Greyhound Corporation v. Sparks
Citation | 283 F.2d 44 |
Decision Date | 03 October 1960 |
Docket Number | No. 18037.,18037. |
Parties | GREYHOUND CORPORATION, Appellant, v. Howard SPARKS, Administrator, Appellee. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit) |
A. Longstreet Heiskell, Memphis, Tenn., Sam Lumpkin, Tupelo, Miss., Shepherd, Heiskell, Williams, Beal & Wall, Memphis, Tenn., Lumpkin, Holland & Ray, Tupelo, Miss., of counsel, for appellant.
Floyd W. Cunningham, Booneville, Miss., Cunningham & Cunningham, Booneville, Miss., of counsel, for appellee.
Before RIVES, Chief Judge, and JONES and WISDOM, Circuit Judges.
At about 6:30 o'clock on Sunday evening, August 3, 1958, Johnny A. Sparks and his friend and kinsman, Charles Dickinson, were killed in an intersection collision between an automobile occupied by Sparks and Dickinson and a bus operated by appellant. The intersection is in a rural section of northwest Alabama. The bus was en route from Birmingham, Alabama, to Memphis, Tennessee, and was proceeding west over U. S. Highway 78.1 The automobile was northbound on Alabama Highway 19. After a full opinion setting forth in detail its findings of fact and conclusions of law,2 the district court entered judgment against the appellant for the wrongful death of Sparks in the amount of $20,000.00. We hold that the district court erred in arriving at the ultimate question of proximate cause through an erroneous process of legal reasoning or a misinterpretation of the legal significance of the evidentiary facts.3
Visibility at the intersection was thus described in the opinion of the district court:
Negligence on the part of Dickinson, whom the district court found to be the driver of the automobile, was described in the opinion as follows:
The district court found that the driver of the bus was also negligent, and that his negligence was a concurring proximate cause of the death of Sparks, as follows:
Assuming to be true all of the district court's findings of evidentiary fact, it affirmatively appears that the sole proximate cause of Sparks' death was the negligence of the driver of the automobile. Our reasons for that conclusion will be stated at length.
The speed limit both for the bus and for the automobile, while traveling along the respective highways prior to the immediate vicinity of the intersection, was sixty miles per hour.4 At the intersection, the driver of the automobile was under a legal duty to stop and to yield the right of way to the bus.5
We do not agree with the district court that the driver of the bus may have forfeited this right of way. The driver of a vehicle traveling at an unlawful speed forfeits any right of way which he might otherwise have as being the driver of the vehicle on the right,6 but there is no similar provision for the forfeiture of the right of way possessed by the driver of a vehicle on a main traveled or through highway.
Again, we do not agree with the district court that Sec. 5, Tit. 36, Code of Alabama 1940,7 may have required a greatly reduced speed for the bus in approaching and entering this intersection. We have been cited to and have found no case applying the pertinent part of that section to a through highway, before entering which drivers of vehicles are required to come to a full stop.8 Instead, we think that the officials of the State of Alabama acted within their lawful authority in establishing a speed zone on U. S. Highway 78 for the approach and entry to this intersection of forty miles per hour and in so posting the highway.9
For a third time, we disagree with the district court on the law. In our opinion, the bus driver was not bound to sound his horn to give warning of the approach of his vehicle.10 Those of us who have been so fortunate as to have lived thus far throughout the motor age have witnessed a marked reduction in the use of automobile horns. Section 6265 of the 1923 Code of Alabama was aptly described in Bradford v. Carson, 1931, 223 Ala. 594, 137 So. 426, 427, 429, as requiring "that upon approaching a curve or a corner in a highway where the operator's view is obstructed, he shall slow down and give a timely signal with his bell, horn, or other device for signalling." That section was superseded by Title 36, Sec. 17 of the 1940 Code of Alabama, which limits the statutory requirement for "a clearly audible signal by sounding the horn" to backing and to instances where a pedestrian may be affected by starting, stopping or turning. There is no existing statute requiring the bus driver to sound a horn on approaching this intersection. "In the absence of statute, the duty of sounding the horn is only a part of the broader duty of reasonable care, and there is no need to sound the horn, unless a reasonably careful and prudent person would have done so." 2 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice (Perm. ed.), Sec. 1041, p. 375.11
The driver of the bus was under no legal duty to anticipate that an automobile would violate the law and without stopping enter the main traveled or through highway on which the bus was traveling.12 No such danger could be reasonably foreseen and, as a matter of law, common prudence did not require the bus driver to sound his horn.13
The three legal principles thus envisaged by the district court, if correct and applicable, would require all motorists on a through highway to slow down to fifteen miles per hour when approaching a blind intersection and to sound their horns. Motorists who do not happen to be familiar with local conditions cannot tell whether they are approaching a blind intersection until they are practically on it. Application of any such rules of the road would be impossible without unreasonably delaying traffic and causing a bedlam of noise. The rules thus assumed by the district court would, in practically every collision case at a blind intersection of a through highway, place the responsibility on the motorist who was proceeding on the through highway.
It seems to us that these erroneous conceptions of law obscured the thinking of the district court. When they are corrected, it becomes obvious, and capable of almost mathematical demonstration, that the sole proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of the driver of the automobile.
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