Grewen v. Colvin, 1:11-CV-829 (FJS)

• Decision Date: 27 March 2014
• Docket Number: 1:11-CV-829 (FJS)
• Parties: BETTY JO GREWEN, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

BETTY JO GREWEN, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN,Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

1:11-CV-829 (FJS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Dated: March 27, 2014

APPEARANCES

LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF

NORTHEASTERN NEW YORK

Attorneys for Plaintiff

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

OFFICE OF REGIONAL GENERAL

COUNSEL - REGION II

Attorneys for Defendant

OF COUNSEL

MARY MARTHA WITHINGTON, ESQ.

ANDREEA L. LECHLEITNER, ESQ.

SCULLIN, Senior Judge

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Currently before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings. See Dkt. Nos. 12-13.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed an application for Supplemental Security Income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act and was given a protective filing date of October 17, 2007. See Dkt. No. 9, Administrative Record ("AR") at 14, 52, 127-33, 141, 184, 218. Plaintiff also filed an application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act and was given a protective filing date of November 13, 2007. See id. at 14, 53, 124-26. The Social Security Administration denied these applications by Notice of Disapproved Claim dated February 27, 2008. See id. at 55-60. On March 17, 2008, Plaintiff filed a timely request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") to challenge the denial. See id. at 61.

On March 17, 2010, Plaintiff had a hearing before ALJ Robert Ringler in Albany, New York. See id. at 14, 23, 25, 112-23. By decision dated March 26, 2010, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's applications for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and Supplemental Security Income benefits. See id. at 11-22. In reaching his decision, the ALJ made the following findings:

1. Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2011.

2. Plaintiff had engaged in substantial gainful activity at certain times since May 27, 2007, the alleged onset date.

3. Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: vertigo, obesity, headaches, and diplopia.

4. Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

5. Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform

medium work as defined by 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(c), 416.967(c), but, due to infrequent episodes of dizziness, she would be unable to drive or work around heights or heavy machinery. In addition, she could not perform employment activities requiring strong visual acuity.

6. Plaintiff was capable of performing past relevant work as a retail sales/clerk because this work did not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by her RFC.

Based on these findings, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from May 27, 2007, through the date of the ALJ's decision, March 26, 2010.

By letter dated May 18, 2010, Plaintiff made a timely request, by certified mail, to the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration to review the ALJ's decision. See AR at 8-10. By Notice of Appeals Council Action dated May 12, 2011, which Plaintiff's counsel received on May 19, 2011, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. See id. at 1-5. In support of her appeal, Plaintiff submitted additional treatment records that she obtained from Neurological and Stroke Care covering office visits between December 2, 2009, and April 2, 2010. See id. at 2, 450-73. The Appeals Council considered relevant evidence through the date of the ALJ hearing, March 26, 2010. See id. at 2. However, information after the ALJ's decision did not affect the Appeals Council's decision regarding whether Plaintiff was disabled beginning on or before March 26, 2010. See id.

Having exhausted her administrative remedies, Plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 1383(c)(3), seeking review of Defendant's final decision. In support of her motion for judgment on the pleadings, Plaintiff argued that the ALJ erred in assessing her credibility and in finding that she could return to her past relevant work as a retail/sales clerk.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of review

1. Correct legal principles and substantial evidence

A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo whether an individual is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Wagner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). In reviewing an ALJ's decision, the court employs a two-prong test. First, the court must decide if the ALJ applied the correct legal principles. See Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979) (citations omitted); Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation and other citation omitted).

The court must determine whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards because

[w]here there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether the ALJ applied correct legal principles, application of the substantial evidence standard to uphold a finding of no disability creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived of the right to have her disability determination made according to the correct legal principles.

Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1987).

Accordingly, the court will not uphold an ALJ's decision if it is based on an erroneous view of the law. See Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1983).

If the court determines that the ALJ applied the correct legal principles, the court must then decide whether "substantial evidence" supports the ALJ's findings. See Johnson, 817 F.2d at 985 (citation omitted); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). "Substantial evidence" is evidence that amounts to "'more than a mere scintilla,'" defined as "'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Richardson,402 U.S. at 401 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 217, 83 L. Ed. 126 (1938)). Where evidence is deemed susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the court must uphold the ALJ's conclusion. See Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). If there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's findings, the court must sustain those findings "even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff's position and despite that the court's independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner's]." Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citations omitted); see also Schauer v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). In other words, the court must afford the ALJ's determination considerable deference and may not substitute "its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner], even if it might justifiably have reached a different result upon a de novo review." Valente v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).

2. Five-step determination of disability

To be eligible for benefits, a claimant must show that he suffers from a disability within the meaning of the Act. The Act defines "disability" as an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). In addition, a claimant's

[p]hysical or mental impairment or impairments [must be] of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which existsin the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. . . .

42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B).

In evaluating disability claims, the ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process:

First, the [ALJ] considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is not, the [ALJ] next considers whether the claimant has a "severe impairment" which significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the claimant has such an impairment, the [ALJ] will consider him disabled without considering vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience[.] . . . Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth inquiry is whether despite the claimant's severe impairment, he has the residual functional capacity to perform his past work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his past work, the [ALJ] then determines whether there is other work which the claimant could perform.

Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. "[T]he claimant bears the burden of proving disability at the first four steps." Berry, 675 F.2d at 467. If the claimant meets her burden, then the Commissioner has the burden of proof at the fifth step. See id.

B. Whether the ALJ erred in assessing Plaintiff's credibility

It is the function of the ALJ, and not the court, "to resolve evidentiary conflicts and to appraise the credibility of witnesses, including the claimant." Carroll v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 705 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 399, 91 S. Ct. at 1426) (other citations omitted). Although the ALJ need not resolve...