) Acts 1947, ch. 365, § 6, p. 1451; Acts 1957, ch. 355, § 2, p. 1033.

We are thus confronted with the question as to which of such sections of the Administration Adjudication Act governs a proceeding to revoke a license to practice dentistry. Our problem in construing the act is not simplified by the vague and irrelevant language of the act which is due to poor legislative draftsmanship and the attempt to have the act applicable to numerous administrative bodies and proceedings not here involved.

Our examination of the two sections above quoted further reveals that the five day statute is applicable to cases '* * * in which the agency is the moving party * * * ' whereas the...