Greyhound Corporation v. Boire, Civ. No. 4414.

• Court: United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Southern District of Florida
• Writing for the Court: LIEB
• Citation: 205 F. Supp. 686
• Parties: The GREYHOUND CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff, v. Harold A. BOIRE, as Regional Director, Twelfth Region, National Labor Relations Board, Defendant.
• Decision Date: 11 June 1962
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 4414.

205 F. Supp. 686

The GREYHOUND CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff,
v.
Harold A. BOIRE, as Regional Director, Twelfth Region, National Labor Relations Board, Defendant.

Civ. No. 4414.

United States District Court S. D. Florida, Tampa Division.

June 11, 1962.

205 F. Supp. 687

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

205 F. Supp. 688

Warren E. Hall, Jr., Chesterfield H. Smith, Wofford H. Stidham, Bartow, Fla., for plaintiff

Martin Sacks, N. L. R. B., Tampa, Fla., for defendant.

LIEB, District Judge.

This cause came on to be heard upon the plaintiff's Prayer for Preliminary Injunction, said hearing having been provided in the Court's Temporary Restraining Order and Order Setting Hearing for Preliminary Injunction entered May 24, 1962. Prior to the hearing, the defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss and, in the alternative, a Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff presented its Complaint and exhibits attached thereto, together with an affidavit of an officer of Floors, Inc., of Florida, and an affidavit of the regional manager of plaintiff, the latter affidavit, in part, swearing to the allegations of the Complaint. No affidavits were presented on behalf of the defendant nor were any sworn pleadings filed on behalf of said defendant.

After considering the matters hereinabove referred to and hearing argument of counsel for the respective parties, the Court is of the opinion that there are no material issues of fact, and the issues of law as resolved herein make it unnecessary and undesirable for the Court to issue a temporary injunction but that a permanent injunction is warranted by the findings hereinafter set forth.

The plaintiff contends that a Decision and Direction of Election of the National Labor Relations Board in that Board's case No. 12-RC-1209, issuing certain directions to the defendant herein, is contrary to the express provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., and is beyond the statutory powers vested in the National Labor Relations Board. This contention is predicated upon the fact that in said Decision and Direction of Election, the Board found that a corporate entity other than plaintiff, viz., Floors, Inc., of Florida, hires, pays, disciplines, transfers, promotes and discharges the porters, janitors and maids who are alleged to constitute an appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining; but nevertheless also found that the said Floors, Inc., and the plaintiff, were joint employers of the employees in the said unit. The findings of the Board, allegedly in support of a joint employer relationship, are that the plaintiff's terminal managers confer with Floors' supervisors in setting up work schedules and in determining the number of employees required to meet those schedules; that Floors' supervisors may visit the plaintiff's terminals on an irregular basis, and on occasion may not appear for as much as two days at a time; that the employees receive work instructions from plaintiff's terminal officials; and that on one occasion the plaintiff prompted the discharge of a porter whom it felt to be an unsatisfactory employee. The Court is of the opinion that the findings of the Board, as recited, are, as a matter of law, insufficient to create a joint employer relationship with respect to the employees in said unit; but that,

205 F. Supp. 689

on the contrary, said findings establish as a matter of law that Floors, Inc., is an independent contractor and, for the purposes of collective bargaining, its employees are not the employees of the plaintiff. The Court is therefore of the opinion and finds that with regard to representation proceedings the Board is prohibited by the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, from conducting a representation election wherein the plaintiff is a party-employer with regard to persons who, under the Act, are not its employees. The Court finds that Section 9 of the Act expressly contemplates representation proceedings only as regards the employer of the employees comprising the unit found to be appropriate by the Board. The Court further finds that by virtue of Section 2 (3) of the Act, any individual having the status of an independent contractor is expressly excluded from the term "employee", as defined in that Act. As a matter of law, the employees of an independent contractor do not stand in the relationship of employer-employee with regard to the principal who employs the independent contractor for the purpose of Section 9 of the Act, unless the facts involve an alter ego situation, that is where one employer is in fact the alter ego of another employer, which is clearly not the case in this instance. To follow a contrary interpretation of the Act would be patently absurd. One can readily see that the prime object of the compulsory bargaining feature of the Act is to bargain on wages and working conditions. It is impossible to comprehend how an employer could bargain in good faith about wages with employees who are not paid by said employer and over whom the said employer cannot exercise the power of hiring or firing

The Court further finds that this case is controlled by the decision of the Supreme Court...