Grey v. Allstate

• Decision Date: 09 April 2001
• Docket Number: No. 81,81
• Citation: Grey v. Allstate, 363 Md. 445, 769 A.2d 891 (Md. 2001)
• Parties: Bobbett GREY, et al. v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

769 A.2d 891

363 Md. 445

Bobbett GREY, et al. v.ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.

No. 81, Sept. Term, 2000.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

April 9, 2001.

Richard K. Green(Peter A. Greenburg and Eric M. Dickman of Greenburg, Spence & Green, L.L.C., on brief), Rockville, for appellants.

Laura L. Greeves(Sussman & Simcox, Chartered, on brief), College Park, for appellees.

Argued before BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL and BATTAGLIA, JJ WILNER, Judge.

On the evening of September 11, 1997, Jumanne Smith, while intoxicated, was driving his Jeep Cherokee in the wrong direction on a highway ramp at a high rate of speed, when he collided with another vehicle occupied by Bobbett Grey, her mother, Delores Grey, and her nephew, Jordan Ashley.Delores was killed; Bobbett and Jordan were seriously injured.As a result of the incident, Smith was charged with a number of criminal offenses.In October, 1998, he entered into a plea agreement with the State, pursuant to which he pled guilty to manslaughter by automobile (Maryland Code, Article 27, § 388) and agreed to pay an aggregate of $85,000 in restitution—$40,000 to Bobbett, $25,000 to Jordan, and $20,000 to Delores's estate.Neither the text of the plea agreement nor information regarding whether any other punishment was imposed appears in the record before us.

In accordance with the plea agreement, the court, on January 7, 1999, entered an Order of Restitution.In that order, the court found that Bobbett, Jordan, and Delores's estate, appellants here, were entitled to restitution under Maryland Code, Article 27, § 807, and it ordered restitution in the amounts noted, with $15,000 of the $40,000 payable to Bobbett to be paid immediately.The court also ordered the clerk to record and index the order of restitution as a money judgment.That, apparently, was done.Smith paid the $15,000 as directed.Through wage garnishments, appellants have collected an additional $4,614.At some point, appellants filed a civil action against Smith in the Circuit Court for Howard County.The pleadings in that case are not in the record before us; we are informed only that the case has yet to be tried and is still pending.

At the time of the accident, Smith had in effect an automobile liability insurance policy issued by appellee, Allstate Insurance Company, with policy limits for personal injury of $20,000 per person and $40,000 aggregate and $10,000 for property damage.The case now before us arises from appellants' attempt to attach the proceeds of the insurance policy in partial satisfaction of the restitution order.

Shortly after entry of that order, appellants filed in the Circuit Court for Howard County writs of garnishment against Allstate, directing it to "hold the property of [Smith] subject to further proceedings."Allstate responded that it was not in possession of any property of Smith and was not currently indebted to Smith.Through a reply to that answer, appellants averred that the restitution judgment was "for compensatory damages arising out of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle," that Smith was insured by Allstate, that it therefore had a contractual obligation to pay Smith the judgment for compensatory damages, and that that obligation constituted "property, money or credit of the Judgment Debtor which is subject to garnishment."With the issue thus joined, both sides filed motions for summary judgment.In February, 2000, the court denied appellants' motions, granted that of Allstate, and entered judgment in favor of Allstate.Appellants appealed, and we granted certiorari, on our own initiative, before decision by the Court of Special Appeals, to determine whether a garnishment action by appellants lies against Allstate under the circumstances of this case.

DISCUSSION

The law governing the ordering of restitution in a criminal case is set forth in Article 27, § 807.That section is a long and detailed one and is not free from some ambiguity with respect to the issue before us.¹Appellants look, in particular, to subsections (f) and (g) of the statute.The latter requires, in relevant part, that a judgment of restitution entered by a circuit court be recorded and indexed in the civil judgment index as a money judgment.Subsection (f) provides that, when the judgment is so recorded and indexed, it constitutes a money judgment in favor of the individual and may be enforced by the individual in the same manner as a money judgment in a civil action.Thus, appellants argue, when the order of restitution in this case was docketed as a money judgment on January 21, 1999, it became no different than any other money judgment so recorded.It established an amount that Smith was legally obligated to pay and, accordingly, triggered Allstate's contractual obligation to pay that amount to Smith.That obligation, they urge, became property of Smith in the hands of Allstate and was therefore subject to garnishment.

