Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court In and For Merced County
Court | United States State Supreme Court (California) |
Citation | 15 Cal.Rptr. 90,56 Cal.2d 355 |
Decision Date | 03 August 1961 |
Parties | , 364 P.2d 266 GREYHOUND CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF MERCED, Respondent; Earline Z. Clay et al., Real Parties in Interest. Sac. 7274. |
Carroll, Davis, Burdick & McDonough and Richard B. McDonough, San Francisco, for petitioner.
No appearance for respondent.
T. N. Petersen, Merced, for real parties in interest.
In this proceeding an alternative writ of prohibition was granted for the purpose of reviewing an order of discovery made by respondent court in a pending action in which petitioner is the defendant and Earline Z. Clay and Leslie Randolph Clay (the real parties in interest) are the plaintiffs. The order was made pursuant to plaintiffs' motion for an order requiring defendant to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing of certain described documents. The motion was predicated upon section 2031 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is a portion of the discovery act enacted in 1957 (Stats. 1957, chap. 1904). There are also pending five other cases involving various facets of the discovery act (Carlson v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.Rptr. 132; West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.Rptr. 119; Steele v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.Rptr. 116; Filipoff v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.Rptr. 139; Cembrook v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.Rptr. 127). Although each of the six cases presents its own particular issues, there are certain general contentions that are common to all. For convenience, we will discuss those general considerations in this opinion, thus preventing unnecessary repetition.
The general problems running through all of the cases are six in number. They can be listed as follows:
1. What discretion is vested in the trial court in discovery matters, and to what extent are the appellate courts bound by the exercise thereof? 1
2. What showing is necessary to support. an order granting discovery?
3. Need discoverable material be such as will be admissible in evidence at the trial of the action?
4. Are the discovery statutes unconstitutional because they permit unreasonable searches and seizures?
5. What is the nature and extent of the attorney-client privilege protected from discovery under the act?
6. To what extent, if any, should discovery be allowed when a party seeks material which is peculiarly the work product of his adversary or the adversary's attorney?
Before specific answers can be given to these questions the act must be examined in its entirety to ascertain, if possible, its general purpose and intent.
In the instant case, the order involved was entered pursuant to the provisions of subdivision (a) of section 2031 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It reads as follows:
Subdivision (b) of section 2016, incorporated by reference in the foregoing quotation, reads as follows:
Subdivision (b)(1) of section 2019, also incorporated by reference in section 2031 via its inclusion in section 2016, reads as follows:
These sections comprise the statutory provisions governing inspection of documents and other objects (both real and personal) in the possession or control of the adversary party litigant. By the enactment of such provisions the Legislature made certain changes in the rules existing under the predecessor statute (Code Civ.Proc. § 1000) which governed inspection prior to 1958. It also incorporated certain procedures, already adopted and tested in the federal courts and in the judicial system of several states. The fundamental purpose of those enactments was to expedite the trial of civil matters by allowing litigants an adequate means of discovery during the period of preparation for trial. (Report of Committee on Administration of Justice of The State Bar of California, reprinted in Journal of The State Bar of California, vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 204 et seq., and in 1 DeMeo, California Deposition and Discovery Practice, p. 2 et seq.) To accomplish this purpose the Legislature not only enacted the three code sections avove quoted, but also enacted an entire article providing for various discovery procedures. In order to interpret any one section it is necessary to consider the entire article. Only in this fashion can the general legislative intent be ascertained.
It should first be noted that the Legislature repealed the then existing statutes on discovery, and retained only such elements of the prior system as were re-enacted in the new article. The new system differs fundamentally from the old.
A summary of the new system, together with its more important changes, is as follows:
By section 2016 it was provided that a litigant might take the deposition of 'any person, including a party * * * for the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence in the action or for both purposes.' This provision greatly enlarged the prior right to take depositions which, insofar as a nonparty witness was concerned, was limited to situations wherein the circumstances indicated a danger that the witness whose testimony was required would not be available at the time of trial (prior Code Civ.Proc., § 2021; see analysis in 15 Cal.Jur.2d 690). Thus, with the exception of the deposition of a party or his agent or employee, depositions previously were provided for the sole purpose of obtaining testimony to be used at the trial. The new rules specifically provide that the procedure be utilized also for the purpose of discovering facts, without any thought of producing those facts at trial.
Subdivision (b) of the same section (quoted above) also enlarged upon the scope of the examination allowed, by providing that the deponent might be examined on any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action (as distinct from the previous rule that questions on deposition might be successfully objected to under those rules of evidence which prevail at trial; i. e., competency, materiality or relevancy to an issue involved in the trial). 2 The same language is incorporated by specific reference into the provisions for other types of discovery,...
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...Although the weight of authority generally requires strict construction of evidentiary privileges (Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 396, 15 Cal.Rptr. 90, 364 P.2d 266), this district has held the basic policy supports a liberal construction in favor of the exercise of......
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