Allstate, of course, has a different view.It notes, first, that, by filing the separate civil action, in which damages far exceeding $85,000 are sought, appellants have recognized that the order of restitution is not a "bonafide civil judgment" against Smith.Additionally, it argues that, if the order of restitution really carried the same weight as a normal civil judgment, Smith would be denied his right of civil jury trial on the issues of liability and damages and Allstate would be denied its right to compromise and settle the case.Finally, it contends that appellants have no standing, in any event, to garnish the policy proceeds, as Smith, himself, presently has no right to sue on the policy.

For the reasons to be explained, we agree with the ultimate position of Allstate.Appellants' argument, focused, as we have said, on § 807(f) and (g), overlooks other provisions of § 807 that must be read together with subsections (f) and (g) in the context of the overall purpose of restitution, and overlooks as well the nature of the restitution judgment and of Allstate's rights and obligations under its policy.

It is important, in any analysis of § 807, to keep in mind that restitution under that statute is a criminal sanction, not a civil remedy.That is clear from both the statute itself and from the more recent historical development of restitution generally.The order of restitution, even when entered as a civil judgment, concludes only the matters that were raised or that could have been raised, in the criminal proceeding.Although it may be enforced in the manner that a civil judgment may be enforced, it does not, and cannot, establish civil liability for anything beyond the matters it concludes.

Restitution as a means of penance for criminal behavior has its roots in ancient societies.Stephen Schafer writes that "[t]he basis of primitive and early Western law was personal reparation by the offender or the offender's family to the victim."STEPHEN SCHAFER, THE VICTIM AND HIS CRIMINAL 8(1968).²Provisions for restitution appear in the earliest recorded codes.³In the Code of Hammurabi, written about 1800 B.C., and in the Book of Exodus, recording events 600 years later, are requirements for restitution for what we now regard as criminal conduct, mixed among the capital and corporal penalties.⁴Schafer notes that, in some ancient societies, "[f]or injuries both to person and property, restitution or reparation in some form was the chief and often the only element of punishment."Id. at 12.

Through these various codes, restitution was offered as the more civilized alternative to private retribution.The State, as such, had not yet arrogated to itself the role of punishing conduct that injured only other individuals and not the community as a whole, and the "payback" for such injurious conduct was private retribution, either by the injured person or his or her family or clan—the "blood feud."Through restitution, the offender could avoid retribution to himself or his family by providing compensation to the victim or the victim's family.In the Twelve Tables, for example— the earliest codification of Roman law (c. 450 B.C.)—it is provided that, "[i]f one has maimed a limb and does not compromise with the injured person, let there be retaliation."Table VIII.

The requirement of restitution for injuries to both property and person continued into later Roman times under the Lex Aquilia and through the time of Justinian in the Sixth Century.See THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, Book IV, Title III, J.B. Moyle(5th ed.1913).It carried over as well into Anglo Saxon England.One of the earliest surviving documents written in the English language, the Dooms (Laws) of Aethelberht, King of Kent from 560-616 A.D., deals almost entirely with the monetary compensation to be paid for various offenses, as do the Dooms of Kings Hlothhaere and Eadric (673 686) and the Dooms of King Alfred (871-901).MEDIEVAL SOURCEBOOK: THE ANGLO-SAXON DOOMS, 560-975, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/560-975dooms.html. Schafer notes that, by the time of Alfred, "the feud was resorted to only after compensation had been requested and refused."SCHAFER, supra, at 16.

Until the late Middle Ages, there was no clear distinction between criminal and civil law, and the restitution provided for in the various codes was regarded more as recompense for the damage or injury inflicted on the victim than as punishment for an offense against the State or the Sovereign.In England and elsewhere, that began to change, as the kings increasingly extended their authority over public order.Even under Anglo Saxon law, before the Norman invasion, there developed a distinction between public offenses and private wrongs, as certain kinds of disruptive and injurious behavior came to be regarded as offenses against "the king's peace."A breach of the king's peace, record Pollock and Maitland, "was an act of personal disobedience, and a much graver matter than an ordinary...